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Abstract 
Using theoretical perspectives drawn from critical discourse analysis (CDA) and visual 
rhetoric, this study examines how the symbolic meaning of two structures, Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the Israeli Anti-Terrorism Fence/Palestinian Apartheid wall, are 
constructed in discourse. Many of the visual rhetorics associated with the structures, 
including graffiti on the fence/wall and the visual layout of the checkpoint, construct 
Palestinian and Israeli identity in specific ways. An analysis of interview, textual, and 
visual data reveals particular rhetorics and discourses operationalizing around the 
structures including the rhetorics of security, land grab, restrictions on Palestinian 
freedom of movement, and the discourse of Promised Land. I conclude that the symbolic 
meaning of the structures and rhetoric of the ―war against terrorism‖ align perfectly with 
Israel‘s symbols and rhetoric of sovereign power. The myths created by these symbols 
are clear: (1) the State of Israel is sovereign; (2) Palestinians in general pose a threat to 
 that sovereignty; and (3) the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has no 
end because Palestinians continue to resist the colonization of historic Palestine.
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 CHAPTER 1: THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND THE WALL 
 
The Palestinian/Israeli conflict is a protracted, sectarian struggle going back to the 
emigration of diasporic Jews to historic Palestine in the early 20th century. 
Manifestations of this conflict include Palestinian terrorism aimed at Israeli targets, 
Israeli military occupation of the West Bank, and numerous wars and conflicts with 
Israel‘s Arab neighbors including an Israeli military campaign against Palestinian 
factions in Gaza in 2014. Barnes and Bacon (2009) argued that the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, brought the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict to the United States. The U.S. discourse regarding Islamic extremism began to 
manifest in U.S. news media, and U.S. foreign policy began to focus on terrorists‘ threats 
to the United States abroad. Even though the 9/11 hijackers were not Palestinian, not all 
Palestinians are Muslim, and not all Muslims seek the same solutions to the problems of 
the region, many Americans began to lump all terrorism together, discursively, to create 
an ideology and mythology that framed most terrorist acts throughout the world as violent 
attacks on Western-held values and ways of life. This simplistic understanding of 
terrorism led to the creation of rhetorical binaries needed for identity construction with 
respect to us (Israel, the United States, and other countries with Western-held values) and 
them (terrorists who attack these values). 
Scholars have extensively analyzed various aspects of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict and theorized about how particular challenges have prevented peace. But they 
have not examined a critical component of the conflict itself: how the symbolic meanings
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of artifacts in the conflict, such as Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall the Israelis 
built for protection, manifest in discourse. This study seeks to answer how the symbolic 
meanings of artifacts manifest in the discourse of the conflict. Symbols of the conflict are 
easy to find: Israeli Jewish settlements, Israeli military personnel that seem omnipresent, 
checkpoints, bomb shelters in Israeli hotels, and the Israeli military occupation of the 
West Bank, to name a few. Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and a wall that Israel built, 
ostensibly for security, are two prominent and highly visible symbols that have come to 
concretize the conflict. This study explores how these two symbols in particular represent 
myths and meta-signs that communicate, intentionally or unintentionally, ideologies to 
Israelis, Palestinians, and internationals. 
Symbols operate in discourse, and ideologies often shape discourse and the 
―construction of the other,‖ which involves a form of ―gaze.‖ Palestinians, Israelis, and 
internationals have looked for years at visual manifestations of the conflict, including the 
Israeli-built wall between Israel and the Palestinians, checkpoints, and graffiti on the 
wall, and these visual artifacts have inevitably become symbolic. The identification cards, 
permitting process, and Israeli Jewish settlements also serve as discursive, visual props 
constructing Palestinian and Israeli identity. These visual rhetorics contribute and lead to 
the construction of other rhetorics that surround the conflict. Architectural structures and 
bureaucratic devices often symbolize the tensions between Israelis and Palestinians by 
framing each respective group in particular ways. For example, a prolific amount of 
graffiti is located on the Bethlehem side of the wall near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. The 
visuals represent vandalism, tags, and graffiti from prominent artists. Larkin (2014) 
3 
 
 
 
called the wall ―the world‘s largest canvas for oppositional protest art, global critique, 
and local resistance‖ (p. 142). The graffiti also reveal important insights and clues about 
how Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall serve as communicative symbols 
constructed by and contested in discourse. This study seeks to answer two critical 
research questions: How is the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
wall constructed in discourse? How does the presence of the wall and the checkpoint 
construct the discourses of othering?Palestinian and pro-Palestinian activists often name 
the wall Israel built the ―Apartheid Wall,‖ which immediately evokes apartheid in South 
Africa. Apartheid policies in South Africa institutionalized racism through legislation by 
which the ruling, white majority separated and segregated various ethnic groups in South 
Africa to multiple, non-contiguous enclaves or ―Bantustans.‖ Regan (2008) defined 
apartheid as ―the system established from 1948 onward which had its roots in early 
moves to implement legislation designed to draw a distinction between black South 
African peoples and the white colonist‖ (p. 202). Apartheid means separateness and 
contrasts sharply with the Israeli naming of the fence as a ―Security‖ or ―Anti-terrorism 
Fence‖ (Regan, 2008). Both names, Apartheid Wall and Security Fence, are particularly 
significant with regard to how the wall is rhetorically positioned by Israelis, Palestinians, 
internationals, and Palestinian rights activists. Scholars often compare and contrast the 
separation and racialization strategies of South Africa with similar legislative 
mechanisms enacted by Israel (Regan, 2008; Chomsky & Pappé, 2015; Yiftachel, 2009). 
Yiftachel (2009) specifically offered an analysis of the Israeli colonial practices and 
legislative policies aimed at Palestinian Arabs and offered a comparison of these policies 
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with the South African apartheid regime (pp. 15–16). Israel, according to Yiftachel, is 
increasing and systematically creating ―white‖ spaces for Jews and ―colored‖ spaces for 
Palestinian Arabs, a strategy similar to South African apartheid. Israeli separation 
policies systematically confine Palestinians to ghetto-like spaces that resemble South 
African Bantustans. Israeli Jews, by contrast, live in relatively open spaces (p. 7). 
Chomsky and Pappé (2015), however, contrasted South African apartheid to 
Israeli apartheid: 
South Africa was different because the white population needed its Black 
counterpart. It was its workforce. Israel does not want the Palestinians. South 
Africa actually supported the Bantustans. They wanted them to develop because 
they had to reproduce the workforce and to be international recognized. (p. 76) 
The distinction between South African apartheid policies and Israeli apartheid strategies, 
as pointed out by Chomsky and Pappé (2015), help inform the visual rhetoric of the 
fence/wall. The concrete construction of the wall near Israeli cities and settlements does 
not allow Israelis to see Palestinian spaces. In effect, it erases them, thus reflecting 
Chomsky and Pappé‘s assertion that Israelis do not want the Palestinians. In other words, 
Israel is seeking to erase Palestinians. 
Describing Israeli policies aimed at Palestinians as apartheid receives 
consideration from scholars. The use of apartheid to describe the wall differs greatly 
from the term separation, which implies that two spaces, places, people, or things are 
separated from one other. As discussed in this dissertation, fences and walls, by their very 
nature, separate. The two sides of a fence or wall also create separate and distinct 
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binaries: here and there, us and them, this space and that space, the separate from the 
separated. These binaries manifest in discourse, particularly regarding the Israeli versus 
Palestinian identity constructs that frame the conflict as two separate groups fighting one 
another physically and discursively. Furthermore, ―separation,‖ as ideologically rooted 
mythology, does not hold the significant historical weight of the term ―apartheid.‖ The 
latter term implies power to create a separate and unequal constructed identity built on 
the idea that one people group is superior to another people group. The superior group 
requires an ideological, institutional, and legal identity that is separate and distinct from 
the constructed inferior. Whites in South Africa posited themselves as superior to the 
inferior local Blacks, and they sought to legalize and legitmate separation policies aimed 
at them. The White minority thus ruled a Black majority. Part of this rule was the creation 
of separate and distinct homelands or Bantustans in which the local Bantustan has limited 
self-government (Regan, 2008; Chomsky & Pappé, 2015). 
Similar to the way South African Whites constructed indigenous Blacks as 
inferior others, native Palestinian Arabs are constructed as inferior others by Israeli 
Jewish leadership, specifically, and the West, in general. Said (1978) argued that the 
Western construction of Arabs, specifically, and the ―Orient,‖ in general, supports an 
ideological formation and framework that posits Arabs and Orientals as a people who 
require domination (p. 9). Said has argued that the privileged role of culture, particularly 
Western culture, has largely been ignored in discussion of empire and the modern 
imperial experience, particularly given the global reach of European imperialism in the 
early 19th and 20th centuries that ―still casts a considerable shadow over our own times‖ 
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(p. 5). 
The use of the word ―apartheid‖ to describe the wall thus further transforms the 
wall into a mythological construct that ties it to South African apartheid policies. 
―Separation,‖ by contrast, evokes a need for separation, for identity construction or 
security as the interview data for this study demonstrates. Rogers and Ben-David (2010) 
examined the various contexts and terms used to describe the structure that separates 
parts of the West Bank from parts of Israel, which are also terms that connect to 
rhetorical strategies of various speakers and evoke debate. Rogers and Ben-David‘s 
findings indicated that Israelis and Israeli sources consistently refer to the structure as the 
―Security Fence,‖ whereas the Palestinian choice of names differs depending on context. 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon designated the term ―Security Fence‖ and 
approved the initial construction of the fence in the early 2000s (Rogers & Ben-David, 
2003). Palestinian sources, Palestinian activist websites, Israeli activists, and many 
internationals call this same structure the ―Apartheid Wall‖ or the ―Separation Wall‖ 
(www.stopthewall.org; www.electronicintifada.net). B‘Tselem, the Israeli Information 
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, calls the structure the ―Separation 
Barrier‖ (http://www.btselem.org/topic/separation_barrier). The Palestinian Grassroots 
Anti-apartheid Wall Campaign calls the structure the ―Apartheid Wall‖ and argues that 
the wall‘s primary goal is to confiscate more Palestinian land (http://stopthewall.org/the-
wall). The International Court of Justice used the term ―barrier‖ (U.N. News Centre, 
2004), whereas the United Nations used ―West Bank Barrier‖ (United Nations, 2005). 
Palestinians interviewed for this research study call this same structure ―the wall.‖ This 
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study will use the term ―wall‖ because I feel it most accurately describes the structure 
located around Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 where this research study has its primary 
focus. 
The US, other Arab countries, and the United Nations in particular have played 
and continue to play significant roles in facilitating talks between Israeli and Palestinian 
leadership in an attempt to resolve the conflict. Political failures, such as the Oslo 
Accords and the Camp David talks, have further perpetuated Israeli plans of 
disengagement and separation from Palestinians, particularly in Gaza where rival 
Palestinian political factions compete for power. The West Bank governing party, 
Harakatal-Filistin (FATEH), has often competed rhetorically with governing factions in 
Gaza, particularly Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS), for the political and 
rhetorical framing of peace agreements with Israel. The result of these attempts to resolve 
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is often a stalemate on the fundamental issues that divide 
Israelis and Palestinians: borders for the Israeli state and future Palestinian state; 
Palestinian refugees‘ right of return; Israeli Jewish settlements on internationally 
recognized Palestinian land in the West Bank; harsh security policies aimed at West Bank 
and Gaza Palestinians that restrict their freedom of movement; and the ultimate fate of 
Jerusalem. 
This chapter contextualizes the research study and the research questions specific 
to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, discourses, and symbols of the conflict, including 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall, which together are the primary focus of this 
research study. Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 is located on the wall and serves as a gate 
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through the wall. It is the main access point for West Bank Palestinians to enter East 
Jerusalem and Israel proper. The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine 
and Israel (EAPPI) reported in 2014 that 4,000 to 6,000 Palestinian workers pass through 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 each day between 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. West Bank 
Palestinians with Israeli permission to enter East Jerusalem and Israel proper must pass 
through this checkpoint. International visitors who wish to access important religious, 
cultural, and historic sites in the southern West Bank also must use this checkpoint. 
In this chapter, I first offer background on the Israeli Anti-Terrorism 
Fence/Palestinian Apartheid Wall as a symbol of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Then I 
discuss the discursive practices surrounding the fence/wall to situate the research 
question. Then I offer a brief background on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, which is 
complicated and multi-layered. Stakeholders in the conflict include not only Palestinians 
and Israelis, but also international audiences such as the United Nations, the United 
States, and Israel‘s neighbors. I then define terms important to the research study 
including discourse, rhetoric, and visual rhetoric. Scholars have defined these terms 
differently, and I explain how this research study uses them. Defining terminology is also 
critical to understanding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and related discourses and 
ideologies. Naming spaces and places is a significant point of contention between Israelis 
and Palestinians. I discuss the various names used in Israeli/Palestinian discourse, and I 
outline how I plan to use these names. Finally, I conclude this chapter with a brief 
overview of Chapters 2 through 5 of the study. 
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Symbols of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict 
 
 Central to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is land ownership in 
general and control of what Israelis generally call ―Israel‖ and what Palestinians 
generally call ―Palestine.‖ The disagreement regarding naming specifically focuses on 
land defined by and related to the Green Line, which was brokered by the United Nations 
and separates Israel from its Arab neighbors, specifically the Jordanian West Bank. 
Israeli Jewish settlements often locate on the east side of the Green Line, an 
internationally recognized de facto border, and therefore on land that is internationally 
recognized as Palestinian. One official source, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, uses 
intentional visual rhetoric to frame the ―Anti-Terrorist Fence,‖ 1949 armistice line or 
―Green Line,‖ and location of Israeli Jewish settlements. The visual and verbal rhetorics 
in the website argue that the fence serves only one role: security. This specific Israeli 
source rhetorically frames the fence as a tool that provides security to Israelis and 
prevents terrorist attacks by Palestinians living in the West Bank (Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2007). The Israeli website name for the structure is the ―Anti-Terrorism 
Fence.‖ The website further argues that the fence does not define an internationally 
recognized border between the State of Israel and a future Palestinian state. Statements in 
the website reject the recognition of the Green Line as a border, arguing, for example: 
The former ―Green Line‖ was the armistice line between Israel and Jordan during 
the years 1949–1967. It was not the final border between the countries which was 
to be determined in peace negotiations. The ―Green Line‖ ceased to exist 
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following the Arab threat to Israel‘s existence in the spring of 1967, which led to 
the Six Day War in June of that year. The drafters of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 242 in November 1967 recognized that the pre-June 1967 lines were 
not secure. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007) 
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website includes a map that does not show the 
Green Line; a visual tool, a map, becomes a rhetorical device that frames all of the land 
as belonging to the State of Israel and subsequently denies Palestinian claims on the 
contested land (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). The path of the Israeli Anti-
Terrorism Fence illustrated on this Israeli website clearly positions the fence on the east 
side of the Green Line, carving and curving to further position Israeli Jewish settlements, 
deemed illegal under international law, on the Jerusalem side of the fence east of the 
Green Line. The website further uses visual rhetoric to convey that the fence is just that—
a fence. In Figure 1, note the image of the fence that is on the Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website: 
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Figure 1. Israeli Anti-Terrorism Fence 
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007 
 
The image of the Anti-Terrorism Fence, labeled ―intrusion detection fence‖ on the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, contrasts sharply with an image of the ―fence‖ 
located at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300: 
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Figure 2. The ―Israeli Anti-Terrorism Fence‖ at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Photo by R. Chad Holt. 
 
Many Palestinians argue that the ―fence‖ manifests into a wall. Palestinians and 
internationals, including travelers who pass through the checkpoint and international 
governing bodies such as the United Nations, argue that the wall confiscates more 
Palestinian land for the purposes of Israeli settlement development and expansion. The 
wall is devastating to the Palestinian economy in the West Bank, because tourists and 
other visitors refuse to subject themselves to rigid security procedures at various 
checkpoints located along the Anti-Terrorism Fence. As discussed in this dissertation, the 
wall symbolically and mythically communicates that some thing or some one must be 
contained behind the 8-meter high concrete walls. Someone or something needs 
monitoring through the use of watchtowers positioned near checkpoints such as 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. The impact of these visual rhetorics on the identity 
construction of Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals is discussed in this dissertation.  
 The word ―fence,‖ used by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website also 
conveys an ideological myth of containment: the fence contains Palestinian terrorists 
located in the West Bank, and this containment proves fundamental to providing security 
to Israelis. Cohen (2006) asserted that fences and walls ―contain‖ ideologically: the 
terrorist contained behind the fence poses less of a threat to Israeli citizens on the other 
side of the fence. Hart (2005) pointed to cognitive linguistics that assert certain images 
and embodied schemas that constitute the foundation for human reason. Hart suggested 
that the schemata of ―containment‖ and the concept of ―container‖ provide the frame that 
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leads to the construction of the political discourse surrounding immigration (p. 189). The 
container or containment schemata directly apply to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and 
the rhetorics of Promised Land and security. Israeli security measures, specifically the 
Israeli Anti-Terrorism Fence and permit systems, ―contain‖ the Palestinians in the 
―container‖ of the West Bank, thus further framing them as immigrants in contested land 
that belongs to the Israelis. 
 The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website argues Israel‘s historical and 
religious connection to the contested land. The Hebrew God‘s ―promise‖ to give historic 
Canaan (modern-day Israel, the West Bank, and parts of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Egypt) to the descendants of Abraham, the nomadic shepherd from Ur in southern 
Mesopotamia who became the patriarch of the Jewish people, informs the Promised Land 
rhetoric. The affirmation given by the Hebrew God to the descendants of Abraham in the 
land of Canaan repeats throughout the Hebrew Bible (Genesis 10:19, 12:6–7, 13:15, 15:7, 
15:18, 17:18, 26:2–5; 50:24; Exodus 6:8; Leviticus 20:24; Numbers 14:18; Deuteronomy 
6:10, 9:1, 31:20; Joshua 5:6; Judges 2:1). Jones (2009) argued that the Israeli Anti-
Terrorism Fence ensures the coherence of Israeli ideological boundaries relative to Eretz 
Israel (Land of Israel) and Zionism.  
 The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website evokes rhetoric of terrorism that 
justifies ideologically the construction of security apparatuses. A simplistic understanding 
of terrorism led to the creation of rhetorical binaries needed for identity construction with 
respect to Israel and its binary, the Palestinians. The fence reinforces this binary construct 
because of the dual-sided nature of fences. The very notion of a fence is to create a 
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boundary or marker designating a space here versus a space there, which is a binary 
construction. The term ―security‖ further adds to the binary construction by positing that 
which needs to be secured against a binary of that which threatens that security. Binary in 
discourse surrounding the fence is clearly evident in the visual and verbal data collected 
for this study. Along with the creation of binary, the fence perpetuated the West Bank 
Palestinians‘ identity construction as a security threat.  
Cohen (2006) argued that the Israeli Anti-Terrorism Fence‘s restriction on 
movement compromises Palestinian access to cultural and religious sites, prohibits 
Palestinians from visiting family members in areas cut off from the West Bank, and 
eliminates employment opportunities for Palestinians in cities such as Jerusalem. The 
wall also eliminates the ability for many Palestinians to farm, because they cannot access 
their land due to the location of the fence. Cohen argued that the fence serves a purpose 
other than reducing the number of Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel: ―In addition, the 
wall has allowed Israelis to feel that they are protecting themselves from contact with the 
Palestinians, a much broader desire than the specific matter of suicide attacks‖ (p. 682). 
Cohen described the two dominant interpretations of the fence: 
It is intended to protect Israelis from the plague of West Bank suicide bombers by 
keeping them out of Israel and by containing them in parts of the West Bank. 
From the Palestinian perspective the wall is a land grab. (p. 682) 
Until the 1967 takeover of East Jerusalem and the West Bank by Israel from Jordan, the 
Israelis solved their Palestinian ―native problem,‖ a term used by Cohen, by physically 
removing Palestinian Arabs from Arab villages and cities and by destroying Arab 
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infrastructure west of the Green Line. The newly occupied territories of East Jerusalem 
and of the West Bank east of the Green Line re-created the problem of the native 
Palestinians. Cohen argued that the fence provides a compromise to the native problem, 
primarily the ideological constructions of security and separation and framing the wall as 
a means to accomplish both ideals (pp. 682–695).  
 Other scholars agree with Cohen‘s (2006) assessment (Billing and Churchman, 
2003; Falah, 1996; Shaul, 2006; Usher, 2006). The fence severely limits the movement of 
Palestinians. It curves and carves through farms, streets, and cities in the West Bank and 
separates farmers from the fields, students from their schools, and workers from their 
jobs, thus creating a highly visible obtrusion of normal, daily life (Cohen, 2006, p. 683; 
Interview Data, 2012).  
 
 
Israeli and Palestinian Conflict: Discourses and Rhetorics 
 
 In the early 2000s, during the second Palestinian intifada, armed Palestinians 
attacked Israeli targets. In response to these attacks, the Israelis enacted security policies 
aimed at preventing Palestinian terrorism. Many of these security policies manifested in 
the form of physical structures (the Israel Anti-Terrorism Fence and barricades 
constructed on roads inside the West Bank) and physical objects such as checkpoints, 
barricades, and gates located within the Anti-Terrorism Fence and inside the West Bank 
and Israel. Israel‘s leadership frames Israeli Jewish settlements as ―security‖ structures, 
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many of which are located deep inside the West Bank. Identification cards identify 
Palestinians‘ place of residence and thus determine their access to areas both inside and 
outside the West Bank.  
The physical structures and security apparatuses create multiple rhetorics among 
Israelis, Palestinians, and the international community. The rhetorical practices and 
discourse surrounding the wall directly connect to, and intersect with, other discourses 
surrounding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The discourses also manifest in physical 
symbols such as the Anti-Terrorism Fence, Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, other 
checkpoints, Israeli Jewish settlements, Jerusalem, and the ID and permit systems, to 
name a few. Some of these discourses manifest internationally in the United Nations. 
Palestinian, Israeli, and international activists protesting the barrier use multiple rhetorics 
to talk about the wall, including the rhetorics of a restriction on Palestinian movement 
and Palestinian land rights. Other protest rhetorics manifest in graffiti on the barrier.  
 Khalidi (1991) asserted that the ―crux and kernel‖ of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict and what Khalidi called the ―Palestinian Problem‖ are two national movements: 
the Zionist movement manifested in the State of Israel, and the Palestinian national 
movement. To describe the mass emigration of world Jewry to Palestine, Zionist thinkers 
would often use the tagline, ―a land without people for people without a land.‖ The 
problem with this rhetoric is that Palestine was indeed inhabited by millions of 
Palestinian Arabs, so it was not ―a land without people‖ as Zionist rhetoric claimed. 
Many Palestinians had established historic Palestine as their homeland for millennia. 
Both national movements use visual rhetorics and naming as a discursive strategy in their 
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respective struggles to establish two nations on the same land and in the same cultural 
and geographic space. Israelis largely evoke security and Promised Land rhetorics, 
whereas Palestinians largely evoke a historical rhetoric that posits them as historical 
natives. 
 The Israeli/Palestinian conflict connects to broader rhetorics of land rights, land 
ownership, and security. Dreams and plans for a Jewish state located in Palestine began 
among Diaspora Jews, particularly in the late 1800s, when Jewish scholars and thinkers 
such as Alkalai, Kalischer, Herzl, and Hess began to dream of a national Jewish home in 
historic Palestine. As a result of these influential thinkers, the Zionist movement began, 
and the first of many Jewish migrations to Palestine occurred in the late 1800s (Barnes & 
Bacon, pp. 275–304). This large influx of immigrants created tensions and hostilities 
between native Palestinian Arabs and migrant Jews. The migration of Jewish immigrants 
continued in several large waves over the next few decades, and the new immigrants 
frequently engaged in hostile and violent activities against the native Palestinian Arabs, 
who saw the immigration as an attempt to colonize Palestine. In 1948, a declaration of 
the Jewish State in historic Palestine led to the defeat of Palestinian and Arab armies by 
Jewish militia groups. Conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, often backed by Arab 
countries neighboring the newly formed State of Israel, occurred frequently over the next 
50 years. 
 The Palestinian terrorist attacks of the intifadas born out of over 100 years of 
Jewish migration to Palestine, and from Palestinian frustration over Jewish colonialism, 
directly connects to multiple rhetorics surrounding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The 
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passivity and political leveraging of the Palestinian cause by neighboring Arab countries 
and leadership further informs rhetorical practices, specifically graffiti rhetorics. Israeli 
Jews and Jews outside of Palestine who subscribe to the rhetoric of Jewish rights to the 
land often refer to themselves as ―Zionist,‖ referencing a hill called Zion located just 
outside historic Jerusalem. This hill represents the historic location of the ancient Judean 
King David‘s city. King David expanded the Israelite kingdom in approximately 1000 
BCE and conquered Jerusalem, taking it away from the native Canaanites (1 Kings 8:1; 2 
Kings 19:21; Isaiah 8:18; Isaiah 33:14). Further shaping the rhetoric of the Promised 
Land and the rhetoric of the Palestinian Other is the Hebrew God‘s biblical mandate to 
the Hebrews to destroy all living things in the Promised Land, specifically the native 
inhabitants and all of their religious sites, buildings, and infrastructure. For example, 
Numbers 21: 2-3 reads, ―Then Israel made a vow to the Lord: ‗If you deliver these people 
into our hands, we will totally destroy their cities.‘ The Lord listened to Israel‘s plea and 
gave the Canaanites over to them.‖ Promised Land narratives evident in the Hebrew 
Bible point to a Hebrew, God-endorsed war aimed at native inhabitants of the Promised 
Land (Deuteronomy 2:30–35, 7:2–6, 20:10–18). The Hebrew Bible Book of Joshua also 
outlines a bloody and violent conquest of Canaan on behalf of the colonizing Hebrews, 
who conquered the land, removed its native inhabitants, and developed their own 
language, culture, and religious beliefs (Joshua 6:17, 21, 8:24–29, 10:28, 30–32, 37, 39–
40).  
These religious texts, located in the sacred scripture for Jews, not only frame 
historic Palestine as ours, given to us by our Israeli God, but they also frame natives as 
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others in need of removal. Israeli military campaigns during the 1948 war followed this 
religious framing of ours versus others binary rhetoric in regard to rights to the land. 
Falah (1996) argued Israel deployed a ―total war‖ strategy during the formation of the 
Jewish state and its war with Palestinians in 1948. Total war ―produces large-scale 
devastation‖ in which all buildings and structures, regardless of their historical or cultural 
significance or importance, as well as densely populated cities, become targets for 
destruction because total war involves ethnic cleansing or the expulsion of Palestinians 
from their native land. Arabic buildings, homes, and significant places of culture, 
worship, and art were destroyed as part of the Israeli total war campaign (p. 257).  
 The Palestinians name the formation of the Israeli state al-Nakba, Arabic words 
meaning ―the catastrophe.‖ Mahmoud Darwish (2008) recorded the testimonies of 
various Palestinians who lost their homes, land, and family members as a result of the 
Nakba. This simplistic understanding of terrorism led to the creation of rhetorical binaries 
needed for identity construction with respect to us (Israel, the US, and other countries 
with Western-held values) and them (terrorists who attack these values), and graffiti on 
the wall often uses the Nakba as a central theme highlighting the Palestinian rights to the 
Jewish Promised Land. The Nakba, however, positions the Israelis as terrorists who stole 
Palestinian land and cleansed the land of Arab Palestinian people and culture. This 
cleansing, according to Palestinians, is still ongoing. This rhetorical positioning posits us 
(the Palestinians with Palestinian-Arab values) against them (Israelis constructed as 
militaristic colonial occupiers) (Graffiti Data, 2012; Interview Data, 2012). 
 Usher (2006) agreed with Falah‘s (1996) assessment of Israel‘s religiously 
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informed war tactics deployed during the 1948 declaration of the Israeli State and the 
Nakba. Settler immigrants must achieve military hegemony over their neighboring 
countries, and they must resolve the problem of the native inhabitants—or the ―native 
problem,‖ to use Usher‘s terminology. The solutions to the newly established Israeli 
State‘s native problem, as discussed by Usher, include annexation, withdrawal, and 
ethnic cleansing of Arabs from the territories conquered by Jewish militia. Chomsky 
(2006), Chomsky and Pappé (2015), Darwish (2008), Kadman (2015), Khaled (1971), 
and Yiftachel (2009, 2010) extensively discussed the expulsion of native Palestinian 
Arabs from historic Palestine during the establishment of the State of Israel. Pappé 
(2006), Darwish, and Kadman recorded and discussed extensively the ethnic cleansing of 
Palestine during the establishment of the newly formed Israeli state by charting the 
destruction of Arab Palestinian villages. The establishment of the State of Israel displaced 
800,000 native Palestinian Arabs and destroyed 531 Palestinian Arab villages. Jewish 
militias also emptied eleven urban neighborhoods, including Arab neighborhoods in 
Haifa, of their native Palestinian residents (Pappé, p. xiii, 295). 
 Sand (2009) discussed the historical and theological ideologies of Jewish Israelis 
that inform many of the rhetorical practices that contribute to and construct the rhetorics 
of Promised Land and Palestinian Other. Critiquing extensively the Jewish myth of exile, 
Sand argued that this myth proves central to Jewish identity and ethnos. Most Jews 
subscribe to a rhetoric that largely constructs exile as a unifying event that binds global 
Jews together, regardless of their geographic location or their location across time (pp. 
21–22). Modern Jewish liturgy references exile and the exilic narratives that unify the 
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Jewish people who have subscribed to them. Historical corroborations are dependent on 
either an overt or hidden ideology, and the State of Israel is no exception (p. 69). Falah 
(1996) and Usher (2006) agreed that these ideological constructions, rooted in a Promised 
Land rhetoric, inform the Israeli colonial agenda, resulting in Israeli expansion into 
internationally recognized Palestinian land using both physical and ideological tools such 
as Israeli Jewish settlements, the wall, checkpoints located within the West Bank, and the 
ID card and permit systems. Ironically, many Palestinian refugees from the 1948 
Arab/Israeli war also evoke the myth of exile to rhetorically frame Palestinian rights to 
return to their historic homeland. This rhetoric largely manifests in a Palestinian 
refugee‘s right to return to their historic homeland lost to the formation of the State of 
Israel and a campaign of ethnic cleansing aimed at Palestinian Arabs (Graffiti Data, 
2012). 
 
Defining Discourse, Rhetoric, and Identity 
 
 The exilic rhetoric evident in Jewish discourse proves valuable to understanding 
why religiously pious Jews want to return to historic Palestine (Sand, 2009; Zerubavel, 
1995). The Western Wall located in East Jerusalem and even Jerusalem itself take on 
symbolic and mythological communicative functions that shape discourse, rhetoric, and 
even visual rhetoric with respect to the conflict. Scholars often debate and discuss the 
definitions of discourse, rhetoric, and visual rhetoric (Foss, 2004; Blair, 2004; Herrick, 
2009). Some scholars use discourse and rhetoric synonymously. Herrick argued that 
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rhetoric connects to personal, psychological, and political power. Ideology shapes, 
informs, and constructs it. Rhetoric can shape ideologies that impact other rhetorics, and 
rhetoric often becomes hidden or embedded in ideologies not immediately evident to the 
unconscious subscriber (pp. 21–22). Herrick defined rhetoric as ―the study or practice of 
effective symbolic expression‖ (p. 24), meaning that rhetoric is a type of discursive 
practice that adapts to an audience and seeks to persuade an audience. Rhetoric is also 
planned and responsive (p. 24). The present study uses the term rhetoric as defined by 
Herrick. 
 Foss (2004) defined visual rhetoric as ―the actual image or object rhetors use 
when they use visual images for the purpose of communicating‖ (p. 304). Three 
characteristics define artifacts as visual rhetoric: they must be symbolic, involve human 
interaction, and serve a communicative function. Foss argued, ―Visual rhetoric is 
symbolic action in that the relationship it designates between images and referent is 
arbitrary, in contrast to sign, where a natural relationship exists between the sign and the 
object to which it is connected‖ (p. 305). The artifact must be represented to an audience 
for the purpose of communicating (pp. 304–305). This study uses the definition of visual 
rhetoric offered by Foss and pays particular attention to the three characteristics of visual 
rhetoric offered by Foss. 
This study also uses Gee‘s (1999) definition of discourse as ―ways of combining 
and integrating language, actions, interactions, and ways of thinking, believing, valuing, 
and using various symbols, tools, and objects to enact a particular sort of socially 
recognizable identity‖ (p. 29). Discourses involve what Gee called ―props,‖ such as 
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books, classrooms, laboratories, technologies, words, and symbols (e.g., basketballs for 
basketball players). Words, action, beliefs, emotions, values, and interactions constitute 
―being and doing in X,‖ in which recognition of these words, beliefs, actions, and so forth 
create a discourse (p. 37). Gee explained, ―In the end a discourse is a ‗dance‘ that exists 
in the abstract as a coordinated pattern of words, deeds, values, beliefs, symbols, tools, 
objects, time, and place, and in the here and now as a performance that is recognizable as 
just such coordination‖ (p. 36). This research study uses Gee‘s vivid definition of 
discourse. 
 
Defining Palestine, Israel, West Bank, Judea and Samaria,  
Territories, Occupied Territories 
 
 Rhetorical practices surrounding Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall 
illustrate the inherent problems associated with naming the geographic spaces located 
near the wall. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu named the West Bank ―Judea 
and Samaria,‖ biblical names for the West Bank. This evokes Promised Land rhetoric and 
thus rhetorically frames Israel‘s biblical rights to all the land, including the West Bank 
(Netanyahu, 2011). 
 Palestinians engage in a similar rhetorical strategy. Palestinians often name the 
same place Palestine or Filistin to demarcate a specific geographic space that often 
includes the State of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Bethlehem is located on the east 
side of the wall in a geographic space known in Palestinian, Israeli, and international 
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sources as the West Bank. This study refers to the east side of the wall as the Bethlehem 
side and West Bank, and to the west side of the wall as the Jerusalem side and Israel 
proper. This study uses West Bank to designate the geographic area east of the Green 
Line to the Jordan River, and State of Israel or Israel proper to designate the area west of 
the Green Line to the Mediterranean Sea. 
  The naming of Palestinians and Israelis further complicates rhetorical practices 
and discourses. Over two hundred thousand Palestinians live on the west side of the wall 
in Israel proper, yet they do not hold Israeli citizenship (Interview Data, 2012). 
Demographics and rhetorical positioning of the land by Israelis further complicate the 
simple binary names of Israel/Israeli and Palestine/Palestinian. This study refers to 
Palestinian Arabs living on the east side of the wall as West Bankers, and to Palestinian 
Arabs living on the west side of the wall as Jerusalemites. Palestinians living in Israel 
proper are identified as Arab Israelis.  
 The term Israeli, equally vague and non-descript, might or might not include 
secular and religious Jews with Israeli citizenship, Mizrahi, Ashkenazi, or Sephardi Jews 
with Israeli citizenship. This study primarily distinguishes between Israeli citizens with 
Israeli citizenship who live in Israel proper west of the Green Line and Israelis living in 
settlements east of the Green Line. The study refers to Israelis who live east of the Green 
Line as Jewish Israeli settlers. Israelis who live west of the Green Line as called simply 
Israelis. Palestinian Jews also represent a subset of Israeli citizenship that includes 
practicing Jews, secular Jews, Samaritans, Jewish proselytes, and other Palestinians who 
claim a Jewish lineage. In an effort to distinguish Palestinian Jews from Palestinian 
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Arabs, this study will use the term ―Palestinian Arabs‖ or ―Palestinians‖ to designate both 
Muslim and Christian Palestinians.  
 
Overview 
 
 The discursive practices surrounding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict prove difficult 
to unravel and understand, and scholars have discussed the implications of the wall and 
checkpoints extensively. Amir (2011) said that the wall in East Jerusalem not only served 
as a comprehensive border or mere barrier, but also was being constructed to reinstate 
―sovereign power‖ through a process of racialization that prevented Palestinian residents 
of Jerusalem from becoming full members of Israeli society and fully integrated into 
Jerusalem municipality services. Bushbridge (2013) agreed with Amir and said, ―It is not 
surprising, and then, that the wall is most often read as the ultimate demonstration of 
Israeli sovereign power‖ (p. 659).  
 The wall separates West Bank Palestinians from Israelis who live in Israel proper 
and from most Jewish Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It prevents Palestinians on the 
Bethlehem side of the wall from accessing important educational, health, and religious 
services and spaces on the Jerusalem side of the wall. Checkpoints like Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 are often located deep inside the West Bank. Kotef and Amir (2011) 
argued that checkpoints in the West Bank ―prevent the establishment of a viable, 
independent Palestinian entity, and they prevent maintenance of a political and 
continuity‖ (p. 57).  
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 The location of the wall also points to Israeli ideologies about the land and 
Palestinians. Tamimi (2011) argued that Israel chose this location for the wall not for 
security reasons, as the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues, but rather to secure and 
control the largest source of water in historic Palestine after the Jordan River. Controlling 
water points to an ideology reflected in Zionist rhetoric that would claim that Zionist 
immigrants came to Palestine to ―make the desert bloom‖ and make the ―Promised Land 
fertile.‖ These scholars did not explore how the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the wall was constructed in discourse, which is what this study seeks 
to do.  
 Chapter 2 explores the theoretical perspectives and concepts offered by critical 
discourse analysis and visual rhetoric scholars. I review the literature relative to the 
research questions and discourse/critical discourse analysis, a theoretical perspective and 
method for analyzing discursive practices. I chose the concepts discussed in Chapter 2 
because Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall are visual symbols that Israelis, 
Palestinians, and internationals view as such. These concepts emphasize looking and ―the 
construction of the other‖ as specific to discourse, ideologies, identities, and power. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methods of analysis applied to the interview data and 
images of graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall. I discuss the research setting and 
context of data collection. I situate the wall with regard to the people, activities, and 
structures surrounding the wall, including a discussion of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
Data, data collection methods, and methods of organizing and analyzing the data are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 4 analyzes the interview data collected in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall, and images and descriptions of the 
wall located on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. The data reveal discourse 
specific to the wall and how the visual rhetorics and operational procedures at the wall 
and Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 shape Palestinian identity and discourse about the wall. 
The graffiti data analyzed further reveals additional discourses and rhetorics specific to 
Israeli security policies aimed at West Bank Palestinians. 
 Chapter 5 discusses the discourses and rhetorics evident in the interview, wall, 
checkpoint, and graffiti data, and how Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall as 
symbols are constructed in discourse. I discuss ideologies that inform the discursive 
practices and rhetorical strategies, specifically the act of naming, with examples of how 
discursive props such as the wall, checkpoint, and ID further frame Israelis and 
Palestinians, creating myths and meta-signs that contribute to furthering conflict and 
destructive discourse. Finally, I analyze graffiti located near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
in relation to its contribution to and construction of specific rhetorics. 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 2: LOOKING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY 
 
 In the introduction, I set the context for the investigation of discourses, both 
verbal and visual, that shape the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Scholars have used various 
theoretical lenses to better understand how discourses and the use of language shape 
contexts and, particularly in this case, conflicts.  
 Central to this research study is the act of looking and Othering. Israelis, 
Palestinians, and internationals look at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall, and these 
respective groups each create the other. In this chapter, I discuss theoretical concepts 
relative to looking and Othering. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and visual rhetoric 
scholars use these concepts to explore the relationship between symbolic meaning, 
discourse, identity, and ideology. Many of the concepts discussed in this chapter overlap 
and intersect. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives from Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 Critical discourse analysis (CDA) frameworks offer concepts that, when applied 
to the discursive practices surrounding the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, provide a 
means of understanding power inequities relative to the stakeholders involved in the 
conflict. These concepts provide insights into symbolic texts about Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the wall, and into the discursive practices related to fundamental 
issues that divide Palestinians and Israelis. Discursive practices often construct power 
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inequities between discursive communities. The discourse of Israeli ―rights‖ to the 
―Promised Land‖ often manifests in Jewish Israeli settlement development in the West 
Bank and the construction of Israeli structures on land internationally recognized as 
Palestinian. A discourse of Israeli ―security‖ often manifests in security policies aimed at 
West Bank Palestinians. As both a theoretical lens and analytical method, CDA provides 
a tool to explore these discourses and their manifestations. Fairclough (2001) defined 
discourse as the whole process of a social interaction in which the text is just a part. 
Discourse is determined by social structures and thus contributes to social continuity and 
change (p. 14). Fairclough defined text as ―what is said in a piece of spoken discourse‖ 
(p. 20). Fairclough critiqued a positivist approach to texts, which sees language texts as 
objects whose properties can be mechanically described without any interpretation (p. 
20).  
 Gee (1999) argued that CDA exposes power in the language use surrounding 
social practices. Gee stated that CDA ―argues that language-in-use is always a part and 
parcel and partially constitutive of, specific social practices that social practices always 
have implications for inherently political things status, solidarity, and distribution of 
goods and power‖ (p. 68). The examination of communication and rhetorical practices of 
particular groups through the critical examination of discourse, using CDA as an 
analytical tool, reveals accurate reproductions of power relationships and inequality 
structures. CDA also offers insights into how discourse shapes the identity of others. 
 I use Fairclough‘s (2001) definition of text specific to the process of social 
interaction. Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall are texts, and Bethlehem Checkpoint 
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300 is also a social space in which Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals socially 
interact. The following questions are not the research questions, but answering them 
should provide insights into how the symbolic construction of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
and the wall are constructed in discourse: 
 How do Palestinians, internationals, and Israelis talk about the social interaction 
at the checkpoints? 
 How do they ―look‖ at the visual design of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300? 
 How does the visual design of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall reflect 
Palestinian, Israeli, and international identities relative to the construction of the 
other? 
 How do this looking and Othering at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 contribute to the 
discourse about Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall?  
 
Identity 
 
 Gee (1999) defined identity as ―ways of being in the world at different times and 
places for different purposes; for example, ways of being a ‗good student,‘ an ‗avid bird 
watcher‘‖ (p. 3). Gee also argued that different people have access to different identities 
and practices, and these identities and practices connect to different sorts of status, social 
goods, and social practices (p. 30). Gee‘s concepts raise an additional sub-question: How 
does the social practice of showing your ID when passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 
300 construct the ID holder‘s identity?  
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 Ainsworth and Hardy (2004) further discussed the implication of discourse on 
identity construction, stating that ―rather than autonomous subjects using discourse to 
construct identities, it is discourse that produces power-knowledge relations within which 
subjects are positioned, identities are constructed and bodies disciplined‖ (p. 238). This 
point by Ainsworth and Hardy is difficult to overstate. Discourse shapes identity. Identity 
does not shape discourse, according to Ainsworth and Hardy. CDA‘s use of a systematic 
and detailed form of textual analysis is derived from conversational analysis, institutional 
dialogue, and pragmatics to reveal power inequities and identity constructions 
accomplished through discourse and rhetorical practices. Ainsworth and Hardy argued 
that CDA can reveal reproductions of power relationships and inequality structures. The 
critical examination of texts provides insights into the practice of looking and the 
construction of the Other. Ainsworth and Hardy claimed that discourses embody 
prejudices and racisms that manifest in racist views, practices, and behaviors. As 
Ainsworth and Hardy further explained, ―In the context of identity, texts are seen as 
‗empirical materials that articulate complex arguments‘ about social identities of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, age, etc.‖ (p. 238).  
Cohen (2006) explained that walls have long been used as defensive mechanisms 
and means of separation. China‘s Great Wall is known for its size, length, and age. The 
Roman Emperor Hadrian‘s Wall, separating Scotland from England, remains visible 
almost 1,900 years after its construction. These ancient walls remind modern viewers that 
people in antiquity were deeply concerned with security and separation, and they invested 
huge efforts in the construction of walls. In more recent times, the Maginot Line, 
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constructed in 1930, deflected an advance of Germany on France. The Berlin Wall 
divided West Berlin from East Berlin for 45 kilometers. Shaul alluded to the symbolic 
meaning of the Berlin Wall: ―The Berlin Wall became an emblem for repression, denial 
of human rights, and state violence. Indeed, the wall acted as a lengthening rod for the 
accumulated tension and hostility that characterized the bipolar world of the Soviet 
Union‖ (p. 683). The Berlin Wall, like the wall in the West Bank, created a visual and 
rhetorical binary constructing an us and them. Fences and walls, along with their 
respective ideological myths of security and separation, require, if not construct, an 
ideological, symbolic, and mythological opposite present in that, which is separated. 
Viewers transform fences/walls into myths and meta-signs that communicate separation, 
otherness, and distinctiveness. The Berlin Wall not only physically separated East from 
West Germany, but it also symbolically communicated the difference between the east 
and west side of the Berlin Wall. 
This study focused on a section of the wall in the West Bank at Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300, yet innumerable symbolic and mythological constructs create similar 
communicative myths regarding separation and the opposite. These include visual 
structures such as walls, fences, boundaries, and lines. These symbols are evident in 
neighborhoods, villages, cities, towns, and institutions of all sorts. Separation of people, 
places, and spaces is a means of control and an instrument of power, even if the control is 
symbolic and mythological. Neighborhoods in the U.S. and abroad often contain invisible 
lines demarcating one piece of property from another piece of property and one person 
from another person. Visuals often define this separate space, and by defining this space, 
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visuals separate it from another space. For example, the construction of a 700-kilometer-
long barrier separating Israelis from Palestinians suggests that keeping Israelis separate 
from Palestinians is a top priority, not only for the safety and security of ordinary Israeli 
citizens, but also for the construction of the distinct and separate Israeli Jewish identity. 
Formed millennia ago, this religiously informed Jewish identity is rooted in an ancient 
theological, ideological, and mythological symbol of separateness. Zionists referred to 
this ancient identity as a ―suppressed historical past.‖ (Declaration of Independence of 
the State of Israel, 1948; Exodus 19:3–6; Leviticus 15:21; Ezra 6:21, 10:11; Zerubavel, 
1995, p. 54). 
Because this particular wall falls within a global context of walls, I chose to focus 
on the discourse created by this wall, and how the symbolic meaning of this wall 
manifests in discourse. I use Gee‘s (1999) concept of identity and his application of CDA 
to explore how the discourse about Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall shapes the 
identities of Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals. I explore how the visual data on the 
wall, primarily graffiti, and the visual layout and bureaucratic procedures at the 
checkpoint shape the identity of others. 
 
Ideology 
 
 Fairclough (2001) defined ideology as ―‗ideas which arise from a given set of 
material interests in the course of the struggle for power‖ (p. 78). Ideologies are 
institutional practices that individuals draw upon without even realizing it. For 
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Fairclough, ideologies encompass assumptions that legitimize power relations, either 
directly or indirectly, primarily through the means of coercion and consent. Fairclough 
said ideology embeds in discourse, and the struggle for power over language is often 
rooted in ideologies. Those in power keep and exercise their power through coercion and 
consent. They must maintain a constant struggle with others in the exercise of power 
through language (pp. 28–29). Fairclough said ideology shapes rhetorical practices and 
the maintenance of power structures through the use of language. Ideologies closely link 
to power because ideological assumptions embed in conventions, i.e., the conventions 
themselves become a mechanism for legitimizing power through ordinary and familiar 
ways of behaving, which take for granted their relationship to power (p. 2). Ideologies 
influence the production of texts, and texts influence the production of ideologies.  
 Amer (2012) used CDA to analyze the themes of a Palestinian homeland evident 
in Palestinian discourse. Pointing to van Dijk, Amer said that most of these ideological 
battles between Palestinian factions take place discursively and through discursive acts in 
which ―ideologically motivated meanings are produced, inculcated, legitimized, or 
contested‖ (p. 118). Using a largely thematic approach, Amer discussed the similarities 
and differences between the secular and Islamic discourses by examining official texts 
from each respective group. He concluded that secular and religious discourses share 
common elements that define the Palestinian political entity within East Jerusalem, the 
West Bank, and Gaza, and that have a direct impact on the ongoing conflict with Israel 
(p. 128). Israelis and Palestinians share a common territorial history, mainly involving 
attachment to the land and the desire for statehood.  
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I used Amer‘s model of applying CDA to texts to explore what themes shape and 
inform the discourse surrounding the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
and the wall. Like Amer, I analyzed ―official‖ perspectives on Bethlehem Checkpoint and 
the wall from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. These analyses raised 
additional sub-questions: 
 What themes manifest in these official sources? 
 What ideologies shape the discourse surrounding the practice of passing through 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 relative to these texts? 
 How do those ideologies shape the discourse surrounding the checkpoint and the 
wall?  
 
Looking, Othering, Binaries, and Imperialism 
 
Central to this study are the concepts of looking and construction of the Other. As 
Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals look at the wall, this process of looking shapes 
their discourse and the construction of identities evident in their discourse. Looking also 
creates Othering and binaries that often position us on one side of the wall and them on 
the other side. This section on the theoretical perspectives discusses concepts associated 
with looking and the concepts of Othering, binary rhetorics, ideologies, naming, and 
defining. 
Visual rhetoric scholars, particularly Sturken and Cartwright (2009), prove 
helpful with understanding looking. They assert that looking or gazing establishes power, 
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establishes the other, and creates a me and other binary. Those who look have more 
power than those who are looked upon (pp. 111–114). Gazing and looking, concepts that 
I use interchangeably, involve a process of Othering, whether intentional or unintentional, 
individual or institutional. Sturken and Cartwright said this process of Othering involves 
power because when we look, we construct our own identity by contrasting it with the 
other that receives our look. Looking assigns the one who is looking as normative (or 
unmarked) and the one looked upon as marked or other (p. 106, 111).  
Sturken and Cartwright (2009) examined a wide range of theories about how we 
engage in looking, specifically examining visual culture, which they defined as ―the 
shared practices of a group, community, or society through which meanings are made out 
of the visual, aura, and textual world of representations and the ways that looking 
practices are engaged in symbolic and communicative activities‖ (p. 3). Sturken and 
Cartwright said that just as humans give meanings to objects, objects give meaning to 
humans and the social networks and processes in which we engage. They claimed, ―This 
means that artifacts such as images and imaging technologies have politics and agency‖ 
(p. 3). Texts are produced through the act of reading and performed according to the 
cultural and political perspectives of the reader, rather than the intentions of the author 
(pp. 52–53). Sturken and Cartwright said, ―It is the job of the critical reading not to 
simply point out dominant meanings for others to see but to show how these meanings 
are made. The text is also open to meanings and interpretations that exist alongside and 
even against these more obvious meanings‖ (p. 52). Producers have an intended meaning, 
but context of meaning and meaning interpretation is not in the full control of the 
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producer (pp. 53–55). Sturken and Cartwright offered an example of an Othering binary 
that clearly illustrates their concepts of looking, Othering, and binaries within Western 
and Eastern cultures. The wall itself creates a binary because it has largely constructed 
Israelis on one side and West Bank Palestinians on the other. 
 Said‘s (1978) concept of orientalism focused on how Western scholarship 
constructs East and West binaries. This construction was central to Said‘s concept of 
imperialism. Said (1994) defined imperialism as ―thinking about, settling on, controlling 
land that you do not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and owned by others‖ (p. 7). 
Said argued that land is central to imperialism. Culture connects to imperialism and the 
acquisition of land, and Said pointed to the American cultural attitudes toward greatness, 
hierarchies of race, and American exceptionalism as manifestations of imperialism. Said 
further argued that empire depends upon ideological support of itself; in other words, 
empire depends upon the idea of empire (p. 11). The West has positioned itself as 
―saviors‖ of the barbaric savages who have required domination. The 20th century saw 
the rise of imperialism on an unprecedented scale, as British, French, and U.S. empires 
flourished. Profit drove the expansion of Western empires, and the ideology of 
imperialism must have support from ordinary or ―decent‖ men and women who ―accept 
the notion that distant territories and their native peoples should be subjugated‖ (p. 10).  
 Said‘s (1978) concept of imperialism is rooted in the ideological construction of 
the binaries of occident and orient. The orient is anything or anyone other than the 
occident; thus it is both an Othering and a binary. Said argued that the relationship 
between the occident and the orient is one of power and dominance. The West assigns the 
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identity of orient, thus forming a constructed grid by which the West views others in 
opposition to the Westerner identity construct (pp. 5–6). Said said that the Western 
identity construct posited itself as dominant and superior and, consequently, non-Western 
culture as dominated and inferior. Cultural artifacts such as film, books, language, and 
movies have become catalysts for perpetuating a hidden imperialistic ideological agenda 
for the West, which moved from movies to wars and from books to domination of people 
on foreign lands. 
 Smith (1993) agreed with Said (1978) and stated that an imperialistic ideology 
justified the conquest of Palestine by European Zionism. Palestinians point to European 
Zionism, dating back to the late 19
th
 century, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East 
as examples of this imperialistic rhetoric that authorizes, if not requires, one culture to 
dominate another. I argue that an imperialistic ideology discussed by Said influences the 
naming of West Bank Palestinians as others. The acts of looking and Othering, as 
discussed by Sturken and Cartwright (2009), posit West Bank Palestinians as others from 
whom Israelis, normative and unmarked, needed separation and security. I use the 
concept of imperialism to explore how this ideology manifests in discourse specifically 
related to Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall.  
 Bushbridge (2013) offered a perspective that overlaps with the concepts of 
looking and Othering. He said that the wall performs not only the exclusion of the 
Palestinian Other, but that it also expresses the anxiety directed toward the construction 
of a Palestinian Other ―out there‖ on the other side of the wall (p. 661). Bushbridge 
argued that the line where civilization ends and violence may be freely exercised against 
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the uncivilized for the fact of their incivility is demarcated and represented by the wall (p. 
661). The wall draws a line and constructs a ―civilized in here‖ contrasted with an 
―uncivilized out there,‖ thus forming the double function of creating a perceived 
bounded, protected national territory enclosure, while buttressing control of territory 
outside that same enclosure. The ―dangerous‖ other is only present in the various 
manifestations of the wall: a fence, barbed wire, watchtowers, concrete slabs, and 
checkpoints. As Bushbridge explained, ―Security technologies ‗wipe out‘ and obscure the 
presence of undesirable populations, just as the separation wall obscures and writes out 
over the presence of Palestinians, replacing them with, quite simply, a wall‖ (pp. 660–
661).  
The wall, however, fails to defend completely against the Other ―out there‖ 
because of Jewish Israeli settlers living on the West Bank side of the wall, thus 
highlighting the complex relationship, between settler and state, of theology and politics 
in Israel that has materialized in the wall. This ideological dialectic threatens to 
undermine State because of the large number of Jewish settlers on the West Bank side of 
the wall (p. 658). Settlers existed before the wall, and the State of Israel encourages 
settlement in the West Bank. The justification for the continued settlement of the West 
Bank east of the Green Line is framed as ―security‖ by Israeli leadership. In other words, 
settlement construction in the West Bank provides structural buffers between the State of 
Israel and its Arab neighbors to the east, including Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank. 
Palestinians argue that the continued settlement and occupation of the West Bank east of 
the Green Line functions to further confiscate Palestinian land. 
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 Settlements built in the West Bank further contribute to an us versus them binary. 
Crowley (2006) provided additional insights into us and them binary rhetoric that 
positions Israelis on one side of the ―Anti-Terrorism Fence‖ and Palestinians on the other 
side of the ―wall.‖ Both discursive communities construct an us versus them rhetorical 
binary operationalizing in and around Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall. This 
rhetorical move results in friend versus enemy relation as well as a collective versus 
individual identity formation (p. 20). Quoting Mouffe (2000), Crowley stated, ―This can 
happen when the other, who was until then considered only under the mode of difference, 
begins to be perceived as negating our identity‖ (p. 20). Typically, the hegemonic 
discourse posits the us as right/good and the other as wrong/bad, thus discursively 
solidifying the identities of both constructs. 
 I use Bushbridge‘s (2013) concept of the other, as represented in the wall, to 
further explore the symbolic meaning of wall evident in discourse. The graffiti on the 
wall further speaks to the wall‘s symbolic meaning, the concepts of looking and 
Othering, and the concept of binaries. Bushbridge provided insights into the symbolic 
meaning of the wall: ―It is not surprising, then, that the wall is most often read as the 
ultimate demonstration of Israeli sovereign power‖ (p. 659). Bushbridge, however, did 
not connect the symbolic meaning of the wall to discourse about the wall. 
 Crowley‘s (2006) perspective on binary rhetoric proves helpful in understanding 
the simplistic bifurcation of Israelis and Palestinians, as employed in language use, but 
Crowley‘s perspective applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict represents an idealistic 
viewpoint on the issues that divide Palestinian and Israeli leadership. A wall both 
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physically and symbolically divides West Bank Palestinians from most Israelis living in 
Israel proper. Simplistic language binaries reflecting the binary separation of us on one 
side of the wall and other on the other side fail to capture the complexities of the 
stakeholders involved in the conflict: Israeli settlers, secular Israelis, religious Jews, 
Palestinian Jews, West Bank Palestinians, Arab Israelis, and Palestinian Jerusalemites, 
not to mention international stakeholders.  
 I use the concepts of looking, Othering, binaries, and imperialism offered by 
Sturken and Cartwright (2009), Said (1978), Bushbridge (2013), Usher (2006), and 
Shurky (2013) as a lens to explore the interview data. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is 
largely a conflict of looking, Othering, and the creation of binaries. The interview and 
visual data speak to these concepts and the discourses they have created. The symbolic 
meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall constructed in discourse involves a 
process of looking, Othering, and binaries, further shaped by Said‘s concept of 
imperialism. Israelis from Jerusalem and other parts of Israel proper ―look‖ at the wall. I 
use Usher‘s (2006) ―native problem‖ to further explore how Israelis construct West Bank 
Palestinians in discourse, and what ideologies evident in discourse shape this framing.  
 When applied to the data, these theoretical perspectives began to raise sub-
questions: 
 How does Usher‘s (2006) concept shape discourse about Bethlehem Checkpoint 
300 and the wall? 
 How does the concept of ―native problem‖ intersect with the concepts of looking, 
Othering, and binaries? 
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 How has imperialism shaped this gaze? 
 When Israeli security personnel ―look‖ at Palestinians and internationals crossing 
the checkpoint, what do they see? 
 How do the visual space and the bureaucracy created by passing through 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 create rhetorical binaries, and what ideologies have 
shaped these binaries? 
 When Palestinians ―look‖ at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and wall, what do they 
see? 
 What do Palestinians see when they pass through the checkpoint? 
 What do Israelis and internationals see when they look the graffiti on the wall? 
 How do they construct the other? 
 How do the checkpoint and wall construct the other from the Palestinian 
perspective? 
 How do these symbols construct other from the Israeli perspective? 
The concepts discussed here help answer these important questions relative to the 
discourse surrounding the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall. 
 
The Power of Naming and Defining 
 
 The power of naming and defining relate to the concepts of CDA, looking, 
Othering, binaries, and imperialism. Bourdieu (1982) said that language and the power to 
name represent an institutional authority to delegate the power of words/language/naming 
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to an authorized spokesperson. The ability to name illustrates a struggle over who and 
what has the power to name and classify. Bourdieu said the power of naming and speech 
is nothing more than delegated power. Language itself has no authority; at best, it 
represents authority (pp. 107–109). Institutions grant language authority; therefore, 
authority comes from the outside. The power of words resides not in the individual, but 
rests on the ―accumulated symbolic capital‖ of the institution that delegate‘s power to 
speak to an authorized individual authority (pp. 110–111). In other words, who or what 
defines who is classified as a particular ethnic group or race? Who defines what is named 
―Israel‖ and what is named ―Palestine?‖ Who or what institution has the power to name a 
structure a ―fence‖ or a ―wall?‖ Where and how did they receive this power to name? 
How does naming shape the discourse surrounding Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
wall? Bourdieu assumed that all social agents have ―aspired‖ to have the ability to name.  
 I use Bourdieu‘s (1982) concepts of naming and defining to explore how the act 
of naming has shaped the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall 
in discourse. The act of naming and defining demonstrates a characteristic of ideological 
power, a concept introduced by Fairclough (2001). Within the context of 
Israeli/Palestinian discourse, ideological power shapes looking, Othering, and often 
constructed binaries. Israeli discourse, as demonstrated in the Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs website, names the land as ―ours,‖ the Israelis‘, because our Israeli God gave the 
land to us millennia ago. Many Palestinians, on the other hand, name the same land 
―Palestine‖ and point to Christian and Muslim religious structures on the land to justify 
their respective land claims and historical and theological claims to the land. Both 
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communities claim a historical connection to the land, grounded in their respective 
religious traditions. Both Israelis and Palestinians use naming in discourse to evoke 
rhetoric of historical precedence, arguing that each respective community has historic and 
even religious claims to the land. For Palestinians and Israelis, naming and renaming 
becomes central to their claims to contested land and consequently to accepting or 
denying the other community‘s historical and religious narrative. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives from Visual Rhetoric 
 
 Visual rhetoric scholars provide concepts helpful to understanding, looking, and 
Othering as they relate to the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
wall. Their perspectives also prove valuable for analyzing the wall as a visual artifact, 
and for how the visual design of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall shapes 
discourse about the wall. Foss (2004) said the ―function‖ of visual artifacts focuses on the 
communicative effects of the visual rhetoric on audiences. Function is not synonymous 
with purpose, which involves the intended or desired effect by the creator of the image. 
Function persuades, using symbols designed to change audience members‘ perception in 
specific ways (p. 309). In Foss‘s article, conception of the audience was a major feature 
of the rhetorical response to a particular visual artifact (p. 306). 
 I apply Foss‘s (2004) concepts of function to Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
wall. EAPPI‘s diagram of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall located at this 
checkpoint receive analysis relative to the presented and suggested elements. A diagram 
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of the ―security fence‖ located on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website also 
receives analysis relative to Foss‘s concepts of function. 
 
Heteroglossia 
 
Graddol (2006) discussed the concept of heteroglossia, defined by the meanings 
conveyed by the various modes and the multiple contradictions found in the semiotic 
modal constructs. Graddol applied this concept to a wine label, arguing that the bar code, 
a code of numbers, nibbles around the label indicating the batch and time of bottling, 
graphic design of rules, words organized in space, and typography visually code language 
(pp. 195–196). The various semiotic resources of text speak to the multiple audiences in 
particular ways, and these audiences recognize social and economic relationships that the 
producer wants to construct. The bar code addresses the retailer and laws requiring 
information about the dangers of alcohol consumption; therefore this text also addresses 
the consumer (pp. 196–197). Also, the design of the wine label addresses multiple 
readerships in complex and contradictory ways associated with the consumption of wine.  
 I use Graddol‘s (2006) concept of heteroglossia as a lens to examine the graffiti 
on the wall. The graffiti includes a hodgepodge of vandalism, images of landscapes and 
symbols, and words in various languages, and it addresses different audiences in 
contradictory ways. Graffiti on the wall reflects multiple discourses, often constructing 
West Bank Palestinian identity as both peace seekers and warriors against Israeli colonial 
expansion and Israel‘s expulsion of Palestinian Arabs. Internationally known graffiti 
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artists, such as Banksy, Blu, Sam 3, and Ron English, have created large works of graffiti 
on the wall, which are often located near more simplistic graffiti tags and vandalism. One 
restaurant owner in Bethlehem, Joseph Hasboun, hung the menu for his restaurant, 
Bahamas Seafood, on the wall (Parry, 2010, p. 20). Some of the graffiti analyzed evokes 
Picasso‘s Guernica and, and the same time, provides a message of hope to Palestinian 
residents of Aida refugee camp located near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. Graffiti on the 
wall constructs Palestinians both as victims with no power and as victors with power. It 
evokes the contradictory rhetorics of Palestinians‘ right to return to their homes in 
historic Palestine, and of the denial of Israeli rights to return to arguably their historic 
homeland. Graddol‘s (2006) concept of heteroglossia helps explain the message, 
audience, and semiotic meaning of the images relative to their location on the wall. 
 The next chapter, Chapter 3, discusses the research setting and context of data 
collection. I situate the wall with regard to the people, activities, and structures 
surrounding it, including a discussion of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, data, data collection 
methods, and methods of organizing and analyzing the data. 
 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 3: SITUATING BETHLEHEM CHECKPOINT 300 AND THE WALL 
 
To answer the research question of how the symbolic meanings of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint and the wall are constructed in discourse, I employ several methods including 
interviews and analysis of texts, images, and structures. I collected three types of data: (1) 
interview data, (2) graffiti data from the Bethlehem side of the wall, (3) textual artifacts 
including a diagram that illustrates the visual design and bureaucratic mechanisms at 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, and (4) material from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website. In this chapter, I describe the context in which the data was collected, the types 
of data collected, and the methods used for organizing and analyzing the data.  
 
Context of Data Collection 
 
 Five visits I made to the State of Israel and the West Bank between 2006 and 
2012 provided much of the context for this study. Three of these trips were part of a study 
tour program with Chowan University, where I served as Vice President of Enrollment 
Management and adjunct faculty in the Department of Religion from 2005 until 2012. 
These study tours to Israel and the West Bank primarily focused on visiting religious and 
archaeological sites. During my first visit, Dr. Chris White, President of Chowan 
University and leader of the trip, organized dinner with a Palestinian student‘s family at 
their home in Beit Sahour, West Bank. A Palestinian man picked us up at our hotel in 
Jerusalem, and we proceeded to drive on a road that paralleled the wall on our way to 
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pass through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 into Bethlehem.  
My wife and I engaged with this Palestinian family at dinner and discussed the 
conflict and U.S. perceptions of Palestinians and the West Bank. My perceptions of 
Palestinians changed dramatically as I heard stories of how the wall impacts their daily 
lives and has ruined the Palestinian economy in Bethlehem, which relies heavily on 
tourism. According to a Palestinian businessman who joined us at the dinner, most 
tourists would not pass through the checkpoint because they were afraid of what was on 
the other side of the wall. He discussed how he perceived that Israelis and Americans, in 
general, constructed the identity of Palestinians—as dangerous terrorists. The man told us 
to go back to the U.S. and tell other Americans that we had dinner with ―good Palestinian 
terrorists,‖ and then he laughed. 
  Dinner with this family resulted in a deep reflection on how I had constructed 
Palestinian identity prior to this dinner and what had caused that construction. My 
interaction with this particular Palestinian family challenged and confronted my own 
unexamined ideologies with respect to Palestinians and Israelis. Questions immediately 
arose—mainly, why was I fearful of entering the West Bank? From where did my 
ideological constructions of Palestinian come? What visual rhetorics contributed to these 
ideological and mythological constructions? 
 The perspective of the researcher played an important part in what data I 
collected, how I collected it, and how I interpreted it. My experience with Palestinians in 
the West Bank and at Chowan University inevitably impacted my perspective on this 
research study, the data, and its conclusions. Moreover, my identity as a college-educated 
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American from the southern United States further shapes how I interpreted the data and 
offered conclusions. 
 My experience in the West Bank serendipitously aligned with Chowan 
University admitting Palestinian students, one of whom I had met during my first trip to 
Israel and the West Bank in 2006. From 2006 until 2012, I interacted with Palestinian 
students at Chowan on a daily basis. Our relationships were mutually beneficial: I taught 
them about the United States and provided logistical, academic, and social support, and 
they taught me about Palestinian culture, language, social norms, West Bank geography, 
and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Experiencing the historical, religious, and cultural 
environment of Israel and the West Bank in 2006, followed by daily conversations with 
these students about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, resulted in my commitment to further 
study this area from the perspective of identity construction and discourse. I began asking 
questions about what shaped the identity of Palestinians, and how and why concepts 
about Palestinians were constructed in a particular way. These experiences led to a 
Palestinian-influenced perspective on Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, the wall, and the 
Israeli/Palestine conflict. I do not take the position of an unbiased observer and 
researcher. 
 Even a non-astute international traveler cannot miss the visible signs and symbols 
of conflict evident in Israel proper and the West Bank: abandoned tanks near major 
highways, missile launchers posited on hilltops, armed military personnel standing on 
street corners, checkpoints,—and, of course, the wall. Highway/Route 60 approaching 
Bethlehem from East Jerusalem gives the viewer a long and protracted view of the wall, 
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which runs parallel to this major highway. On that first trip to Israel and the West Bank in 
2006, nothing affected me more than the visual impact of this wall and how I interpreted 
it. I thought, ―Whoever or whatever is behind this wall must be contained. Someone or 
something behind this wall is dangerous.‖ 
 My desire to learn more about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the wall, and 
Palestinian ways of life resulted in two solo trips to Israel and the West Bank in 2010 and 
2012. The first trip allowed time to visit places seen in the previous trips and 
opportunities to explore other areas with local Palestinian Jerusalemites and Palestinian 
West Bankers. In 2010, I spent extensive time in East Jerusalem, the Bethlehem area, and 
Ramallah, learning more about the mundane aspects of Palestinian daily life and the 
impact of the wall and checkpoints on the daily lives of Palestinians. The primary 
purpose of my trip in 2012 was to collect data for this dissertation, which I discuss in this 
chapter. During that trip, I also visited the contested areas of the Silwan neighborhood in 
East Jerusalem and downtown Hebron near al-Shahuda Street, which is home to Jewish 
settlers in the center of a large Palestinian city.  
 
Situating Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the Wall 
 
 The people, activities, structures, and signs around Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
and the wall exemplify conflict. The people around the wall include both armed Israeli 
security personnel stationed at the checkpoint and religious pilgrims visiting Rachel‘s 
Tomb as well as other religious and archaeological sites in Bethlehem. Copious amounts 
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of graffiti and vandalism on the Bethlehem side of the wall also symbolize the conflict. 
The wall and its checkpoints have chopped up the West Bank and created distinctive, 
non-contiguous Palestinian enclaves. Chomsky (2006) asserted that the wall will 
eventually encompass all Israeli Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank, creating three 
separate Palestinian cantons or ―Bantustans.‖ The three cantons/Bantustans created by the 
wall, according to Chomsky, are Jenin-Nablus, Bethlehem-Hebron, and Ramallah (p. 
190). 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 allows Palestinians and internationals to pass through 
the wall using either a pedestrian terminal or a car lane. Palestinian West Bankers with 
Israeli-issued permits use the pedestrian terminal because vehicles with Palestinian 
license plates cannot enter Israel through the car lane (EAPPI, 2011, p. 6). Internationals 
and Palestinians who hold an Israeli ID can use the car lane. Checkpoints are common in 
the West Bank and do not solely operate along the wall. Kotef and Amir (2011) argued 
that most of the checkpoints are located in the West Bank, not between Israel and the 
West Bank as represented by the Green Line. Checkpoints are located at the entrance to 
Palestinian villages, towns, and cities, thus restricting freedom of movement for vehicles 
and people entering or leaving these areas. Restrictions on Palestinian freedom of 
movement provide security to the approximately 300,000 Israeli Jewish settlers living 
east of the Green Line (Heffez, 2012, p. 95).  
I chose this particular section of the wall to research because it is located near 
other prominent symbols of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, including Israeli Jewish 
settlements, Palestinian refugee camps, Jerusalem, and contested religious sites such as 
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the Harem Al Sharif/Temple Mount complex in East Jerusalem. I also have had personal 
experience passing through this checkpoint. Figure 3 represents the location of this 
research study. 
 
 
Figure 3. Map of the area surrounding Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Source: B‘Tselem, http://www.btselem.org/download/201411_btselem_map_of_wb_eng.pdf 
 
The red line in Figure 3 represents the current location of the wall relative to the 
geographic area around Bethlehem and East Jerusalem. The red line in the center of 
Figure 3 that forms a rectangle is Rachel‘s Tomb, which is completely surrounded by the 
wall. Rachel‘s Tomb is a site of religious pilgrimage for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. 
Adjacent to Rachel‘s Tomb and the Aida (Ayda) Refugee Camp is Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300. Israeli Jewish settlements are light blue in color, whereas Palestinian 
areas are tan and a medium-brown color. 
 The 1949 armistice or ―Green Line‖ (indicated by the green line in Figure 3) 
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represents the armistice line between Israel and the Arab countries of Syria, Lebanon, 
Egypt, and Jordan. The United Nations established the Green Line in 1949, after the 1948 
Israeli/Arab war and the declaration of the State of Israel (The Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2007). In the 1967 war, the Israelis conquered the area from the Green Line east 
to the Jordan River (the area known as East Jerusalem and the West Bank) from Jordan, 
the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Israeli has 
since removed its military occupation from the Sinai and returned that land to Egypt. 
Israel annexed East Jerusalem and unified it with West Jerusalem, thus rhetorically 
establishing a ―unified Jerusalem,‖ and the Golan Heights still remains under Israeli 
occupation. Israeli occupying forces left Gaza in 2005, yet Israel still controls everything 
around and above Gaza. Israel also controls electricity to Gaza, which is separated from 
the Israeli-occupied West Bank (Heffez, 2012, p. 54). EAPPI (2007) has reported that 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 is located 2 kilometers east of the Green Line. Note in Figure 
3 that the Israeli Jewish settlements of Gilo, Har Gilo, Har Homa, and Giv‘at HaMatos 
are located east of the Green Line and west/northwest of the wall. 
 People using this checkpoint also include Palestinian West Bankers, Palestinian 
Jerusalemites, and internationals that seek to access East Jerusalem or Bethlehem via 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. EAPPI (2011) reported that between 4,000 and 6,000 
Palestinian West Bankers with Israeli-issued permits pass through this checkpoint every 
day between 4 a.m. and 7 a.m. (p. 1). This volume of Palestinians encourages other 
groups of people to gather at this space, such as vendors selling food and coffee and taxi 
drivers. The discourse of the conflict and the identities that are of most concern in this 
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dissertation are Palestinians in general and Palestinian West Bankers specifically. 
Palestinians are typically divided into three subgroups: Jerusalemites, West Bankers, and 
Arab Israelis. 
 
Data and Data Collection Methods 
 
Because the research questions focus on discourse, looking, identity, and the 
construction of the Other relative to the checkpoint and the wall, I collected interview 
data about Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall, but also about how Palestinians and 
internationals talk about the checkpoint and wall. During my five trips to Israel and the 
West Bank, Palestinian West Bankers and Palestinian Jerusalemites talked with me 
consistently about the conflict relative to the wall. This experience shaped my 
appreciation of how the wall both symbolizes the conflict and impacts the lives of 
Palestinians, and how looking at the wall results in discourse that leads directly to 
identity constructions of Israelis, Palestinians, and internationals. 
 
 
Data from Interviews 
 
 The interview data consists of 19 interviews, including 13 interviews with 
Palestinians who live near or pass through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. Two of the 
Palestinian participants held the Israeli ID and were from East Jerusalem, and 11 
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Palestinian participants held the Palestinian ID and were from Beit Jala and Bethlehem, 
West Bank. Other interviewees included five internationals (three from the US, one from 
Korea, and one from the United Kingdom) and one Israeli from Jerusalem. The 
individual interviews ranged from approximately 5 minutes to 43 minutes in length. I 
conducted the interviews in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in May 2012. Interview 
participants were selected based on both a convenience sample and the snowball effect 
leading to additional interviews. All interview participants spoke English fluently. 
Interview questions were prepared in advance, and the interviews were allowed to flow in 
a natural, conversational way (see Appendix B). East Carolina‘s University Center and 
Medical Institutional Review Board (UCMIRB) reviewed and approved the study prior to 
my collecting the data (see Appendix A).
1
 
Through the interview questions, I attempted to gather information from 
participants regarding their experiences with Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall, 
including how the participants have used the checkpoint, how often they have used it, 
how they would describe the checkpoint and their experiences with it, what 
advantages/challenges it has presented, and how the checkpoint has impacted their daily 
lives. Most of the conversations migrated to other topics relative to the conflict, including 
the role of the ID and the process of obtaining permission to pass through the checkpoint.  
After a few interviews, consistent themes began to emerge: ID, security, Israeli 
identity, Palestinian identity, and how the Palestinians feel when they pass through the 
checkpoint. Because the checkpoint is located on the wall, I also asked questions about 
                                                 
1
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the wall. The questions were simple: How do you feel about the wall? What are the 
benefits of the wall? My goal before the interviews was to segment and analyze the 
interview responses based on ID type, religion, place of residence, and gender. 
Reviewing the data revealed remarkable connections among these demographic markers, 
and thus I decided to analyze themes, which I discuss later in this chapter. 
My conversations with Palestinians at Chowan University and during visits to the 
West Bank strongly suggested that Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall assumed a 
symbolic meaning, which led to further exploration of how Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
and the wall as symbols have been constructed in discourse.  
 
Data from the Wall 
 
My time spent in and around the wall revealed that Palestinians and internationals 
also use graffiti to comment on the wall, so collecting samples of graffiti became 
appropriate for answering the research question. I collected images of graffiti on the 
Bethlehem side of the wall because these graffiti represented a variety of discourses and 
audiences, and because it was easier than collecting images of graffiti on the Jerusalem 
side of the wall. I collected images based on both their proximity to Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the legibility of the graffiti itself. A large portion of the graffiti on 
the wall is a hodgepodge of tags, vandalism, words, phrases, and images, which made 
deciphering some graffiti extremely difficult. 
The graffiti in a large part represents opposition to the construction and symbolic 
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meaning of the wall from the perspective of Palestinians and internationals. Heffez 
(2012) said, ―Graffiti on the Barrier tends to support the Palestinian view that Israeli 
security is a pretext for imprisoning Palestinians‖ (p. 90). Other images selected for 
analysis include images of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall from the EAPPI 
Special Report: The Bethlehem Checkpoint, Key Findings Based on EAPPI Checkpoint 
Monitoring (EAPPI 2011). I analyzed 22 images of the wall, including images from the 
EAPPI report. 
 
Data from Textual Artifacts 
 
A diagram of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 from the EAPPI Special Report 
provided a helpful analysis of the checkpoint‘s visual design and layout. This diagram 
adds additional context relative to understanding how the interview participants construct 
the process of passing through the checkpoint. It also provides a visual understanding of 
the checkpoint and further helps contextualize what the users of the checkpoint see when 
they talk about passing through the checkpoint in the interviews. This diagram also 
illustrates how the wall physically and symbolically relates to the checkpoint, allowing 
further contextualization and intersection of the interview data, the graffiti, and the 
diagram of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
The EAPPI diagram and images of the wall located near Bethlehem Checkpoint 
300 contrast sharply with the visual presentation of the ―Anti-Terrorism Fence‖ found on 
the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. I analyzed the visual presentation of the 
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fence/wall on this website by focusing on the images used to construct the fence, its 
purpose, and its design. I chose this website because I felt that it offers an ―official‖ 
perspective on the checkpoint and wall from an Israeli point of view. Content on the 
website related to the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall was 
also analyzed, because the verbal and visual content on the Israeli website offers further 
insight into how official Israeli sources talk about the checkpoint and wall and how this 
talk constructs to symbolic meaning.  
 
Methods for Organizing and Analyzing the Data 
 
 The interview data collected in this research study represents a variety of 
rhetorical practices, rhetorical strategies, and narratives used to talk about and describe 
the discourse surrounding the wall and Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, including the visual 
discourse. During the interviews, I asked permission to record the participants, and I used 
a battery-powered voice recorder when conducting the interviews. Upon returning to the 
US, I saved this recorded data in an external hard drive and on my personal computer, 
while also keeping copies of the data on the voice recorder. I listened to the recorded 
interview data saved on my computer and transcribed the interviews into Microsoft 
Word, identifying the interview participants according to the order in which I collected 
the data. To protect the identity of the participants, I did not collect names during the data 
collection process. On the transcript, I designated participants with a ―P‖ for ―participant‖ 
and designated the order in which the data was collected with a number resulting in a 
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―P1, P2, P3‖ and so on designation. These codes—P1, P2, P3, etc.—became a method for 
organizing the data.  
 The process of closely listening to and transcribing the recorded data revealed 
clear and consistent themes. This process of transcribing also revealed data relative to 
policies and symbols that I had not previously considered. The question to interview 
participants regarding their ID type (Palestinian, Israeli, or international) suggested 
another prominent symbol of the conflict that constructs identity and impacts discourse: 
the ID and ID type. This symbolic construct, the ID, contains immense power, and the 
respective Palestinian groups understood that one Palestinian with one ID had more (or 
less) power than a Palestinian holding another ID. The participants were also fully aware 
of the power of an international ID, such as a U.S. passport. Noting that the ID/ID type 
was a theme that reverberated throughout all the interviews, I further organized the data 
according to themes by identifying key words and phrases like ―ID.‖ The transcript data 
in Microsoft Word was uploaded into Invivo, and I identified themes by searching for 
key words and phrases. The key words and phrases included ―Palestinian,‖ ―Israeli,‖ 
―wall,‖ ―Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 or 300,‖ ―ID,‖ ―checkpoint,‖ ―security,‖ ―permit,‖ 
―permissions,‖ ―Muslim,‖ and ―Christian.‖ I further analyze the interview data using the 
theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2. 
 Interview participants‘ discussions about the experiences with Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the wall overlapped with the analysis of diagram of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 created by EAPPI. I analyzed the diagram relative to this visual layout 
and operational procedures evident in that layout focusing on how the checkpoint‘s visual 
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and operational layout contributed to and helped construct the identity of the users of the 
checkpoint. This analysis and correlation with the interview data raised sub-questions. 
What did these visuals and bureaucratic procedures communicate? How did they 
construct, intentionally or unintentionally the identity of Palestinians? How did these 
visuals and procedures construct, intentionally or unintentionally the identity of Israelis?  
 The context of this specific section of the wall at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
provides an easy avenue for Palestinians, tourists, and activists to have a voice and to 
express their interpretation of the wall through the use of graffiti, vandalism, and even 
projection screens. The graffiti often demonstrates solidarity with Palestinians and 
provides communication with viewers through images and text. The wall shows black 
soot from fires, splashes of paint from paint cans hurled at the wall, and messages to 
leaders and citizens of the United States and Israel. Graffiti near Rachel‘s Tomb stated, 
―Question your leaders‖ and ―Freedom has no cost.‖ Nazi swastikas are painted alongside 
of the Star of David, a prominent symbol displayed on the Israeli flag. Other iconic 
images on the wall include a young, Palestinian freedom fighter Leila Khalid, a 
Palestinian member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian and hijacker of 
two passenger planes in 1969 and 1970, respectively. Both the defacing of and extensive 
graffiti on the wall suggests that Palestinians and internationals sought to distance 
themselves not only from the Israelis, but also from symbols relative to the Israelis. These 
symbols include the wall, checkpoint, ID, and Israeli Jewish settlements. The graffiti 
speaks to multiple discourses surrounding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict including 
Palestinian refugees‘ right to return to their historic homeland. The graffiti includes 
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prominent Palestinian cultural symbols like the Palestinian Flag and the Dome of the 
Rock located in East Jerusalem. 
 In Chapter 4, I present analyses of the interviews, a diagram of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300, graffiti, and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website data using the 
methods discussed here and theoretical concepts discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, I 
discuss the implications of the data analysis and draw conclusions from the data analyzed 
specific to the research question. 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 4: RHETORICS CREATED, IDENTITIES CONSTRUCTED 
 
 This chapter presents the data analysis results using the theoretical perspectives 
from visual rhetoric scholars and CDA scholars discussed in Chapter 2. Extending these 
theoretical perspectives to analyze the data I collected, I examine the visual discourse and 
visual rhetoric of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall.  
 As discussed in Chapter 1, this study defines rhetoric as ―the study or practice of 
effective symbolic expression‖ (Herrick, 2005, p. 24). The act of persuasion is a key 
component of the effectiveness of symbolic communication. Rhetoric is a type of 
discourse that is planned and responsive, adjusting and adapting to audiences. It connects 
to personal, psychological, and political power, and it is shaped, informed, and 
constructed by ideologies. Rhetoric can also shape ideologies. The persuasive function of 
rhetoric often hides or embeds in ideologies not immediately evident to the unconscious 
subscriber (Herrick, 2005, pp. 21–22). 
 The persuasive component of rhetoric differentiates it from discourse. This study 
defines discourse as ―ways of combining and integrating language, actions, interactions, 
and ways of thinking, believing, valuing, and using various symbols, tools, and objects to 
enact a particular sort of socially recognizable identity‖ (Gee, 1999, p. 29). Discourse is a 
recognized ―dance‖ of words, deeds, values, beliefs, symbols, tools, objects, time, and 
place (p. 36). Discourse involves the use of props including books, classrooms, 
laboratories, technologies, words, and symbols. Words, action, beliefs, emotions, values, 
and interactions constitute ―being and doing in X,‖ in which recognition of these words, 
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beliefs, actions and so forth create a discourse (p. 37). 
 Visual rhetoric functions to persuade viewers and also adapts and adjusts. Visual 
rhetoric is symbolic, involves human interaction, and serves a communicative function 
(Foss, 2004). Like rhetoric, ideology shapes visual rhetoric. Visual discourse, by contrast, 
involves objects, tools, symbols, and social interaction that are recognized as a type of 
who (identity) engaged in what (activity) (Gee, 1999, p. 35). When visual discourse shifts 
to a persuasive function specific to who engaged in what, then the visual discourse 
becomes visual rhetoric. 
 
Visual Rhetoric 
 
 Visual rhetoric examines associations with emotional response, image, and 
abstract values related to visual symbols (Hill, 2004). The visual rhetoric scholars 
discussed in Chapter 2 investigated how visual designers used images to evoke a desired 
response from viewers, create specific rhetorics, or construct identities using visual 
images. One strategy used by creators of visual rhetoric is to associate a visual artifact 
with abstract values and mythological symbols. These values and symbols help construct 
meaning and identity and persuade audiences.  
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall serve as persuasive visual rhetoric 
exploiting cultural values laden with emotional weight—specifically the cultural value of 
security and safety from others on the other side of the wall, from a Israeli perspective. 
From a Palestinian perspective, the wall persuades Palestinian and international 
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audiences that the State of Israel is a colonial enterprise. Regardless of their perspective, 
viewers transform these visual rhetorics into myths and meta-signs that serve as a 
communicative function to shape identity. 
 
Visual Rhetoric of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the Wall 
 
 The physical and visual layouts, as well as the symbolic meaning of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 and the wall, shape several rhetorics and discourses evident in the 
interview and visual data, including the rhetoric of security and a discourse of Promised 
Land. The interaction of these rhetorics, discourses, and symbols contribute to and 
construct myths about Palestinian and Israeli identity. In 2011, EAPPI reported on 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and published a diagram of the checkpoint and adjacent 
sections of the wall. Note the various ID booths, security booths, metal detectors, and 
other bureaucratic mechanisms and the layout of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. Also note 
the checkpoint‘s location relative to the wall. 
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Figure 4. Diagram of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Source: EAPPI Special Report: The Bethlehem Checkpoint in 2011, p. 7 
 
The four security booths, three metal detectors, five enclosed spaces housing 
Israeli security personnel, and 12 ID booths on this diagram are located inside a metal 
building on the Jerusalem side of the wall (Figure 4). The series of bureaucratic security 
controls and security personnel located at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 visually 
communicate security—that the wall and the related security apparatuses and 
bureaucracies located at the checkpoint secure something, some place, and somebodies. 
Symbolically, these visual elements communicate that those individuals who wish to pass 
through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall must receive intense scrutiny in the form 
of multiple security screenings and multiple ID checks.  
The wall itself—with its physical characteristics including innumerable 8-meter 
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high concrete slabs, metal cage-like structures around the initial queuing lanes, and 
redundancy of ID checks—suggests that Israeli security personnel do not trust West Bank 
Palestinians who pass through the checkpoint. Their ID, or lack thereof, largely 
determines their identity and the level of bureaucratic security screening to which they 
will be subjected. The wall must keep them contained, and the only way they can pass 
through the wall into Israel proper and East Jerusalem is to undergo extensive security 
screenings. 
The audience for the visual rhetorics inside the checkpoint terminal is Palestinians 
and internationals. The visual rhetorics outside and inside the checkpoint persuade by 
constructing the identity of Palestinians as potential security threats who demand 
redundant security screenings. As the Palestinian users of the checkpoint look upon the 
various queuing lines, metal turnstiles, metal detectors, and ID booths, these visual 
rhetorics further communicate what the Bethlehem side of the wall outside the terminal 
communicates rhetorically. That is, Palestinian identity equates to being an exotic, 
dangerous other and a potential terrorist (Said, 1978).  
The wall also communicates, visually and rhetorically, that Israel is sovereign—
even on Palestinian land east of the Green Line. Thus the wall is a visual rhetoric that 
persuades Israeli, international, and Palestinian audiences. The wall‘s location, near the 
historic cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, makes the wall a particularly effective tool at 
communicating Israel‘s sovereignty and, in a sense, Israel‘s construction of West Bank 
Palestinians on the other side of the wall. Israelis and internationals in Jerusalem cannot 
miss seeing the wall; thus it becomes an effective visual and communicative tool to these 
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audiences. Palestinian Jerusalemites and Palestinian West Bankers also see the wall. The 
rhetorical presence of the wall makes it an effective visual rhetoric. Its size and length 
persuade Israeli, Palestinian, and international audiences that the other side of the wall 
poses a danger to those on Jerusalem side of the wall. 
The visual rhetoric of the wall impacts discourse significantly when Palestinians 
describe passing through the checkpoint. Marina, a Palestinian with an Palestinian ID, 
explained that she used to ―see‖ Jerusalem often. Now, however, the process of getting to 
Jerusalem, which used to take ten minutes, is a bureaucratic quagmire that makes 
Palestinian travel to Jerusalem ―miserable.‖ Marina said, ―For twenty years, I used to go 
easily. Ten minutes, I was in Jerusalem. You know, but since they came here, why should 
I go? Why should I go through all this to see Jerusalem? You feel miserable there‖ 
(Interview Data, 2012). Marina‘s words ―since they came here‖ are rhetorically 
significant. ―They‖ refers to Jewish migration into historic Palestine and the expansion of 
Israeli Jewish settlements, many of which locate just outside the wall on the Jerusalem 
side. ―They‖ is rhetorically positioned as the reason why Marina does not go to 
Jerusalem. This blame rhetoric was evident through the interview data, as Palestinian 
participants pointed to Israelis as ―they/them‖ who have caused the hardships of many 
West Bank Palestinians. ―They‖ also suggests a binary rhetoric that constructs the 
opposing identity of ―I.‖ 
Moreover, Marina‘s refusal to ―go through all this to see Jerusalem‖ reflects how 
she felt about the bureaucracies and intense security screenings that go with passing 
through the checkpoint (Interview Data, 2012). Because Marina is a Palestinian Christian, 
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Jerusalem holds religious and mythological significance for her. Prominent Christian 
churches and other sites important to Palestinian Christians are located in Jerusalem. But 
seeing the city, which was once important to Marina, is now not worth it (Interview Data, 
2012). In other words, the process of passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
supersedes the importance of seeing the holy city and its related religious sites.  
This perspective is repeated throughout the data. Christian Palestinians with 
Palestinian IDs received permission to enter Jerusalem, but they refused to do so because 
of their treatment by Israel security personnel at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
security screenings required to pass from Bethlehem into East Jerusalem. Graffiti on the 
Bethlehem side of the wall often uses Christian symbols to communicate the difficulties 
of Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and the inaccessibility of Jerusalem. The 
audience for this graffiti is likely Christian internationals visiting Bethlehem, a site of 
religious pilgrimage for Christians worldwide.  
 Marina‘s comment suggests that the wall‘s purpose extends beyond security. The 
wall serves as an ideological apparatus that refuses access of Palestinians, Christians, and 
Muslims to prominent religious sites in East Jerusalem. In a sense, the wall is a 
mechanism for restricting worship for both Palestinian Christians and Muslims (Interview 
Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012). These religious sites are located east of the Green Line, 
which is rhetorically framed as internationally recognized Palestinian land, thus further 
frustrating West Bank Palestinian who aren‘t being allowed to access important religious 
sites on their Palestinian land.  
Jewish Israelis living in Jerusalem, and even in settlements deep in the West 
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Bank, can access these religious sites, many of which hold significant meaning for Jewish 
Israelis as well. Access from settlements in the West Bank to Israel proper primarily 
occurs on settler-only roads that further bisect the West Bank. Symbolically, Israeli 
Jewish settler access to religious sites via settler-only roads rhetorically communicates to 
West Bank Palestinian audiences that Jewish Israelis can access these sites, whereas 
Palestinian West Bankers cannot. This lack of access to religious sites shapes a discourse 
of restriction of Palestinian moment (Interview Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012).  
Bushbridge (2013) argued that the wall fails at achieving its intended purpose of 
security for two reasons: (1) because obvious gaps in its structure fail in buttressing 
against the other ―out there,‖ and (2) because Israeli Jewish settlers live on the Bethlehem 
side of the wall. Israeli Jewish settlements highlight the complex relationship between 
settlers and the State and a complex relationship of theology and politics in Israel that has 
materialized in the wall. This ideological dialectic has threatened to undermine the State 
because of the large number of Jewish settlers on the West Bank side of the wall (p. 658). 
Settlements such as Gilo, Har Gilo, and Har Homa are visible from many parts of the 
West Bank near the research site, including Abu Dis, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, and 
Bethlehem. Also, these settlements become significant components of visual rhetoric 
because they seek to persuade the Palestinian audience that the land belongs to the Israeli 
Jews. Israeli leadership frames settlements as ―security,‖ thus attempting to convince 
international and Israeli audiences that ―grabbing‖ additional Palestinian land does not 
determine the location of settlements, but security determines location of settlements. 
Gilo, Har Gilo, and Har Homa are located on mountaintops and maintain a visual 
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presence from both Israeli and Palestinian audiences. Thus the settlements are a 
significant component of visual rhetoric that constructs Israelis as rightful owners of the 
land, regardless of their location relative to the Green Line. 
The creators of the wall symbolically connect it to two positive cultural values 
evident on the Jerusalem side of the wall—safety and security from West Bank 
Palestinians, and Israeli land rights. The rhetorics of security and Israeli land rights 
manifest discursively and symbolically. The wall, checkpoints, ID, and Israeli Jewish 
settlements communicate to Israeli, international, and Palestinian audiences that Israel is 
the ultimate, sovereign power, even in and on ―Palestinian‖ land. Central to interpreting 
this symbolism is the way in which Israelis and Palestinians frame each other‘s and their 
own identities. As Shurky (2013) explained, ―The positive self-presentation and negative 
other presentation are employed in discourse‖ (p. 174). The discursive space of 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 clearly illustrates Shurky‘s assertion: the visual discourse of 
security apparatuses and structures operating at the checkpoint constructs a positive 
identity for Israeli security personnel and a negative identity for Palestinians. This 
identity construction further illustrates the binary of positive self and negative other. The 
Israelis must protect themselves and the Israeli homeland from the dangerous, West Bank 
Palestinian other, and that protection requires physical separation and distinction from 
Palestinian West Bankers.  
Conversely, the restriction on Palestinian freedom of movement constructs a 
negative identity for Israeli security personnel at the checkpoint and Israelis in general 
and a positive identity for Palestinians, from the perspective of many West Bank 
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Palestinians and internationals (Interview Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012). In other 
words, the same discursive space—Bethlehem Checkpoint 300—constructs people 
differently depending on what discourse and rhetoric are operating and when they are 
operating. The rhetorical audience also plays a major factor in the positive self or 
negative other identity construct. As Leila explained, 
They‘re [Israeli security personnel] gonna be asking me questions and making me 
go through all these … um … machines to make sure that I don‘t have anything 
on me, and just asking me ridiculous questions like why I wanna go there, and 
who am I gonna be hanging out with, and stuff like that. So it‘s a really hard time 
for me to go there. That‘s why even though I have the permit, I don‘t really use it, 
but I have it most of the times. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Leila‘s comment about the difficulty of passing through the checkpoint and the scrutiny 
she endures suggest that Israeli security personnel frame her identity as a negative other. 
From their perspective, she is unsafe and requires further questioning while passing 
through the checkpoint, even though she has a permit, issued by a branch of the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) that allows her to do so. Leila‘s discourse is similar to that of 
Marina; Leila did not use her Israeli-issued permit because of the difficult of passing 
through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. This discourse constructs an identity of negative 
other with respect to Israeli Security personnel stationed at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
Israeli security personnel issue permits to cross the checkpoint and enter East Jerusalem 
and Israel proper, while they simultaneously make it extremely difficult for Palestinians 
who have these permits to actually use them for that purpose (Interview Data, 2012).  
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The checkpoints are a focal point for interaction between Palestinians and Israelis 
and a space for discursive exchange. Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 locates about two 
kilometers east of the Green Line, but most checkpoints are deep inside the West Bank, 
often between Palestinian cities. Kotef and Amir (2011) explained that most checkpoints 
are at the entrances to villages, towns, and cities, thus restricting the movement of 
vehicles and people entering or leaving those areas. Checkpoints enclose the cities, thus 
separating them from surrounding villages that depend upon them. This impedes many of 
the mundane aspects of everyday life such as traveling to work or school, to the doctor or 
the market. Checkpoints restrict or altogether prohibit visits with family members. 
Checkpoints restrict the flow of goods and labor, thus negatively impacting various 
economies, including Bethlehem‘s tourism industry (pp. 56–57).  
Kotef and Amir (2011) argued that the checkpoints entail a disciplinary approach. 
They ―discipline‖ Palestinians for ―bad‖ behavior, thus constructing Palestinians as 
subjects in need of disciplining. As Kotef and Amir argue, this is designed to fail, thus 
enabling a construction of Palestinians as national-less and subjected to a foreign, 
sovereign, and omnipotent power of whom they are the enemy. The checkpoint produces 
them as occupied subjects (p. 64).  
This perspective offered by Kotef and Amir (2011) parallels Shurky‘s (2013) 
concepts of negative other presentation and positive self-representation. Evident in the 
discourse created by the interaction between Palestinians and Israelis at the checkpoints is 
that both groups construct each other‘s identity in similar negative ways (Interview Data, 
2012). For Palestinians using the checkpoint, Israel security personnel have a negative 
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other identity. Palestinians construct themselves in a positive self-representation that 
posits the Israelis as a brutal, occupying power seeking to confine, restrict, and oppress—
if not entirely erase—Palestinians and Palestinian ways of life in the West Bank. The 
Palestinians are ―victims‖ of the Israeli occupation. This victim rhetoric is evident from 
both Palestinian and Israeli perspectives, as each group rhetorically constructs their own 
identity as victims of occupation (Palestinians) or victims of Palestinian and/or general 
terrorism (Israelis) (Interview Data, 2012; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).  
The checkpoints, like the wall and settlements, further communicate to 
Palestinians that Israel has power over them, visually symbolized in the checkpoints, 
wall, IDs, and settlements. These symbols remind Palestinians of how Israel constructs 
their identity. In a sense, Palestinians become mythological, communicating to many 
Israelis that they are indeed dangerous others whose goal is to kill Israeli citizens.  
Said (1979) argued that each Palestinian community must struggle to maintain its 
identity on two fundamental levels. First, as Palestinians facing Zionism and the reality of 
the loss of the Palestinian homeland, and second, existentially, as Palestinians living day-
to-day with the pressures of being Palestinian without a Palestine, resulting in hostility 
almost everywhere both inside and outside Israel and the West Bank. Said explained 
further the complexity of Palestinian identity: 
Their [the Palestinians‘] relationship to Zionism, and ultimately with political and 
even spiritual Judaism, gives them a formidable burden as interlocutors of the 
Jews. The imperialistic struggle, to the Christian world (with its unique historical 
and cultural attachment to Palestine), to Marxist, to the socialist world, all these 
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put upon the Palestinian a burden of interpretation and a multiplication of selves 
that are virtually unparalleled in modern political or cultural history—a fact made 
more impressively onerous in that it is all filtered through negation and 
qualifications. (p. 122) 
The interview data attest that Palestinians face daily encounters with rhetorical signs and 
symbols of the Israeli occupying power and Zionism—the ID, wall, checkpoints, Israeli 
military bases inside the West Bank, Israeli military patrols, Israeli Jewish settlements, 
settler-only roads, and Israeli flags flying over prominent historical and archeological 
sites located in the West Bank (Interview Data, 2012). Said (1979) argued that many of 
these symbols remain an unchecked domination over Palestinians living both inside and 
outside the West Bank, including Israeli Arabs with Israeli passports whose identity is 
neither particularly Israeli nor Arab. Other Arab countries often view Arab Israelis as 
neither Arab nor Israeli (pp. 126–130). Graffiti on the wall often calls on world leaders 
outside of Israel and the West Bank to voice their opposition to Israeli aggression toward 
Palestinians, if not to seek to stop Israeli aggression altogether (Graffiti Data, 2012). The 
graffiti thus becomes transnational in the way that it speaks to multiple international 
audiences in multiple languages on one specific medium: the wall (Toenjes, n.d.). 
The wall is perhaps the most visible sign of Israeli domination over Palestinians, 
yet the graffiti and defacing of the wall suggest that Palestinians and internationals 
contest this domination through graffiti and vandalism. The wall is part of a long-term 
persuasive strategy involving other physical structures and communicative modes that 
work together to form a cohesive message. The settlements, the wall, and other structures 
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are persuasive in the ways that they act on viewers‘ perceptions, and in that sense they 
are significant aspects of visual discourse. However, they are also—and maybe 
primarily—features of a built environment that serves other purposes as well. I propose 
that these rhetorics are the communicative actions that capture how positions are 
expressed about these structures (graffiti, written materials, arguments, etc.). These visual 
rhetorics are intended to persuade Palestinian, Israeli, and international audiences and 
viewers that the West Bank and West Bank Palestinians are not safe, and that the State of 
Israel is sovereign even in and on the West Bank. 
West Bank Palestinians with special Israeli permits issued by a branch of the IDF 
must use the pedestrian terminal at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 if they want to access East 
Jerusalem and Israel proper. The process of passing through the pedestrian terminal is 
much more extensive and bureaucratic than passing through the car lane. Only 
Palestinians with Israeli IDs and internationals use the car lane (Figure 4). This process 
normally includes an ID check and a search of the Palestinian‘s car and possessions held 
within that car. Sometimes these searches are cursory, but at other times, the search and 
scrutiny of the individual, the car, and its contents are extensive. The degree of security 
screenings, either cursory or extensive, largely depends on the security personnel 
stationed at the checkpoint. Security personnel often use their own discretion when 
determining the extent of security screenings (Interview Data, 2012). 
The pedestrian terminal begins with two queuing lanes adjacent to the wall that 
forms a narrow corridor with an uphill incline (Figures 5–7). 
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Figure 5. The initial queuing line at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Source: EAPPI Special Report, Photo by J. Schilder 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Initial queuing lanes at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Source: EAPPI Special Report. Photo by Oliver Wnuck. 
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Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the main queuing lane for Palestinians who hold Israeli-
issued permits. Internationals can bypass the initial queuing lane by using the 
humanitarian/international lane, designated ―HL‖ on Figure 4. The queuing lane consists 
of a concrete floor surrounded by square bars on both sides and on top, covered by a 
metal roof (Figures 5 and 6). This built environment functions rhetorically not only to 
construct Palestinians as potential security threats, but also to construct Israel as 
dominant and all-powerful. After all, Israel can build the wall and settlements on 
internationally recognized Palestinian land east of the Green Line and ignore U.N. 
sanctions because of the US, Israel‘s imperial ally who consistently vetoes U.N. 
Resolutions against Israel (Lynch, 2011).  
The checkpoint and wall communicate to Palestinians that they are not wanted in 
Israel. As Marina explained, 
And they, uh … built it [the wall] to make it, uh … harder for Palestinians in 
order to give up. So they‘re trying to, uhm … close every window, every door you 
can go through so you will gi-give up. And then you will leave all the lands, all 
the rights, all the things you are defending, uh … about in order to, to get all the 
lands, and they build their state and so on. (Interview Data, 2012) 
The wall, according to Marina, was simply another manifestation of colonialism and a 
tool for colonizing more land for the Israeli state. Israel wants ―all the lands,‖ not just the 
land west of the Green Line. The wall symbolizes Israeli colonialism to many 
Palestinians and internationals, and it functions both physically and rhetorically to keep 
Palestinians contained to the West Bank and not allow them to enter the Jerusalem 
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municipality (Interview Data, 2012). The goal of the wall is to persuade Palestinians to 
―give up,‖ and thus its persuasive function, according to Marina, is for Palestinians to 
acquiesce to Israel‘s colonial agenda relative to land. 
EAPPI reported that thousands of Palestinians pass through the checkpoint every 
day, with Ramadan Fridays seeing the highest number. An average of 2,359 Palestinians 
form a line to pass through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300‘s pedestrian terminal every 
morning (Figures 5 and 6; EAPPI, 2011, p. 11). 
 
Figure 7. Palestinian West Bankers on Fridays of Ramadan 
Source: EAPPI Special Report, Photo by Oliver Wnuck 
 
The interview data offer further insights into how the checkpoint works 
operationally and how the operational procedures affect discourse. When describing 
passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, research participants consistently used the 
words security, soldiers, and gates. Christina, a Palestinian West Banker with a 
79 
 
 
 
Palestinian ID, described going through doors and gates, and being required to remove 
her earrings and shoes. For Christina, passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 was 
―very humiliating.‖ According to Christina, the process of passing through the checkpoint 
also included annoying redundancies. As she explained, ―They take away your ID and 
your permission, umm … maybe three times while getting through the gates.‖ Seeking 
clarification on the number of times Christina showed her ID to Israeli authorities at the 
checkpoint, I asked, ―So you show it three times?‖ Christina responded with the 
following explanation, 
Yes, at the first gate and the second gate. No, the second gate is like, um, um … 
wearing the earrings and stuff, and then you have to show it at the third gate … 
and they wouldn‘t let you. There‘s, um … that metal thing that‘s … with it open 
on one side. They put something, and they keep you waiting while they‘re [Israeli 
security personnel] talking on the phone or sometimes they‘re, um … yelling at 
you. It‘s a very, very bad experience. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Christina described a multi-layered security apparatus involving a three-step process. ID 
checks, gates, and metal detectors managed and controlled Christina‘s passage through 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 on her way to East Jerusalem (Figure 4). These security 
checks only occurred after she had gone through a long bureaucratic process that granted 
her permission to pass through the checkpoint into East Jerusalem. In their interactions 
with West Bank Palestinians passing through the checkpoint, Israeli security personnel 
employ various technologies and controls, including an intercom through which they 
―yell‖ at West Bank Palestinians who used the checkpoint (Interview Data, 2012).  
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The long lines at the checkpoint further communicate, visually and persuasively, 
that the Israelis are in control. They control passage through the checkpoint, and they are 
even in control of Palestinians‘ time spent in queue. By controlling the checkpoint, the 
Israelis have power to allow—or disallow—worship at religious sites in East Jerusalem. 
The security checks described by Christina are part of the built, visual environment. They 
shape the discourse about passing through the checkpoint, and they also function as 
visual rhetorics persuading Christina that Israel, including Israeli security personnel at the 
checkpoint, has power over her. They determine the level of security screenings, and they 
control her passage through the checkpoint. They also control Christina‘s experience as 
she passes through the checkpoint, and they can make the experience positive or 
negative, depending on the level of questioning and security screening to which she is 
subjected. 
In contrast to Christina‘s experience as a Palestinian West Banker passing through 
the checkpoint, Beth, an international, discussed Bethlehem Checkpoint 300‘s physical 
features. She described security measures common at major border crossings: armed 
security personnel, terminals, ID checks, metal detectors, x-ray machines, taxis, buses, 
local pedestrians, vendors, and tourists. She also described the security apparatuses 
located inside the checkpoint—gates, soldiers, and metal detectors—and then she 
commented, ―They try to make it nice.‖ The security apparatuses at Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 were juxtaposed with potted plants, benches, and a sign that reads, 
―Welcome to Israel,‖ which Beth called ―ridiculous‖ (Interview Data, 2012). An entrance 
sign, written in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, is juxtaposed against a tight corridor 
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surrounded by metal bars and a metal roof (Figures 5–7).  
 The welcome and entrance signs, potted plants, and benches visually and 
rhetorically conflict with the metal, cage-like structure surrounding the initial queuing 
line at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall adjacent to the queuing line (Figures 5 
and 6). These visual rhetorics create contradictory messages. People who pass through 
the checkpoint are both welcomed and not welcomed by the visual rhetorics created by 
the queuing line itself, the adjacent wall, and the cage-like structure surrounding the 
initial queuing lane.  
This visually mixed rhetorical message illustrates Graddol‘s (2006) concept of 
heteroglossia. As discussed in Chapter 2, Graddol defined heteroglossia as the meanings 
conveyed by the various modes and the multiple contradictions found in the semiotic 
modal constructs. Just as the contradicting visual rhetorics located inside the checkpoint 
likely address different audiences, so do the various semiotic modes. Signs written in 
English that read ―Welcome to Jerusalem‖ probably address an international audience, 
just as the potted plants and benches likely communicate to internationals crossing from 
the West Bank into East Jerusalem and Israel proper.  
 The treatment that internationals receive when they cross the checkpoint further 
suggests that the potted plants and benches, both aspects of the visual environment, 
rhetorically communicate to an international audience, as opposed to a Palestinian 
audience. The interview data revealed that the constructed relationship between 
Palestinians and Israeli security personnel at the checkpoint differs greatly from the 
relationship between internationals and those same Israeli personnel (Interview Data, 
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2012). Internationals received less scrutiny than did Palestinians who passed through the 
checkpoint (Interview Data, 2012). Internationals, particularly U.S. passport holders, 
passed freely through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 into Israel proper and the Jerusalem 
municipality (Interview Data, 2012). International travelers often bypassed intense 
scrutiny from Israeli personnel stationed at the checkpoints because their international 
passports framed them in a different way.  
The lack of security screening and scrutiny aimed at internationals suggested that 
Israeli security personnel constructed them as less of a security threat than West Bank 
Palestinians and Jerusalemite Palestinians (Interview Data, 2012). Judith, an 
international, described her experience passing through the checkpoint: 
Yeah, um … I don‘t like it [passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300]. I mean, 
for me it‘s not so bad, because it just takes like 10 minutes, but, uh … Yeah, just, 
it just feels … Yeah, I don‘t like it. I feel like they treat us with suspicion going 
through, but I went there once at three in the morning to see how it is for workers 
going through there, and it … Yeah, and I … How I feel going through there 
doesn‘t compare to how they would, like, have to be there for four hours in queue 
to go four miles away. It‘s ridiculous. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Judith describes how an international and a Palestinian passing through the checkpoint 
have different experiences. Internationals pass relatively easy, whereas Palestinian 
workers often wait for hours (Interview Data, 2012; Figures 6 and 7). As Judith 
describes, it can take a Palestinian four hours in queue to go four miles away (Interview 
Data, 2012).  
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The lengthy process of passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 further 
communicates to Palestinians and internationals rhetorically. Specifically, Palestinians 
are potential security threats and are not welcome in the Jerusalem municipality and 
Israel proper, while internationals are welcome in Israel proper and East Jerusalem. West 
Bank Palestinians need to meet strict security requirements before they are allowed by 
Israeli security personnel to enter Israel proper. Israeli power clearly manifests in their 
ability to control a group of people, both within and outside Israel‘s internationally 
recognized borders. Israeli institutional structures support Israeli security personnel and 
authorize it to control the movement of Palestinians using IDs, permissions, the wall, and 
checkpoints.  
Expressive words used in the interview data illustrate an important point made by 
Fairclough (2001). Ideological struggles take linguistic form and certain ideologies 
―struggle‖ with other ideologies. This ideological struggle determines dominance 
relations between completing ideologies (Fairclough, 2001, p. 89).  
 
Looking and the Construction of the Other 
 
Palestinians used a number of words to express their negative experience of 
passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 (Interview Data, 2012). Christina and Beth 
described their experience as ―humiliating‖ and ―very, very bad,‖ and Leila offered 
similar negative comments. She used ―very hectic‖ and ―very devastating‖ when 
describing the ―whole process to get into Jerusalem,‖ which was ―emotionally and 
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mentally disturbing‖ for her. Leila described the process of passing through the 
checkpoints, including going through gates ―and stuff like that.‖ Soldiers stationed at the 
checkpoint also gave her ―hard times to get into Jerusalem,‖ and she described the 
questions that the Israeli security personnel asked her as ―ridiculous‖ (Interview Data, 
2012). Internationals also used the term ―ridiculous‖ when describing the process of 
passing through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 en route to East Jerusalem. 
The word animal was repeated in the interview data. Muna, a Palestinian with a 
Palestinian ID, referenced the act of looking and construction of ―the Other‖ with respect 
to the visual and technical layout of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 (Figures 5–7). Muna 
stated, ―They [Israeli security personnel at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300] see us as the 
image for them like animal‖ (Interview Data, 2012). Chomsky and Pappé (2015) said that 
when an Israeli soldier sees a Palestinian, he does not see a human being—he sees the 
enemy (p. 31). 
George, a Palestinian with a Palestinian ID, echoed Muna‘s statement with regard 
to how West Bank Palestinians feel when they pass through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
George‘s comment is similar to Judith‘s with regard to the queuing lines at Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300: 
If you go around 6 o‘clock or 6:30 or 7, you‘ll find several thousand people there, 
and not human, like goats. They go there. They go, and it‘s very, very, very hard 
to cross … They [Israeli security personnel] drive you. They drive goats to 
slaughter. That‘s a big problem here. It‘s not easy. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Figures 5 and 6 contextualize Judith, Muna, and George‘s comments regarding looking 
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and Othering. These images illustrate a narrow passage that runs uphill alongside the wall 
at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. Square bars surround the narrow passage on both sides, 
and metal turnstiles control access through the wall into the security terminal (Figures 5 
and 6). These physical structures regulate bodies and control movement, like farmers who 
use moveable fences to regulate the bodies and control the movement of animals.  
Najaal, a Palestinian Christian holding the Palestinian ID, also referenced 
―animals.‖ Najaal agreed with Muna and explained, 
It‘s hard for us … We can‘t move as a Palestinian people, according to this 
checkpoint 300. I hate it very much because, eh … I feel like, eh … that they are 
treating us like animals. We are going to go through iron bars, eh … and, eh … 
communicating with the, eh … with the sound only. You can‘t see people. Okay, 
you can just hear sound and the soldiers up there. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Najaal evoked a discourse of restriction of movement with a visual imagery of ―treating 
us like animals.‖ The iron bars in Figures 5 and 6 perpetuate the feeling of being 
contained like an animal, and the narrow space for the initial queuing lane restricts 
movement on a small scale.  
Many of the controlling technical apparatuses evident in Najaal‘s description 
serve to minimize talk between Israeli security personnel, Palestinians, and internationals 
that pass through the checkpoint. Israeli security personnel were ―up there‖ on catwalks 
inside the pedestrian terminal, thus impeding Najaal‘s ability to look upon them 
(Interview Data, 2012). Israeli security personnel looked down on Palestinians and 
internationals in queues and passing through the security procedures (Interview Data, 
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2012).  
Mohammed, speaking about how Israeli security personnel treat Palestinian 
Christians better than Palestinian Muslims, agreed with Muna‘s understanding of the 
process of looking and the construction of the other. ―They [Israeli security personnel] 
treat the Christians better than the Muslims, because, you know, the Christians and the 
Jews … basically the same religion, so they get the better treatment. But they still treat us 
like animals, both of us‖ (Interview Data, 2012). Mohammed concluded that Israeli 
security personnel treated Palestinian Christians better than Palestinian Muslims because 
Palestinian Christians have ―the same religion‖ as the Israeli Jews. Religious affiliation, 
according to Mohammed, determined the level of treatment and security screenings from 
Israeli security personnel. However, Mohammed conceded that they treat both Christians 
and Muslims ―like animals‖ (Interview Data, 2012). 
The bias and preferential treatment for West Bank Christians discussed by 
Mohammed further manifested in other interview data. Palestinian Christian West 
Bankers often received permits and permission from Israeli security personnel to visit 
holy sites in East Jerusalem, whereas Palestinian West Bank Muslims did not receive 
permission to enter East Jerusalem for religious reasons. Najaah, a Palestinian Muslim 
with an Israeli ID, said, 
Christians, uh … They [Israeli security personnel] give them the permissions to 
go through the checkpoint for every, uh … holiday or every religious holiday. 
But, uhm … Muslims, they don‘t give them the permission to go, uh … through 
the checkpoints, and uh … even in their religious holidays, uhm … But, uhm … 
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they‘re trying to, to make discriminations between, uhm … Muslims and 
Christians, and uh .. sometimes they, uh … actually they, they do it, but, uhm … 
to—if you‘re aware of that, you would understand that their—this is their game, 
so they‘re playing it well. (Interview Data, 2012) 
This Israeli bias and preferential treatment for West Bank Christians, observed by the 
interview participants, suggested that Israeli security personnel framed West Bank 
Christians as less of a security threat than West Bank Palestinian Muslims.  
West Bank Palestinian Christians and West Bank Muslims remain aware of this 
bias toward Christians, and the bias creates tensions between them (Interview Data, 
2012). Both Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims seek to visit Jerusalem 
because of holy sites, for both religious traditions are located there. Additionally, 
Jerusalem provides access to entertainment, healthcare, recreation, and education. Many 
West Bank Palestinians have relatives who live in East Jerusalem, but they cannot visit 
them because of the difficulty passing through the checkpoint. Israeli security personnel 
are unwilling to issue permits to Palestinian West Bankers to allow them to pass through 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and enter the Jerusalem municipality and Israel proper 
(Interview Data, 2012). 
 Lisa, an international with an American passport, further confirmed the 
construction of identity informed by physical structures located at Bethlehem Checkpoint 
300 and the discourses and rhetorics these physical structures create (Figures 5 and 6). 
Lisa said, ―I remember walking up through the stalls and pretty much feeling like I was 
an animal‖ (Interview Data, 2012). The feeling like an ―animal‖ transcended religion, 
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gender, and ID type. Muslims, Christians, internationals, men and women all used this 
word to describe how they felt going through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. The wall and 
checkpoint, intentionally or unintentional, persuaded Palestinians and internationals that 
their identity was no better than that of an animal (Interview Data, 2012). 
 Palestinians who possess an Israeli ID and internationals do not require special 
Israeli-issued permits like Palestinian ID holders, if they travel to the Jerusalem 
municipality from Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. An Israeli ID allows its holder to enter the 
Jerusalem municipality (Interview Data, 2012). The ID marks West Bank Palestinians for 
additional bureaucratic procedures needed to obtain permission to pass through the 
checkpoint, and it marks Palestinian Jerusalemites as potential security threats, even 
though the Jerusalem ID allows them to pass through with a special permit issued by the 
IDF. Internationals, however, did not undergo the same bureaucratic procedures when 
passing through the checkpoint on their way to the Jerusalem municipality (Interview 
Data, 2012). 
 
The Rhetorics of Land and Land Grab 
 
 The location of the wall at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, approximately two 
kilometers east of the Green Line, helps to create a rhetoric of land grab evident in 
Palestinian and international discourse. Ann, an international from the US, offered her 
explanation for the wall: 
If you talk to Israelis, they say it‘s for security purposes, to prevent terrorist 
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attacks, uh … If you talk to an American, same thing. If you talk to Palestinians, 
the wall is there for a land grab for Israel, and it‘s there basically to, uh … keep 
Palestinians and Israelis away from each other. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Ann suggests that both Israelis and Americans construct the wall in the same way—to 
prevent terrorist attacks. Israelis and Americans share a common enemy and an 
ideological construct of that common enemy that discursively justifies the creation of the 
wall. The common enemy is terrorists, in general, and Islamic terrorists more specifically. 
As discussed previously, the perceived Israeli bias suggests that they perceive Palestinian 
Christians as less of a security threat than their Palestinian Muslim counterparts. 
Palestinians refute this construction on common enemy and argue that the wall is a land 
grab and a means of separating Palestinians from Israelis (Interview Data, 2012; Cohen, 
2006). In other words, the wall and its location relative to the Green Line have persuaded 
Palestinians and internationals that the wall is a mechanism for ―grabbing‖ Palestinian 
land. 
Judith, an international, agreed with Ann and added, ―But we all know the wall is 
half land grab and half a tool of oppression for the Palestinians― (Interview Data, 2012). 
―A tool of oppression‖ discourse manifests further in Palestinian interview data as West 
Bank Palestinians discuss the wall‘s impact on the Palestinian economy and ways of life. 
Not only does the wall construct Palestinians in a particular way (e.g., others, terrorists, 
or animals), but it also oppresses them. Evident in the data were the creations of several 
discourses about the meaning or purpose of the wall. It functions as a security apparatus 
that both separates and oppresses. It further constructs Palestinian identity in a negative 
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way, and this identity construction adds to the oppressive nature of the wall, ideologically 
and symbolically. 
The rhetorical meaning of the wall evident in the interview data also functions 
mythologically: the wall becomes security, separation, oppression, and the constructor of 
a negative Palestinian identity. These abstract values function psychologically to impact 
the respective viewers‘ perspective of the wall. The visual presence of the wall, or the 
extent to which an object is the foremost consciousness of audience members, creates an 
unconscious, visceral response from the viewer (Hill, 2004, p. 28) As Hill explained, 
―Images, like verbal text, can be used to prompt an immediate visceral response, to 
develop cognitive (though largely unconscious) connections over a sustained period of 
time, or prompt conscious analytical thought‖ (p. 37). The data support Hill‘s concept of 
presence and the impact visual images have on viewers. One interviewee asked, ―Why 
did they have to make it [the wall] so big?‖ (Interview Data, 2012) 
Palestinians and internationals alike argue that the wall is a means of confiscating 
land in the West Bank for future Israeli settlement development and for positioning 
important natural resources, such as water, on the Jerusalem side of the wall. Figure 8 
illustrates an image of the wall approaching Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 from East 
Jerusalem along Highway 60. 
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Figure 8. The wall approaching Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 on Highway 60 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
Figure 8 shows the erratic path of the wall as it curves and carves through the West Bank 
along Highway 60. Walls demarcate territory and mark boundaries, and the path of the 
wall as seen in Figure 8 appears arbitrary and random.  
The wall at this location also separates Palestinian villages from the main 
highway connecting Jerusalem to Bethlehem and the southern West Bank. West Bank 
Palestinians argue that the wall has devastated the local economy (Interview Data, 2012). 
Sally, a Palestinian Christian with a West Bank ID, offered further insights into the wall‘s 
impact on Palestinians living in the West Bank: 
It‘s like they‘re [the Israelis] controlling us with the wall. It‘s like they‘re building 
the wall around us so we can be stuck inside the wall. Make it, like, uh … smaller 
and smaller each time so they can benefit from the whole land, and then we‘ll 
have this tiny area. We cannot move it. We can‘t do anything. (Interview Data, 
2012) 
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The discourse of restriction on Palestinian movement is evident in Sally‘s comments, 
other interview data, and graffiti data. For Sally, the wall is a mechanism for constricting 
the movement of Palestinians to small areas that get ―smaller and smaller each time so 
they can benefit from the whole land‖ (Interview Data, 2012). Restriction on Palestinian 
movement is understood as a means for Israel to ―benefit from the whole land.‖  
This perception of Sally‘s discourse contextualizes the naming of the wall as 
apartheid. The wall, as Chomsky (2006) and Usher (2006) argued, was designed to create 
three non-contiguous Bantustans that separate and segregate Palestinians from Israelis. 
The name Bantustans immediately evokes South African apartheid, in which whites 
separated themselves from native South African blacks. The native South Africans, 
comprising eight ethnic groups, lived in small enclaves or Bantustans that at some point 
would have been self-governing (Regan, 2008, p. 204) In 2003, Israeli Prime Minster 
Ariel Sharon named the wall and its consequential separating of Palestinians from Israelis 
as the ―Bantustan plan,‖ thus further evoking South African apartheid policies (Usher, 
2006, pp. 20–21). The wall‘s goal, from the very beginning of its construction, was to 
concentrate Palestinians into three distinct, non-contiguous Bantustans separate from 
Israelis. 
 Tamimi (2011) argued that access to water resources, including wells, rivers, 
lakes, and natural aquifers, determined the path of the wall, reflecting Israel‘s goal of 
complete control over all resources in the West Bank and Israel. Increase of this control 
over water will undoubtedly further Palestine‘s impoverishment and compromise its 
nationhood ambitions. Controlling water points connects to an ideology reflected in 
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Zionist rhetoric that claimed that the influx of European Jews to historic Palestine came 
to ―make the desert bloom‖ and to make the ―Promised Land fertile.‖ Tamimi argued that 
Israel uses the wall to create facts about the wall. The result of the wall‘s location with 
respect to water resources is that the land becomes inaccessible to Palestinian Arab 
farmers, who therefore lose the inability to irrigate and cultivate their land. Israel 
leadership then confiscates this ―uncultivated‖ land. In Tamimi‘s words, ―Israeli policy, 
rhetoric by politicians, water experts, and implementation at various levels: all point out 
to the planned total Israeli control over the Western Aquifer. This is a fact made possible 
by Israel‘s construction of the Wall‖ (p. 560). Zureik (2001) agreed with Tamimi‘s 
argument and discussed the impact of the wall, concluding that, ―Examining the impact 
the fence is having on Palestinian water management allows us to decipher the intricate 
fashion in which Palestinian power structures are affected‖ (p. 105). 
 
The Green Line 
 
As stated earlier, the rhetoric of land grab connects to the location of Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 relative to the 1949 Armistice Line or ―Green Line.‖ The wall is located 
approximately two kilometers east of the Green Line, on what many Palestinians and 
internationals call the ―West Bank‖ and ―Palestinian land.‖ Israeli leadership denies 
Palestinian rights to the contested land, both east and west of the Green Line, by using the 
wall as a physical barrier to prevent Palestinians from accessing the land. Rhetorically, 
Israeli leadership denies the Palestinians Arab‘s historical narrative that Palestinian Arabs 
94 
 
 
 
have indeed resided in the contested land, both east and west of the Green Line, for 
millennia. This rhetorical move by Israeli leadership helps to justify Israeli construction 
of settlements east of the Green Line by pointing to their own historical claims to the 
land. 
 The symbolic meaning of the Green Line manifests differently depending on the 
audience. For Palestinians and many internationals, the Green Line symbolically 
represents a border between the State of Israel and Palestinian land, or a future 
Palestinian state, thus shaping discourse regarding Palestinian land rights. For Israeli 
leadership, the Green Line holds no symbolic value. Israeli leadership consistently refutes 
international law and U.N. sanctions regarding the Green Line, settlements, and the wall. 
The State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website rhetorically frames all of historic 
Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, including the West Bank and 
the State of Israel, as belonging to the Jewish Israelis alone. ―Israel is a land and a 
people,‖ the website argues. ―The history of the Jewish people, and its roots in the Land 
of Israel, spans some 35 centuries. In this land, its cultural, national, and religious identity 
was formed‖ (The State of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).  
Interview participants also interrogated the purpose of the wall and argued that the 
wall was a mode of confiscating more land for future Israeli settlement development and 
expansion (Interview Data, 2012). According to the interview participants, Israeli 
leadership uses a rhetoric of security and discourse of Promised Land as a pretext to 
confiscate Palestinian land and redefine the potential borders of a future Palestinian state 
(Interview Data, 2012).  
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The rhetoric of Israeli land grab repeats in the interview data. From the 
perspective of West Bank Palestinians, Palestinians cross Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and 
the wall built on Palestinian land to enter another part of Palestinian land including East 
Jerusalem, a ―Palestinian city.‖ Roni, a Palestinian Christian with a Palestinian ID, 
explains: 
So the checkpoint that you have here, Checkpoint 300, it is also still a checkpoint 
between a Palestinian city and another Palestinian city. At least the east side of 
Jerusalem is Palestinian. If you go to the east side of Jerusalem, there‘s only 
Palestinians who live there. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Roni explained that Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 was not a checkpoint or access point 
from a Palestinian City (Bethlehem) to an Israeli city (Jerusalem). It is not a border 
crossing, in other words, but a checkpoint from one Palestinian city to another Palestinian 
city. He explained that Israel has a right to keep him from entering Israel: 
I think it‘s okay if Israel doesn‘t want me to go to Israel. It‘s their right not to let 
me go to Tel Aviv. I can understand. If I believe it‘s a two-state solution, it‘s their 
state, and they have the right that I‘m not allowed to go there. My problem is with 
not going to East Jerusalem since 1993. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Roni affirms that ―that‘s their right‖ to keep him, a Palestinian, from entering Tel Aviv. 
The two-state solution discourse informs Roni‘s statement that Israel, as a state, can keep 
him from going to Tel Aviv, an Israeli city.  
What Roni wanted to make clear was that the wall and the checkpoint restrict 
access from one Palestinian space to another Palestinian space. It is not a border crossing 
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between Israel and Palestine or the West Bank, but a restriction on Palestinian access and 
movement between two Palestinian cities, Bethlehem and East Jerusalem (Interview 
Data, 2012). Implicit in Roni‘s comment is that East Jerusalem resides in a Palestinian 
State, thus his restriction to enter a city in a Palestinian State did not make sense to Roni. 
The two-state solution discourse informs Roni‘s rhetorical positioning of East Jerusalem 
as a Palestinian city in a Palestinian state. East Jerusalem is located east of the Green 
Line, and this location further illustrates the symbolic meaning of the Green Line relative 
to the two-state solution discourse. For many Palestinians, the Green Line is indeed a 
border between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.  
The discourse of restriction on Palestinian movement also manifests in Roni‘s 
statement. This phenomenon of checkpoints restricting movement of Palestinians from 
one part of the West Bank to another contributes to and informs a discourse of restriction 
of movement evident in the interview and graffiti data. Evident in the data is how 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall impacts West Bankers with respect to Jerusalem. 
As Issa explained, 
For 20 years I used to go easily. Ten minutes I was in Jerusalem. You know, but 
since they came here, why should I go? Why should I go through all this to see 
Jerusalem? You feel miserable there. The economics in Palestine, when this 
fence, uh … wall come here. They‘re killing the economics. Everybody is looking 
for work. 
Issa connected the construction of the wall with the complicated process of passing 
through the wall and it‘s impact on jobs in the West Bank, where tourism is a major 
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economic driver. Because of the wall, countless tourist-related industries have closed, 
including retail souvenir shops, hotels, and restaurants that were once booming with 
tourists. Central to this impact is the mythological meaning the wall conveys. Eight-to-
ten-meter concrete walls, turret-style watchtowers, barbed wire, and armed security 
personnel communicate that the West Bank and West Bank Palestinians are unsafe and 
must be contained, secured, and monitored by these security apparatuses. Tourists are 
simply scared away by these visual rhetorics and the messages they create. 
The wall‘s location relative to the Green Line proves controversial when 
demarcating ―Palestinian‖ space from ―Israeli‖ space. Central to interview participant 
Roni‘s argument was the recognition of the Green Line as a de facto border between 
Israeli-controlled ―Israel‖ and the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank (Interview 
Data, 2012). Jerusalem, a Palestinian city according to Roni, is inaccessible to 
Palestinians. The inability to access Jerusalem from the West Bank influences graffiti 
rhetorics and contributes to the rhetoric of restriction of Palestinian freedom of 
movement. Jerusalem holds significant religious significance for Palestinian Christians 
and Muslims, as well as for Israeli Jews. The holy city also provides jobs, healthcare, 
recreation, and religious opportunities for those who can access it. 
 
Palestinians as a Nationless Other 
 
The words Palestine and Palestinian are repeated throughout the interview data. 
An examination of a recent global map, however, does not name any country or 
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geographic space ―Palestine.‖ Israeli security personnel, using the ID as a discursive 
prop, name and define Palestinians as non-native others and nationless. Mohammed 
explained, ―Uh … there‘s no citizens for their [Palestinians‘] ID. The nationality, it‘s just, 
uh … stars. There‘s no nationality. There‘s no nothing‖ (Interview Data, 2012). 
Mohammed‘s mother, who was born in Israel, does not have ―Israeli‖ on her ID, but 
instead she has stars marking her as an Arab without a nationality (Interview Data, 2012). 
The nationality of Palestinians on the Israeli ID as ―just stars‖ indicates that the 
Palestinians are not citizens of the State of Israel, but Palestinians are also not citizens of 
any nation. Their ID constructs them as nationless. Israeli security personnel erase 
Palestinian national identity, rhetorically, by using the ID as a visual rhetorical prop. The 
words ―there‘s nothing,‖ and the melancholy tone in which Mohammed delivered this 
phrase, conveyed the hopelessness of this particular Palestinian Arab relative to the 
discourse of a Palestinian state, hence a Palestinian nationality and identity, and 
Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank free of Israeli occupation. 
The ideology of a nationless Palestinian further manifests in the bureaucratic 
process of obtaining permission from Israelis to pass through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
The discourse surrounding this process creates sets of rights: rights for Israelis in Israel, 
rights for Palestinian Arabs in Israel proper, and rights for Palestinian Arabs in the West 
Bank. Israeli security personnel often issue Palestinians different types of IDs, depending 
on where they live. To get an Israeli ID, and thus greater freedom of movement, 
Palestinians must prove to Israeli officials that they have a permanent residence on the 
Jerusalem side of the wall. Palestinians born in the West Bank, by contrast, hold a 
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Palestinian ID and cannot access Jerusalem and Israel proper without special 
permission—or ―permission to receive permission,‖ as one interview participant 
described it. Mohammed and his mother were both born in Jerusalem, but she had an 
Israeli ID while Mohammed was issued a Palestinian ID—thus illustrating the confusing 
requirements of receiving an Israeli ID. Mohammed explicitly named his mother ―an 
Israeli‖ because of her ID (Interview Data, 2012). 
The interview data further suggest that West Bank Palestinians often covet the 
Israeli ID, because it grants them access to the Jerusalem municipality and Israel proper. 
Roni explained, ―Uh, those Jerusalem Palestinians, they have a nice life here in the 
country, because they‘re allowed to come here, and they‘re allowed to go there‖ 
(Interview Data, 2012). Roni argued that Palestinians Jerusalemites have more freedom 
of movement than their West Bank Palestinian counterparts, which equates to ―a nice life 
here in the country‖ (Interview Data, 2012). Compared to the West Bank, Jerusalem 
offers Israeli ID holders more education, employment, religious, and cultural 
opportunities.  
Even though Israeli ID holders can access Jerusalem and Israel proper, 
Palestinians with Israeli IDs ―didn‘t have all the rights‖ that Israeli Jews have (Interview 
Data, 2012). Mohammed explained, ―Even if you have the Israeli written in your ID, and 
you‘re Arabian or Christian or Muslim, you don‘t get your full rights. Just for the Jews‖ 
(Interview Data, 2012). Mohammed‘s comment specifically references Israeli citizenship 
and the power of that citizenship as represented in ―rights.‖ One specific right is the 
ability to move more freely in Israel without needing to obtain permission. The wall has a 
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severe impact on West Bank Palestinians‘ right to movement, common in West Bank 
Palestinian discourse. Specific to this right is the inability of West Bank Palestinians to 
access holy places in East Jerusalem. The power to access these places in Jerusalem and 
Israel proper connects to the identity of the cardholder, which is evident in the visual 
design of the ID itself: West Bank Palestinians held green IDs and Palestinian 
Jerusalemites held blue IDs. Palestinians Arabs who held an Israeli ID and internationals 
with passports, another acceptable form of ID, moved more easily through the 
checkpoint.  
Yiftachel (2009) argued that the Israeli state is engaging in a ―creeping apartheid‖ 
that segments the colonized West Bank, occupied East Jerusalem, and the military 
lockdown of Gaza into three distinct groups of people with different identity and status. 
Israeli leadership divides each Palestinian group—Palestinian, Jerusalemites, and West 
Bankers—into distinct categories with distinct sets of rules and rights. These distinctions, 
according to Yiftachel, are merging into one regime system controlled by the Israelis (p. 
7). Other scholars have contextualized the wall as part of a ―separation‖ strategy 
resembling South African apartheid (Al-Rimmawi, 2009; Hasan, 2008; Regan, 2008).  
Leila, a Palestinian Christian with a Palestinian ID, describes how the wall 
impacts Palestinians in the West Bank: 
It‘s limiting our movement, like we don‘t have the free movement to go anywhere 
across the cities in our country. Like I … I hear about so many cities and places 
where I really want to go, but I‘ve never had the chance to go to. And like many 
tourists and internationals have the privilege to go to these countries, and to these 
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cities in my own country that I‘ve never heard about or like, never visited before. 
So just the freedom of movement is … is gone. 
The lack of freedom of movement, concretized and symbolized by the wall, is an 
omnipresent reminder of how Israelis construct Palestinian identity—as unsafe, potential 
terrorists who must be contained. Moreover, Palestinian ID checks conducted by Israeli 
security personnel become constant and consistent reminders of Israel‘s power to define 
Palestinian identity. The daily activity of Palestinians showing their IDs—at checkpoints 
when going to school, traveling to work, or even opening a bank account in the West 
Bank—reminds Palestinians that they are nationless and under the full control of Israeli 
security personnel. Israel, as both a state and a theological institution, is sovereign over 
Palestinians regardless of their geographic location, inside and outside Israeli proper. The 
ID further reminds Palestinian Jerusalemites and Palestinian West Bankers of how Israeli 
security personnel frame them—as dangerous others not incorporated into Israeli Jewish 
society and social structures, and as others from whom Israelis need security and 
separation.  
 
The Rhetoric of Security 
 
 Leila, a Palestinian with a Palestinian ID, evoked a rhetoric of security when 
describing the wall. Leila stated, ―For them [the Israelis] I believe it‘s [the wall] for what 
they say is for secure, security reasons because they‘re afraid of the Palestinians‖ 
(Interview Data, 2012). The interview participants who used Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
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consistently used, referred to, and drew upon this particular rhetoric. George illustrated a 
perceived meaning and purpose of the wall: ―For their security, maybe? Okay. They tell 
us we are terrorists, maybe? Okay. Not maybe. Surely! They can do everything to be 
safe‖ (Interview Data, 2012). The words security, terrorist, and safe evoke a rhetoric of 
security, and George‘s comment that ―they can do everything to be safe‖ illustrates the 
power of the rhetoric of security specific to Israeli security policies aimed at West Bank 
Palestinians who are potential ―terrorists.‖ The interview and graffiti data suggest that the 
rhetoric of security, integrated with the Palestinian identity construction of ―terrorists‖ by 
Israeli leadership and security personnel, grants Israelis the power to implement any 
policies they deem necessary to keep them secure, regardless of how those policies 
impact Palestinians and Palestinian ways of life (Interview Data, 2012). 
 The ID, wall, and Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 as symbolic constructions all 
contribute to and construct the rhetoric of security. These visual props further construct 
West Bank Palestinians as the instigators and perpetuators of violence against Israelis. 
According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the Palestinians are the 
reasons why Israelis and Palestinians have not achieved peace. The Palestinians are the 
reason why the Israelis constructed an anti-terrorism fence (Israel Ministry of Defense, 
2007). This rhetorical positioning of Palestinians lays the foundation for Israeli leadership 
to label Israeli settlement development, the construction of the wall, military occupation 
of the West Bank, and frequent military excursion into Gaza as ―security measures.‖ As 
long as Palestinians resist, sometimes violently, the occupation and colonization of the 
West Bank by Israeli leadership and citizens of the State of Israeli, Israeli leadership will 
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have a reason to justify their ―security measures‖ because their security is at stake. 
 Not only do the visual rhetorics of the ID, wall, and checkpoint symbolize this 
Israeli rhetorical strategy, but the wall also serves as a physical manifestation of the 
operationalization of the rhetoric of security. The ―Security Fence‖ has reduced terrorist 
attacks in the West Bank by more than 90% (Bard, 2007). Specifically, the website 
argues that the ―Security Fence‖ serves to prevent ―suicide bombers who entry into Israel 
with the sole intention of killing innocent people.‖ The website explicitly labels security 
measures enacted with the fence, including an image that identified pyramid-shaped 
stacks of barbed wire, a ditch, patrol road, intrusion tracking dirt road, intrusion detection 
device, and observation system. These security measures, according to the website, have 
greatly reduced the number of Palestinian terror attacks aimed at Israeli targets. 
 The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website further perpetuates the rhetoric of 
security and the construction of Palestinians as terrorists by including multiple images of 
the aftermath of ―Palestinian terrorist attacks‖ in the early 2000s. This webpage provides 
a link to a video called ―Fence against Terror‖ and repeats arguments for the path of the 
fence and its legality, including repeated use of the word security. Note the images of the 
―Security Fence‖ used on the Israeli website: 
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Figure 9. The ―Security Fence‖ 
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) 
 
 
Figure 10. The ―Anti-Terrorism Fence‖ 
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) 
 
These images of the fence above contrast sharply with images of a wall located near 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 (Figures 5–8). The further importance of these images on the 
Israeli website is what they do not show—an 8-meter-high concrete wall that surrounds 
not only the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem and Beit Jala, but also Jenin, Beit Hannia, 
Qalindya, Abu Dis, and other Palestinian villages and cities located in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem. 
 The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website contextualizes the security fence 
firmly within a rhetoric of Palestinian terrorism and security from that terrorism. The 
website not only uses visual images to show the aftermath of terrorists attacks in several 
Israeli cities, but it also paints the clear picture that Palestinians in the West Bank are 
indeed terrorists whose mission is to attack Israeli citizens and targets. In Figure 11, note 
the depiction of Palestinian children, located on the Israeli website: 
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Figure 11. Image of Palestinian children 
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) 
 
The caption under this image reads, ―Brandishing toy guns at a Palestinian kindergarten 
graduation ceremony.‖ The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website uses this specific 
visual rhetoric not only to construct the symbolic meaning of the wall intentionally, but 
also to intentionally construct West Bank Palestinians as potential terrorists.  
 The rhetoric of security and construction of terrorists manifest in other ways. 
Me‘ha, an Israeli resident of Jerusalem and former Israeli soldier, used a rhetoric of 
security to construct Israeli Jewish settlers as unsafe and a potential security threat. 
Me‘ha explained,  
What makes me feel unsafe is the fact the, uh … settlers and the Israeli 
government and the Jerusalem municipality are doing everything in their power to 
be sure that, that … that Palestine can‘t be a capital and that there won‘t be a two 
state there and won‘t be any kind of peace solution. Forget one state or two state. 
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They‘re making sure there is no peace solution. (Interview Data, 2012) 
The status quo, according to Me‘ha, favors the powerful Israeli occupation of East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. The discourse of Israeli/Palestinian peace, then, becomes 
an obstacle for Israel leadership, relative to their goals of confiscating more Palestinian 
land and expanding the State of Israel into the West Bank. In other words, the discourse 
of a two-state solution—two states for two people, Israelis and Palestinians—and the 
discourse of peace are obstacles for Israeli leadership‘s colonial agenda (Interview Data, 
2012). Palestinian terrorism perpetuates, if not condones, Israeli colonial policies largely 
manifesting in settlements.  
Conflict with the Palestinians helps rhetorically justify Israeli leadership‘s 
colonial practices in the West Bank, which are often named ―security measures.‖ Me‘ha 
said that settlers, not Palestinians, made him feel ―unsafe.‖ Israeli leadership and the 
Jerusalem municipality were doing ―everything in their power‖ to prevent two states 
(Interview Data, 2012). Me‘ha described the impact of Israeli Jewish settlement 
development on Palestinians, 
The only thing, the only places it‘s possible for Palestinians to live now are the 
small cantons, similar to Native American reservations in the United States. Uh, 
Bantustans, if you will, similar to South Africa … Palestinians are clustered into 
cages, uhm … and, and, uh, uh, uh … are divided and controlled and, uh … that 
doesn‘t make me feel safe one bit. (Interview Data, 2012) 
Me‘ha‘s statement parallels statements from other interview participants about 
Palestinians clustered into cages that are then divided and controlled (Interview Data, 
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2012). Bantustans immediately connects Me‘ha‘s discourse to South African apartheid-
like strategies aimed at Palestinians. Me‘ha also used the word cages, which further 
supports the Palestinians‘ construction as animals. He also explained that the Israelis 
―export‖ the occupation of the West Bank. He pointed to the Olympic Games in China 
and Brazil, and argued that Israeli soldiers trained police and military personnel in 
Beijing and Rio de Janeiro on cleansing neighbors near Olympic venues by expelling 
particular citizens constructed by Olympic officials as potential security threats to 
Olympic participants and spectators alike (Interview Data, 2012). 
 Evident in the data is a Palestinian understanding of Israel‘s colonial agenda 
aimed at the West Bank and Israeli Jewish settlement of the West Bank east of the Green 
Line. Israeli settlement activities are not covert, but highly visible. Sally offered an 
explanation of why Israel continues to grab land from Palestinians: 
They‘re trying to get as many land from the Palestinians as possible because 
they‘re, um … bringing people, like immigrating people and like giving them, 
um … free homes, free houses, and full coverage, like insurance and health 
insurance and work and stuff like that. And just come you have your own house, 
you can live here in and be an Israel citizen if you are a Jew or something. So 
they‘re trying to get as much land as possible for them for, like, the other people 
from outside to come in here and, like, take the land and live in it. (Interview 
Data, 2012) 
Sally pointed to Israel‘s encouragement of settlement of Palestinian land by Jews from 
outside Israel. These migrant Jews receive significant benefits for settling in the land: 
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Israeli citizenship, free homes, free insurance, and work. These benefits are not offered to 
Palestinians born in Israel proper, but to migrant Jews only (Interview Data, 2012). For 
Sally, these initiatives and benefits offered to immigrant Jews from the ―outside‖ is an 
attempt to take the land from Palestinians (Interview Data, 2012). The goal of Israel 
settlement and Jewish migration is clear: ―Come in here and take the land and live in it‖ 
(Interview Data, 2012). 
 
 
 
Promised Land Discourse and Construction of the Other 
 
The discourse of Promised Land fits seamlessly with the rhetoric of security. 
Subscribers to the Promised Land discourse often argue that the Hebrew God gave the 
contested land to the ancestors of modern Jewish Israelis. Biblical texts support this 
discourse (Falah, 1996; Numbers 21:23–24; Deuteronomy 2:30–35, 7:2–6, 20:10–18; 
Joshua 6:17, 21, 8:24–29, 10:28, 30–32, 37, 39–40). This God ―promise‖ historic 
Palestine to the descendants of Abraham. When Abraham, the nomadic shepherd from Ur 
in southern Mesopotamia, traveled to Canaan at the Hebrew God‘s request, Abraham 
received a promise: 
Abram (Abraham) traveled through the land as far as the great tree of Moreh at 
Shechem. At that time, the Canaanites were in the land. The Lord appeared to 
Abram and said, ‗To your offspring, I will give this land.‘ (Genesis 12:6–7) 
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This affirmation that the Hebrew God gave the decedents of Abraham the land repeats 
throughout the Hebrew Bible (Genesis 13:15, 15:7, 18, 17:8, 26:2–5, 50:24; Exodus 6:8; 
Leviticus 20:24; Numbers 14:18; Deuteronomy 6:10, 31:20; Joshua 5:6; Judges 2:1). 
Falah (1996) argued that Jewish militias deployed a ―total war‖ strategy during 
the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, which resembles the biblical mandate of 
total war instituted by their Hebrew ancestors. Total war ―produces large scale 
devastation‖ in which all buildings and structures, regardless of their historical or cultural 
significance or importance, are destroyed. Densely populated cities become targets for 
destruction because total war includes ethnic cleansing that involves the expulsion of the 
native people from contested land, echoing the biblical mandate outlined in Numbers 
21:2–3. In the 1948 war, Jewish militias destroyed Arab buildings, homes, and significant 
places of culture, worship, and art, as part of the Israeli total war campaign (Falah, 1996, 
p. 257).  
 
Graffiti and Challenging the Promise Land Discourse 
 
The graffiti on the Palestinian side of the wall contests the Promise Land 
discourse and rhetoric of security by constructing discourses and rhetorics very similar to 
those in evidence on the Israeli website. Palestinian graffiti often reconstructs the identity 
of Palestinian from terrorists to oppressed freedom fighters and martyrs who fought 
against an aggressive, violent, and colonial Israeli empire. This colonial empire, 
supported by a Zionist and imperialistic rhetoric, sought to conquer land inhabited by 
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Palestinian Arabs for millennia. Central to the Zionist colonial agenda was the 
establishment of a Jewish homeland in historic Palestine. This land, however, also held 
religious significance for these native Palestinian Arabs. Palestinian Christian and 
Muslim Arabs alike point to ancient sites of religious pilgrimage as historical and 
religious justification for their respective claims to the contested land. In other words, 
graffiti on the wall often constructs Israelis as non-native others in need of removal from 
land that is ours, the Palestinians‘. 
 Through graffiti on the wall, West Bank Palestinians often celebrate and 
commemorate fellow Palestinians who fought and often violently resisted Israeli colonial 
practices. Figure 12 illustrates a picture of a young Yasser Arafat, the former Palestinian 
president. Arafat is shown wearing the kufiyah or hatah, the traditional Palestinian 
headdress and symbol of Palestine and Palestinians. The kufiyah is a prominent symbol 
of Palestine and Palestinians and is prevalent in graffiti. 
 Surrounding the image of Arafat are texts that read ―Free Palestine‖ and ―From 
Palestine with Love,‖ in a font and graphic design that resembles a postcard. 
Rhetorically, the image of a postcard is important. People send other people postcards 
typically of places they have visited, and this postcard evokes that same imagery. It is 
sent to someone ―from Palestine‖ and ―with love.‖ Images of postcards on the wall often 
symbolize Palestinians in diaspora, mostly refugees from the 1947 war, who seek to 
return to their native Palestinian homeland. The various textual fonts, colors, and images 
in Figure 12 strongly suggest that several artists created the graffiti. Rhetorically, Arafat‘s 
images evoke a symbol of hope of a future Palestinian state and defiance of Israeli 
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occupation. For the West, including Israel, Arafat‘s identity is synonymous with 
terrorism. This contrasting identity construction is evident in other examples of graffiti. 
Palestinians name Palestinian soldiers and prisoners as ―martyrs,‖ and graffiti on the wall 
commemorates them. Conversely, Israelis often name these same Palestinians as 
terrorists. 
The location of the graffiti, near the busy Qalindya checkpoint between Beit 
Hannia, on the Jerusalem side of the wall, and Ramallah, on the West Bank side of the 
wall, provides an opportunity for thousands of viewers each day passing through the 
Qalindya checkpoint. Travelers use this checkpoint to access Ramallah, the political 
center of the West Bank. The audience is Palestinians with Israeli-issued IDs, Israelis 
with work permits who are authorized by Israeli security personnel, and Palestinians who 
live near the checkpoint. Qalindya, a Palestinian refugee camp, is located near this 
checkpoint. Skirmishes between Palestinian residents of the refugee camp and Israeli 
security personnel stationed at this checkpoint happen frequently, and vandalism on the 
wall is clearly evident. Figure 12 shows graffiti located just before travelers pass through 
the checkpoint. 
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Figure 12. Graffiti of a young Yasser Arafat 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
Other images on Figure 12 include a hodgepodge of graffiti including what appears to be 
a hand grenade wearing a wig and several images that resembled keys, which represent 
Palestinians in diaspora who still held the keys to their homes lost in the Nakba. The key 
has come to symbolize not only the Nakba, but also the right of Palestinian refugees, both 
inside and outside Israel and the West Bank, to return to their homes lost in the Nakba. 
The key symbol is particular prevalent in graffiti located near refugee camps.  
  The graffiti below depict another personification of Palestinian resistance to 
Israeli colonial policies and a symbol of Palestinian hope. Like Arafat, the West and 
Israel associate Leila Khaled with terrorism. Palestinians, on the other hand, argue that 
Khaled is a brave freedom fighter that not only resisted Israeli occupation of historic 
Palestine, but also fought against the imperialistic impulse that fueled, and continues to 
fuel, the expansion of Israel deeper into the West Bank. Notice the image of the young 
Leila Khaled on the left side of Figure 13: 
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Figure 13. Graffiti of Leila Khaled on the Bethlehem side of the wall 
Photo by Linda Myers-Reed 
 
Graffiti depicting a young Leila Khaled is prominent on the Bethlehem side of the wall. 
In Figure 13, Khaled‘s smile and youthful appearance are depicted. Her smile rhetorically 
conflicts with the West‘s construction of her identity as a terrorist, and, at the same time, 
supports her construction as a proud Palestinian freedom fighter. In this graffiti, Khaled 
wears the traditional Palestinian headscarf, the hatah, and holds a machine gun. 
 The images of Khaled and Arafat symbolize Palestinian resistance to Israeli 
colonialism and occupation, as well as resistance to Western imperialism. These images 
challenge the rhetoric of security and attempt to reconstruct both identities, from a 
Western perspective of terrorists to an identity as freedom fighters and political figures 
who rebelled and fought against the colonial agenda of Israeli leadership aimed at historic 
Palestine. Often painted next to Khaled‘s image in graffiti on the wall are the words, ―I 
am not a terrorist,‖ which confronts her Western-constructed identity and further attempts 
to redefine her as a Palestinian fighting for Palestinian land rights. Khaled (1971) pointed 
to the partition of Palestine in 1936 and 1939 as the ―losing of Palestine‖ to the influx of 
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Jewish immigrants. Western imperialism drove the Zionist colonial project, and Khaled 
identified imperialism as the primary tool used by European Zionism to ―take‖ Palestine 
from Palestinians (p. 10). These visual rhetorics seek to persuade audiences that 
Palestinians should celebrate and commemorate the resistance of Arafat and Khaled. 
 Next to the image of Khaled in Figure 13 is an image of the wall surrounding 
what appears to be a Christmas tree. Bethlehem, surrounded by the wall on three sides, 
often symbolizes Christmas because it is the traditional location of the birth of Jesus of 
Nazareth, Christianity‘s central figure. Most Christians celebrate this event as Christmas, 
an event symbolized by a decorated evergreen tree. Evoking religious imagery becomes a 
rhetorical tool for graffiti artists who aim their visual rhetorics at specific audiences—in 
this case, Christians visiting Bethlehem. The wall around the Christmas tree symbolizes 
the inaccessibility of Christmas, a mythological symbol of the inaccessibility of 
Bethlehem, as well as the restriction on Palestinian freedom of movement. The wall 
surrounds and prohibits access to the symbolic Christmas tree, while also prohibiting 
egress from the Christmas tree. The area surrounding the tree, relatively small and 
confined, visually communicates the discourse evident in the interview data: Palestinians 
are confined to small spaces enclosed by a wall. The location of this graffiti, just after a 
traveler passes through Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 to enter Bethlehem, makes it an ideal 
place to visually communicate the rhetorics of restriction of Palestinian freedom of 
movement and the oppression of Palestinian Christians because of the wall (Interview 
Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012).  
The Christmas tree additionally symbolizes Palestinian Christian land claims. 
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These land claims, common in Palestinian Christian rhetoric, compete with the Israeli 
discourse of Promise Land and, in a sense, also with Palestinian Muslim claims to the 
land, which also manifest in graffiti (Figure 9). Palestinian Muslims and Palestinian 
Christians use religious symbols on the wall as visual rhetorics to rhetorically justify their 
historic and religious claims to the land and to communicate this land claim with 
Palestinians and internationals. The Christmas tree is more than a religious symbol; it is a 
historic symbol as well, positioning Palestinian Christians in the contested land for 
millennia. The Dome of the Rock in Figure 9 uses the same rhetorical strategy. As one of 
Islam‘s oldest structures, it visually communicates not only religious land claims, but 
historic land claims as well.  
 Ironically, Israelis point to their own religious and historical symbols to visually 
communicate their respective land claims. Many of these symbols also connect to 
symbols and myths for both Christianity and Islam. Jewish religious symbols seldom 
manifest in graffiti in the West Bank, but they manifest in cities west of the Green Line 
such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, and West Jerusalem (Heffez, 2012). Tourist discourse further 
promotes Israeli Jewish historic and religious sites, particularly in East Jerusalem where 
Christian and Muslim sites are located. These Jewish religious and historic sites include 
places such as the Western Wall, Temple Mount, and the City of David.  
 Israeli discursive power is demonstrated in how Israel connects these historical 
and religious sites to the discourse of Promise Land. For Israel, these sites offer proof of 
their historical narrative. Christianity and Islam often affirm the same religious texts that 
Jewish Israelis point to when rhetorically justifying their God-given rights to the land. 
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Many times, the Promise Land rhetoric is reduced to a simple historical fact: the Israelis 
were in the land first. This affirmation of Israeli rights to the land, rooted in religious 
scriptures and ―proved‖ by ancient archeological and religious sites, creates a discursive 
dilemma for Palestinian Muslims and Palestinian Christians. How do they both affirm 
and dispute Israeli colonial practices rooted in Promise Land discourse and religious texts 
to which all three religious groups subscribe? 
The graffiti on the wall seeks to recreate the historical narrative of the founding of 
the State of Israel by rhetorically connecting it to other historical events. Graffiti in  
 
Figure 14. Graffiti symbolizing the Dome of the Rock 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
Figure 14 challenges the State of Israel and Zionist rhetoric about the ―empty land‖ by 
equating the founding of the State of Israel and subsequent Palestinian Nakba with the 
horrific murdering of the indigenous habitants at Guernica by the Nazis. 
Nazi symbols and other references to Nazi Germany are prevalent on the wall. Most of 
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these references equate the Nazi policy aimed at killing civilians to the killing of 
Palestinians. Figure 14 rhetorically accomplishes this comparison by positioning 
―Palestina 1948‖ just below ―Gernica 193X,‖ thus visually equating the two events: the 
bombing and destruction of civilians at Guernica by Nazi forces equated to the 
destruction of Palestine and Palestinians by Jewish militias in 1948. The date after 
―Palestina‖ is also significant. The establishment of the State of Israel took place in 1948, 
suggesting that the Palestinian Guernica occurred the year the State of Israel was 
established.  
  Guernica receives significant scholarly discussion focusing on the famous city‘s 
symbolic meaning relative to the atrocities of war specific to civilians (Ray, 2006; 
Collins, 2008; Rhodes, 2013). Kopper (2014) specifically analyzed the rhetoric evoked 
by the use of Guernica in the context of protest. He argued that Guernica connected 
events of protest to a grand narrative. That is, the use of Guernica is linked to generalized 
discourses regarding abuse of power and injustices, including the intentional harming and 
killing of innocent others (p. 444). The Palestinian flag under the Gernica/Palestina 
graffiti further connects the two events. This graffiti is located near the Palestinian 
refugee camp of Al-Aida, suggesting that the audience for this particular visual rhetoric is 
Palestinian refugees. The graffiti seeks to persuade viewers that the establishment of the 
State of Israel in 1948 resulted in the murder of indigenous peoples by a powerful and 
brutal regime. 
 The Dome of the Rock seen on the left side of Figure 14 commemorates the 
Islamic prophet Mohammed‘s nighttime journey to heaven, an important religious event 
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for Muslims (The Holy Quran, Surah 17:1). But it also signifies Palestinian Muslims‘ 
religious and historical claims to the contested land in and around East Jerusalem, as a 
symbol of Palestinian nationhood and land rights specific to East Jerusalem and historic 
Palestine as a whole. The shrine, located in the Old City of East Jerusalem on 
internationally disputed land east of the Green Line, holds eschatological significance for 
Palestinians, but particularly for Palestinian Muslims. Images of the Dome of the Rock 
are prominent in the West Bank, while this religious, eschatological shrine remains 
inaccessible to most West Bank Palestinians because of the wall (Interview Data, 2012; 
Graffiti Data, 2012). The Dome of the Rock, visible through cracks in the wall, allows 
Palestinian audiences to ―see‖ the Dome of the Rock without having to pass through the 
security protocol at nearby Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 (Figure 14; Interview Data, 2012). 
The concept of seeing Jerusalem manifested in interview data when a Palestinian 
Christian referenced seeing the Holy City. The graffiti rhetorically reminds Palestinians 
that the Dome of the Rock is still located in East Jerusalem. The image of this iconic 
structure is synonymous with Jerusalem. It evokes both Palestinian Christian and 
Palestinian Muslim rights to Jerusalem and the violation of those rights because of 
security procedures aimed at Palestinians, including Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, the ID, 
and the wall. 
 The graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall strengthens the rhetoric of Israeli 
colonial practices aimed at contested Palestinian land on both sides of the Green Line. It 
challenges the rhetoric of security offered by the Israeli website and often labels Israel as 
an imperial project supported by Western imperial powers such as the US. The Dome of 
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the Rock and the Christmas tree symbolize Palestinian Christian and Palestinian Muslim 
land claims and reposition the land as belonging to them, not to the Israelis. The graffiti 
further challenges the identity construction of Palestinians by Western powers and Israel 
by commemorating Palestinian icons such as Arafat and Khaled, who are called terrorists 
in the West and Israel. 
The graffiti further positions the migration of world Jewry to historic Palestinian 
as an imperial project with a colonial agenda. The colonization and occupation of historic 
Palestine resulted in expulsion of native Palestinians from the contested land, to make 
room for the influx of world Jewry to the Promise Land. The wall thus becomes a 
concrete symbol of this occupation and a target for Palestinian and international voice 
against the occupation. The graffiti transforms the wall into a rhetorical space for 
persuading audiences that Palestinians have power and hope, even in the face of Western-
backed Israeli occupation. 
The visual design of the wall literally removes West Bank Palestinians from the 
sight of viewers on the Jerusalem side of the wall. In a sense, the wall visually hides West 
Bank Palestinians, thus also hiding the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and erasing the reality 
of the Israeli colonial project. The wall visually and literally hides the social, cultural, and 
economic plight of West Bank Palestinians, which was largely a result of the 
establishment of the State of Israel and Jewish migration to the contested land. The 
graffiti reminds Palestinians and internationals that Palestinians, by contrast, see the wall 
and recognize its purpose as a tool of separation and security from Israelis living on the 
Jerusalem side of the wall. 
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The Rhetoric of Security and Discourse of Promise Land 
Evident in Official Israeli Discourse 
 
 The rhetoric of security found in the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website 
overlap and intersect with Promise Land discourse. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu (2011) affirmed Israel‘s God-ordained rights to the Promise Land in a speech 
to the United Nations. Like the Palestinians who pointed to the Dome of the Rock to 
rhetorically justify their historic and religious land claims, Netanyahu pointed to another 
physical, historical, and symbolic structure—the Western Wall. Located in Palestinian 
East Jerusalem, the Western Wall conveys the mythological meaning that the State of 
Israel is indeed the Promise Land for modern Jewish Israelis. The Western Wall, 
Judaism‘s holiest site, resides only a few hundred meters from the Dome of the Rock, 
Islam‘s third holiest site, and a few blocks from the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, 
Christianity‘s holiest site. Netanyahu evoked mythological meaning that transformed the 
physical structure of the Western Wall into mythological symbol and meta-sign that 
―proved‖ Israeli land claims. In Netanyahu‘s words,  
So here in the United Nations, automatic majorities can decide anything. They can 
decide that the sun sets in the east or rises in the west. I think the first has already 
been pre-ordained. But they can also decide—they have decided that the Western 
Wall in Jerusalem, Judaism‘s holiest place, is occupied Palestinian territory. 
(Murphy, 2012) 
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The discourse of Promise Land evident in Netanyahu‘s speech connects to the 
mythological meaning of the Western Wall. He challenged the affirmation by the United 
Nations that the Western Wall is located in ―occupied Palestinian territory,‖ rather than in 
the Jewish State of Israel. According to Netanyahu, the United Nations decided that the 
Western Wall, ―Judaism holiest space,‖ indeed was located in an area other than Israel. 
The implied message is clear: How can Israel‘s holiest site be located in an area other 
than Israel? Netanyahu used the Western Wall as a religious symbol to challenge the 
naming of the area around the Western Wall and Jerusalem as ―occupied Palestinian 
territory.‖ The symbolic meaning of the Western Wall proves that God gave the Israelis 
the contested land, and that the land surrounding the Western Wall is Israel, not the 
―occupied Palestinian territory.‖ Undergirding the United Nations‘s naming the area 
around the Western Wall is the recognition of the areas east of the Green Line as 
―occupied Palestinian territory.‖ As stated earlier, Israeli sources refute the Green Line as 
a border between Israel and Palestinian territory. 
 
Hegemonic Discourse and Ideology 
 
 In Chapter 2, Fairclough (2001) defined hegemony as ―the power over society as 
a whole of one of the fundamental economic-defined classes in alliance with other social 
forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily‖ (p. 92). Hegemonies 
thus become a locus for struggle (p. 92). The Israeli permit system, wall, and Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 all provide examples of material social practices in which collective 
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ideologies manifest. The ideology of Israeli land rights, ownership, and security emerge 
through the use of visual symbols and bureaucracies such as the wall, Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300, and Israeli Jewish settlements. Even the symbolic meaning of the 
Western Wall communicates Israeli land claims. For most audiences in the West, Israeli 
hegemony over discourse surrounding land rights dominates the discourse and narrative 
informed by the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Like Jewish Israelis, the Palestinians evoke 
symbolic meaning and claims to contested land by pointing to the symbolic meaning and 
location of the Dome of the Rock.  
The interview and graffiti data suggest, however, that the visual and bureaucratic 
measures instituted by Israeli leadership and security personnel become hegemonic tools 
used to control Palestinians and Palestinian discourse, and ensure Israeli dominance and 
power that often manifests in the Israeli control of discourse surrounding the conflict, 
particularly with Western audiences. Graffiti rhetorics become a way that Palestinians 
and internationals can confront, interrogate, and challenge the Israeli hegemonic 
discourse and control of narratives. 
 The interview data speak to this hegemonic relationship and ideology: Israeli 
security and rights to the land supersede Palestinian rights to the same land, even though 
both groups have provided evidence of their historical and theological connections to the 
land (Interview Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012). Israeli Jewish settler power was 
particularly clothed in legitimacy, thus making the Promise Land rhetoric ―the most 
potent weapon‖ and particularly effective at erasing Palestinian history (Ellis, 2014, p. 
477). The religious settlers construct and reinvent themselves as authentic natives and 
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consequently construct the Palestinians as dangerous, non-native others from whom 
Israelis need to be protected. Ellis stated, 
The religious Zionist settlers have no conflict with individual Arabs, as long as he 
or she is not seeking rights or interfering with the general settlement project. 
Nevertheless, this sense of protectiveness can turn quickly when there is a violent 
incident and the local ―primitives‖ will be described as murderous and compared 
to Cossack hordes. (p. 482)  
Ellis concluded that the ―security argument‖ has become the pragmatic argument used 
when Israeli Jewish settlers refrain from using their theological rhetoric and accept 
secular legal language as a ―weapon‖ to settle the contested land (p. 479). This security 
argument used by Israeli Jewish settlers is the same argument used by the Israel Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs website. The website rhetorically constructs Israelis as authentic 
natives and further position the native Palestinian Arab population as inauthentic others. 
Israeli Jews ―reinvent themselves as its native population,‖ to use Pappé‘s words (2006, 
p. 18).  
The international community, specifically the United Nations and the United 
States, insert themselves into the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in an attempt to resolve it. 
The international community‘s insertion into the conflict has shaped specific discursive 
practices and rhetorical strategies. The United Nations instituted several resolutions 
aimed at Israel condemning settlement development, and reaffirming Palestinian Arabs‘ 
rights to return to their historic homeland land (U.N. Resolution 446). The United 
Nations also contested the legality/illegality of the wall and argued that settlements, the 
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wall, and the refusal to grant Palestinians the ability to return to their homes lost during 
the establishment of the State of Israel, are illegal under international law (United 
Nations, ―U.N. Resolution 446,‖ 1979). 
Graffiti data speaks to the Palestinian refugees‘ right to return to historic Palestine 
and Israel leadership‘s refusal to allow them to do so, despite U.N. resolutions and 
international law. The 1948 Arab/Israeli war resulted in the uprooting of approximately 
800,000 Palestinians and the destruction of 531 Palestinian villages. Eleven urban cities 
saw the removal of their native Palestinian inhabitants (Pappé, 2006, p. xiii). The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) serves about 1.6 million registered 
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, plus 4.3 million registered Palestinian 
refugees in surrounding countries (http://www.unrwa.usa.org/who-are-palestine-
refugees/). Palestinians and internationals argue that Palestinian refugees displaced or 
expelled because of the 1947 Arab/Israeli war have the right to return to their Palestinian 
homeland (U.N. Resolution 194; Graffiti Data, 2012). 
Palestinians have sought to create an identity in the United Nations. Their bid for 
recognition at the United Nations received fierce criticism from Israel and its 
international and powerful ally, the US. In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, U.S. 
President Barak Obama (2011) downplayed the bid for Palestinian statehood and 
sovereignty. Obama illustrated the discourse of Palestinian/Israeli peace and argued that 
only Israelis and Palestinians can reach peace agreements: 
Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations—if 
it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now. Ultimately, it is the 
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Israelis and the Palestinians who must live side by side. Ultimately, it is the 
Israelis and the Palestinians—not the US—who must reach agreement on the 
issues that divide them: on borders and on security, on refugees and Jerusalem. 
(Obama, 2011) 
Obama‘s ―it‘s up to the Palestinians and Israelis‖ rhetoric seemed odd in the context of 
consistent U.S. vetoes of U.N. resolutions against Israel and the US‘s financial support of 
Israel. According to the Jewish Virtual Library, the United States has vetoed 38 U.N. 
resolutions against Israel since 1983 
(http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/U.S.vetoes.html). The United States 
withdrew funding from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization) immediately following UNESCO‘s granting membership to Palestine 
(Lobe, 2011). These actions by U.S. leadership suggest that the United States plays a 
significant role in the ―issues that divide‖ Palestinians and Israelis (Obama, 2011). In 
other words, the US‘s consistent vetoes of U.N. resolutions against Israel, and its 
financial support of Israel, suggest that the United States indeed shaped the issues that 
divided Palestinians and Israelis. U.S. actions at the United Nations and the US‘s 
financial support of Israel further suggest that the United States authorized Israel‘s 
colonial and ―security‖ policies aimed at Palestinians, in spite of President Obama‘s 
claim that ―it is the Israelis and the Palestinians—not the US—who must reach agreement 
on the issues that divide them.‖ Recently, U.S. policy toward Israel took a drastic turn. 
Samantha Power, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, abstained from a recent U.N. 
Security Council resolution vote condemning Israeli settlements. As a result, the 
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resolution passed, marking a turn in U.S. policy toward Israel in the context of the United 
Nations (Morello & Eglash, 2016). 
 
Challenges to the Rhetoric of Security and Discourse of Promise Land 
 
 The wall has attracted internationally known graffiti artists. Banksy‘s ―Santa‘s 
Ghetto‖ project in 2006 brought 14 graffiti artists to the wall in an effort to both display 
their graffiti and offer commentary on the wall about the wall (Parry, 2010, p. 15). 
Banksy called the wall and the West Bank, ―the world‘s largest open-air prison and the 
ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti artists‖ (Banksy, 2006, p. 136). An image 
of one of Banksy‘s graffiti on the wall appears in Figure 15: 
 
Figure 15. Banksy‘s living room scene on the wall 
Source: Parry, 2005; The Electronic Intifada, https://electronicintifada.net/content/well-known-
uk-graffiti-artist-banksy-hacks-wall/5733 
 
These graffiti depict a living room scene complete with the symmetry of two chairs on 
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either side of a centrally placed window. Curtains frame the window and the beautiful 
view of a mountain scene outside the window and on the other side of the wall. A table 
between the two chairs with a flowerpot helps to further frame the beautiful, idealistic 
view out the window. The symbolic meaning is clear: scenes of beauty, tranquility, and 
serenity are available to Palestinians only through a window in the wall. The graffiti 
seeks to persuade audiences that the other side of the wall is where they‘ll find idealistic 
beauty in an idealistic space. 
 Figure 16 depicts a similar image from Banksy, answering the question, ―What‘s 
on the other side of the wall that is hidden from our West Bank Palestinian Arab view?‖ 
 
 
Figure 16. Banksy‘s beach scene on the wall 
Source: Parry, 2005, The Electronic Intifada, https://electronicintifada.net/content/well-known-
uk-graffiti-artist-banksy-hacks-wall/5733 
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Cracks and a hole in the wall reveal a beautiful beach. The scene depicts two children, 
with toy shovels and buckets, one yellow in color, playing in front of the idealistic beach 
scene visible through the wall. The boys are playing on the West Bank side of the wall, 
while the beautiful and idealistic scene is located on the other side of the wall. The other 
side of the wall is a mythological construct of beauty, opportunity, and serenity. The 
graffiti is persuasive in how it acts upon viewers‘ idealistic impressions of the other side 
of the wall, a side that is inaccessible to them both physically and symbolically. It further 
points to power structures manifested in the wall that prohibit them from accessing this 
beautiful and idealized space. 
The audience for Banksy‘s graffiti is Palestinians and internationals. The context 
for the graffiti is on the wall near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. The purpose of the graffiti 
is to show what is on the other side of the wall. The idealization is that the other side of 
the wall contains beauty, serenity, peace, and prosperity. This idealization conflicts with 
the realization on the Bethlehem side of the wall that the Palestinians are without these 
mythological and ideological constructs. Banksy‘s graffiti further supports binaries. The 
other side of the wall is a beautiful place. This side of the wall, the other‘s binary, is a 
place of oppression and desolation. 
  Banksy‘s graffiti have become a source of tourism and economy for 
entrepreneurially minded West Bank Palestinians who offer a ―Banksy Tour‖ to tourists 
(Murad Tours, n.d.). Graffiti on the wall, and even tours of graffiti on the wall, have 
normalized the wall. Banksy‘s book discusses a scene in which a local Palestinian man 
both praised Banksy‘s graffiti and denounced his process of making the wall ―beautiful.‖ 
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According to Banksy, the local Palestinian man said, ―You paint the wall. You make it 
beautiful … We hate this wall. Go home‖ (Banksy, 2006, p. 143). In some ways, the 
graffiti on the wall has the opposite affect: it provides Palestinians and internationals a 
space to paint on or vandalize the wall. But that process normalizes the wall and changes 
it from a symbol of Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian oppression to that of a casual 
activity or source of entertainment. When visiting the West Bank in 2012, a Palestinian 
West Banker casually asked me, ―Do you want to paint something on the wall?‖  
 Graffiti thus becomes a communicative mode used primarily on the Bethlehem 
side of the wall, to contest the rhetoric of security and discourse of Promise Land offered 
on the Jerusalem side of the wall. The rhetorical struggle further separates the two sides 
as they seek to discursively define the purpose of the wall. This separation, demonstrated 
by the competing rhetorics that seek to define the purpose of the wall, symbolizes not 
only the physical separation of West Bank Palestinians from Israelis living on the 
Jerusalem side of the wall, but it also symbolizes the separation of Israeli and Palestinian 
leadership with respect to the issues that divide them. In a sense, the wall symbolizes 
these issues including the fate of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees‘ right of return, 
Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and the borders of the 
State of Israeli and the not-yet-materialized Palestinian state. 
 Graffiti as a communicative mode suggests a struggle for rhetorical power, 
particularly regarding the semiotic meaning of the wall. Figures 13 through 20 illustrate 
this re-construction through competing binary rhetorics—a rhetoric of security versus a 
rhetoric of apartheid, a rhetoric of security versus a rhetoric of restriction of movement, a 
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Promise Land discourse versus a rhetoric of Palestinian right of return, a Palestinian right 
of return versus a Jewish law of return, etc.  
  The prolific amount of graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall, in contrast to 
the lack of graffiti on the Jerusalem side of the wall, suggests that the wall speaks 
differently to different audiences with respect to their perspective. The visual contrast 
between the Jerusalem side of the wall and the West Bank side of the wall is stark and 
difficult not to notice. The side of the wall facing Jerusalem and Israel proper is a 
relatively clean and well-maintained concrete surface largely absent of graffiti, 
vandalism, or damage. When compared to the Palestinian side of the wall, which is 
loaded with text, graffiti, and vandalism, the Jerusalem side of the wall is silent.  
Glenn (2004) argued that voice and silence, or no comment, are rhetorical arts. 
The written text and visuals on the Palestinian side of the wall demonstrate how 
Palestinians and the creators of graffiti signal their power of speech. Glenn said, 
―Containing everything in itself, silence is meaningful, even it is invisible. It can mean 
powerlessness or emptiness, but not always‖ (p. 4). The lack of graffiti and vandalism 
and the apparent lack of comment on the Israeli side of the wall do not suggest Israeli 
powerlessness or emptiness, but instead the meaning-making power of silence. Silence 
becomes a form of Israeli speech and a key component of the visual dialogue and 
discourse between Israelis on one side of the wall and Palestinians on the other side. 
Glenn explained, ―Speaking and silence remain tied to our civilizing tendencies, which 
play out expressly in conversation‖ (p. 5). Glenn argued that who spoke and who 
remained silent always depended on the rhetorical situation. Figure 17 illustrates the 
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Jerusalem side of the wall just outside Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. Note the absence of 
graffiti, vandalism, and litter. 
 
 
Figure 17. The wall, Jerusalem side, located at Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
The lack of graffiti and vandalism and the apparent silence on the Jerusalem side of the 
wall in Figure 17 do not represent powerlessness or emptiness. The wall itself speaks. It 
symbolizes and signals security to Israelis and internationals from unsafe, Palestinian 
―others‖ on the other side the wall. The absence of graffiti by Israelis suggests a 
willingness not to speak using text, graffiti, and vandalism. Instead, silence is indeed a 
form of speech and voice. The symbolic meaning created by the wall from this 
perspective is clear: security. Something or someone behind this wall is so dangerous that 
the Israelis must contain and secure it using an 8-meter-high concrete wall with built-in 
turret-style watchtowers and barbed wire fencing on top that faces toward the West Bank. 
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This visual silence suggests that the wall itself, rhetorical, discursively, and ideologically, 
silences the conflict with the Palestinians. It allows everyday Israelis to view the wall and 
construct a meaning that, as I stated earlier, erases the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
the conflict with them. The blank, grey concrete almost comforts the Israelis, because 
West Bank Palestinians and the threat that they pose to Israelis are not visible. 
 The graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall suggests Palestinians‘ willingness 
and ability to speak before others, including superiors. The wall offers Palestinians and 
internationals a visual space to challenge the idea of Israeli sovereign power, the 
performance of sovereignty discussed by Bushbridge (2013), and the rhetoric of security. 
Figure 18 illustrates graffiti and vandalism to the wall near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300. 
 
Figure 18. Graffiti on the wall located near Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
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Figure 18 is typical of most graffiti on the wall: a hodgepodge mixture of political 
statements, cartoon-like characters, symbols, tags, and individual names. The context of 
the location of this section of the wall proves vital to interpreting the graffiti. The location 
of this example is adjacent to the Aida Refugee Camp, which covers 0.71 square 
kilometers with a population of 3,150 Palestinian refugees. Aida is one of 19 Palestinian 
refugee camps located in the West Bank served by the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA, n.d.). Aida Refugee Camp is located near the Israeli Jewish 
settlements of Gilo and Har Gilo on the Jerusalem side of the wall. Figure 19 illustrates a 
close-up of Figure 18: 
 
Figure 19. Graffiti on the wall with the names of Palestinian villages 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
The use of graffiti on the Palestinian side of the wall demonstrates that Palestinians and 
the creators of graffiti signaled their power of speech using graffiti as a communicative 
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mode. Figure 19 illustrates several seemingly unrelated graffiti: a boy on a cross throwing 
paper airplanes toward the top of the wall, and a bearded man resembling Western 
images of Jesus of Nazareth looking through a hole ripped in the wall. Various tags in 
Arabic and graffiti are also evident. Of particular interest is the Arabic script located at 
the bottom right of the image of the bearded man. The graffiti list three names of Arab 
cities located in historic Palestine: Akka, Haifa, and al-‗Iraqiya al-Manshiya. During the 
establishment of the State of Israel, Israeli militias expelled—or ―ethnically cleansed,‖ to 
use Pappé‘s (2006) term—native Palestinian Arab residents and replaced by immigrating 
Jewish residents. Figure 20 further promotes a rhetoric of Palestinian return to historical 
Palestine: 
 
Figure 20. Letter from a Palestinian Refugee located on the wall 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
Figure 20 resembles the visual structure and format of a personal letter. A Palestinian 
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refugee who signed the letter wrote ―Dear Haifa, We are returning,‖ which promotes a 
definitive declaration that Palestinians expelled from Haifa during the 1948 Nakba were 
indeed returning to Haifa. Pappé (2006) discussed the de-Arabization of Haifa. On April 
21, 1948, Jewish speakers began urging Palestinian residents of Haifa to leave because of 
an impending attack on Arabs in Haifa by the Jewish militia group Hagana. Haifa‘s 
Jewish mayor, Shabtai Levi, gave Palestinian Arabs an opposing message, asking Arab 
residents to stay. Mordechai Maklef, operational officer of the Cameli Brigade, however, 
ordered the cleansing campaign. Pappé reported that Maklef‘s orders to his troops were 
clear and concise: ―Kill any Arab you encounter; torch all inflammable objects and force 
doors open with explosives‖ (p. 95). Pappé continued, 
When these orders were executed promptly within the 1.5 square kilometers 
where thousands of Haifa‘s defenseless Palestinians were still residing, the shock 
and terror were such that, without packing any of their belongings or even 
knowing what they were doing, people began leaving in masse. (p. 95) 
The expulsion of Palestinian Arabs from Haifa was part of Plan Dalet, a plan designed to 
destroy Palestinian areas of historic Palestine. Plan Dalet resulted in the uprooting of half 
of Palestine‘s native population: over 800,000 people were displaced and 531 villages 
destroyed.  
The tree in the upper left corner of Figure 20 resembles a prominent symbol for 
Palestine, the olive tree. The top of the letter reads, ―The Nakba at 63,‖ and the letter is 
dated ―15/5/2011.‖ Sixty-three years had elapsed since the founding of the State of Israel 
in 1948. A graphic resembling a keyhole is visible in the top right of the letter. Keyholes 
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and keys symbolize the Palestinians‘ right of return to historic Palestine. Many 
Palestinians who fled their homes during the Nakba still have the keys to their homes that 
were vacated when Jewish militias expelled the Palestinian Arabs (Sacco, 2009, p. 3). A 
Palestinian Christian who lives in East Jerusalem shared with me her journey from Jaffa, 
where she lived, to East Jerusalem, where she now lives and where Israeli militia forced 
her to march during the Nakba. She still has the keys to her former home in Jaffa. 
The popular image of the Handala, or Hanthala, further symbolizes the Nakba and 
the Palestinian rhetoric of return to their native homeland. Ali Al-Naji, a Palestinian 
cartoonist, invented the Handala, an unattractive, bitter, and tough Palestinian refugee 
child who longs to return to his home lost during the Nakba and the founding of the State 
of Israel (Sacco, 2009, pp. vii–ix; Handala, n.d.): 
 
Figure 21. Graffiti of Handala located on the wall 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
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Handala always turns his back to the viewer, and his hair is always a mess. The prickly 
nature of his hair symbolizes the cactus, a prominent symbol in Palestine that represents 
the toughness of Palestinian refugee children. His clothes are torn, symbolizing his 
poverty. The Handala symbolizes a multitude of inter-related and entangled rhetorics, 
including the rhetorics of security, occupation, land rights, right of return, and restriction 
of movement (Sacco, 2009, p. 2). Al-Naji wrote, ―At first he was a Palestinian child, but 
his consciousness developed to have a national then a global and human horizon‖ 
(Handala, n.d.). The Handala become a symbol of Palestine‘s oppression by the Israelis, 
and their lack of political and ideological support from neighboring Arab countries, as 
well as the US‘s unwavering support of Israel. 
 The myths created by the wall, combined with those created by the symbolic 
meaning of the Handala, create a meta-myth. The visual image of the Handala by itself 
symbolizes multiple myths: Palestinian right of return to historic Palestine, loss of 
Palestinian land via the establishment of the State of Israeli and the occupation of the 
West Bank by Israeli security personnel, and loss of Palestinian rights to self-govern. The 
location of this image of the Handala, on the wall in Aida Refugee Camp, is particularly 
significant. Palestinian refugees are the audience, and the context of the graffiti makes it 
easily viewable by Palestinians living in the refugee campus.  
 The Handala is also located on another section of the wall that separates 
Palestinians from Rachel‘s Tomb, a site of religious pilgrimage and tourism for 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews alike. Various graffiti tags surround the iconic image, seen 
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in Figure 22: 
 
 
Figure 22. The Handala 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
The Handala also symbolizes the lack of support for Palestinian rights, particularly from 
Israel‘s Arab neighbors and Israel‘s imperial ally, the US. Al-Naji frequently condemned 
the US‘s unwavering support of the State of Israel and the Arab world‘s inability to 
change the status quo regarding Palestinians‘ right of return to their native, historic 
Palestine (Sacco, 2009, pp. 3–21, 43–65). The audience for Figure 22 differs from that 
for Figure 21. The location of this graffiti specifically communicates to internationals 
seeking to visit the now inaccessible Rachel‘s Tomb. Note the image of graffiti, located 
near Figure 22, implicating the United States for its support of the State of Israel and its 
ideological, financial, and political support of the wall: 
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Figure 23. ―Made in the USA‖ graffiti 
Photo by R. Chad Holt 
 
The graffiti on the wall reads, ―Israel have you become the evil you deplored?‖ and 
―Made in the USA‖ (Figure 23). Black underlines and black lines combined with red 
lines surround the ―Israel have you become the evil you deplored?‖ written script. The 
―Made in the USA‖ graffiti resemble the size, font, and design of logos placed on 
manufactured goods produced in the US. This logo, written in black, is clearly visible on 
the bottom of approximately 20 sections of the wall. The symbolic message is clear: the 
United States made the wall. The symbolic meaning mythologized in this graffiti is also 
clear: the United States not only created the wall, but also created the conditions for the 
wall through its support of the State of Israel. The audience for this graffiti, located near 
the entrance to Bethlehem just past Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, is likely an English-
speaking Christian pilgrim visiting religious sites in Bethlehem. This graffiti further 
represents transnational graffiti in the way it works in conjunction with other graffiti to 
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offer social commentary on how respective countries aid in the occupation of Palestine. It 
seeks to persuade audiences that the US, an important imperial ally to Israel, financially, 
politically, and ideologically supports the wall. Amy, an international from the United 
States volunteering in Ramallah, said, 
Knowing that I have help funded the checkpoints and the walls, it‘s very 
frustrating because it something that I … It is a burden on me every morning 
going to work, and I know that it‘s a huge burden on those families living here. 
(Interview Data, 2012) 
Amy alluded to the US‘s unwavering financial, political, and military support of the State 
of Israeli. The United States provided Israel with a ―conservative estimate‖ of $114 
billion dollars in aid from 1949 to 2008. This amount of aid surpassed foreign aid to all 
other countries except Iraq. Additional Defense Department aid to Israel totals over $10 
billion dollars since 1949. The United States also provided loan guarantees to the Israelis, 
including $600 million for housing between 1972 and 1990, $9.2 billion for resettlement 
of Jews from the Soviet Union between 1992 and 1997, and $14 billion for refinancing 
military loans (McArthur, 2011, pp. 10–11). 
 The ―Made in the USA‖ graffiti also symbolizes U.S. defiance of the international 
community, including the United Nations, in support of Israel‘s policies aimed at 
Palestinians and historic Palestine. The Washington Post reported that the Obama 
administration cast its first-ever veto vote in the U.N. Security Council in February 2011. 
The veto blocked a Palestinian-backed resolution condemning the building of Israeli 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The other 13 members of the 
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U.N. Security Council supported the resolution, and the United States was the only 
member of the Security Council not to approve the resolution. Susan Rice, the U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations, acknowledged Israeli Jewish settlement construction 
as illegal and as a major roadblock in peace negotiations. Nevertheless, Ambassador Rice 
and the United States sided with the Israelis, arguing that the adoption of the resolution 
would risk ―hardening the positions of both sides‖ (Lynch, 2011). The position echoed 
similar positions by previous U.S. administrations. In 2004, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed House Resolution 713, refuting the International Court of 
Justice‘s ruling that the wall was illegal under international law (United States Congress, 
2004).  
 Mearsheimer and Walt argue that a new rhetorical strategy now advocates for the 
Israeli state and supports their policies aimed at Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza: 
the war on terror. Israel has become the US‘s key ally in the war on terror, with both the 
United States and Israel having the same ideologically constructed enemy: terrorists, and 
particularly Islamic terrorists (p. 61). The examples of graffiti on the Bethlehem side of 
the wall reject the construction of the wall as a mythological sign for security and Israel 
as sovereign over Palestinians and the West Bank. The graffiti further reject the discourse 
of Islamic terrorism and ideological construction of West Bank Palestinians as collective 
terrorists. Palestinian and international graffiti artists, local Palestinians, and tourists 
embrace the role of producers of knowledge, messages, and symbolic meanings, using 
graffiti as a communicative mode creating their own rhetorics and symbolic meanings of 
Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall. These rhetorics challenge the war on terror 
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rhetoric and the symbolic meaning of the wall as a mechanism for Israeli security. 
 
The Wall as Myth and Visual Rhetoric 
 
The graffiti depicting Leila Khaled (Figure 14) is an example of myth. According 
to Barthes (1972), myth is a type of signification—whether that signification is text, 
image, design, or spoken words—that has an implicit cultural significance for a particular 
group beyond the apparent meaning. Barthes theorizes myth as a system of second order 
signs that signify ideologies; first order signs are signifiers for particular things or ideas 
(signs). For example, the words ―bald eagle,‖ or a picture of a bald eagle, is a first order 
signifier when the signified is large bird native to North America. The bald eagle is a 
second order sign when it appears on currency, documents, official seals, or patriotic 
images and signifies qualities the United States associates with itself: strength, courage, 
and freedom. The second order sign, the myth, is an ideology of U.S. exceptionalism.  
The myth signified by the image of Khaled happily and violently resisting Israel‘s 
colonization of historic Palestine communicates Palestinians‘ duty to resist colonial 
occupation. In fact, that resistance as a key to happiness is part of an ideology. An 
exaggeration or distortion of reality is presented to communicate a specific message, 
which in this case is Palestinians‘ obligation to resist violently the Israeli occupation. 
Barthes‘ (1972) framework suggests that the communicative meaning of the Leila Khaled 
graffiti is rooted not in the graffiti itself, but in the graffiti‘s symbolic meaning. Khaled‘s 
image becomes mythological and functions as a sign of resistance, a myth, conveying an 
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ideology that constructs Palestinians in the West Bank as freedom fighters.  
Often Israelis detain these Palestinian ―freedom fighters‖ in Israeli prisons that are 
remarkably similar, visually, to the wall surrounding the West Bank at Bethlehem 
Checkpoint 300 (Figure 18). The visual, physical construction of the wall mirrors that of 
an Israeli prison, further persuading viewers that West Bank Palestinians are indeed 
prisoners confined to a prison. On a drive to Tel-Aviv from Beit Hannia near Northeast 
Jerusalem, I drove past an Ofer prison and noticed undeniable visual similarities between 
the wall surrounding this prison and the wall surrounding the West Bank. The size, type, 
and color of the concrete walls used to construct this prison are identical to the wall that 
encircles Palestinian areas in and around East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank. Note the visual design of Israel‘s Ofer Prison in Figure 24: 
 
Figure 24. The Israeli Ofer Prison 
Source: Levy and Levac, 2015 
 
Rotbard (2013) asserted that every piece of Israeli architecture is an act of Zionism. 
Every building functions to support the Zionist colonial project in historic Palestine (p. 
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40). Buildings and structures have taken on a duplicitous, symbolic role. They function 
according to their purpose, but they also function to symbolize and persuade viewers of 
Israel‘s sovereign power. Like other Israeli structures that symbolize the building of Eretz 
Yisrael (the Land of Israel) and Israeli sovereignty, Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the 
wall become communicative symbols and meta-signs. These structures signal that Israelis 
are in power because they, the Israelis, have the power to build these structures regardless 
of local Arab Palestinian land claims and historical narratives tying Arab Palestinians to 
the land. Chomsky and Pappé (2015) supported Rothbard‘s assertion and argued that 
Zionism as colonialism is central to explaining the Judization of historic Palestine, 
including settlement development in the West Bank. They argue that early Zionists 
proudly used Hebrew terms meaning ―to colonize‖ or ―to settle‖ to describe their 
takeover of historic Palestine (p. 21). 
 
Mythological Meaning of Religious Structures and Places 
 
Complicating the matter are religious sites sacred to Jews, Muslims, and 
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Christians located in East Jerusalem east of the Green Line. As stated previously, 
Palestinians engage in a similar rhetorical strategy that uses religious structures as meta-
signs to construct the contested land as belonging to them, the Palestinians. Figure 25 
illustrates graffiti on the Bethlehem side of the wall. Note the image of the Dome of the 
Rock located near the watchtower: 
 
Figure 25. Graffiti showing hands, a ladder, the collapse of the wall, and Jerusalem 
Photo by Linda Myers-Reed 
 
The graffiti add another layer of religious significance to the Dome of the Rock by 
adding visual rhetoric that evokes a religious, eschatological scene relative to the collapse 
of the wall. This image depicts a ladder coming through a cloud with two hands at the 
top. Sections of the wall are falling down like dominos as the ladder from heaven reaches 
the historic city of Jerusalem. The Dome of the Rock, one of Jerusalem‘s most iconic 
structures, is located at the far left of the image, along with the historic 16th-century wall 
that surrounds the Old City of Jerusalem. This eschatological scene suggests that God in 
heaven will topple the wall and offer a ladder to heaven leading from East Jerusalem. The 
ladder is located on the Jerusalem side of the wall and is now accessible to West Bankers 
because the wall has fallen. The persuasive function of this example of graffiti is clear: 
God will topple the wall. 
 The next chapter will discuss the data and offer conclusions about how the 
symbolic meaning of Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall are constructed in 
discourse. The visual discourse created by the wall required opposite identity constructs. 
These opposites prove fundamental to understanding identity as it relates to both verbal 
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and visual discourse. Separateness and security, as synonymous ideological constructs 
mythologized in the visual rhetoric of the wall, also require an ideological opposite, an 
other. I will argue that the current Israeli/Palestinian discourse needs to evolve to reflect 
Israeli colonial expansion into the West Bank, as mythologized by the symbolic meaning 
of the wall. I will also argue that current Israeli leadership seeks to maintain the status 
quo and further to perpetuate violence against its own citizens, West Bank Palestinians, 
and Gaza Palestinians, so that it may continue to justify colonial and imperial expansion 
into the West Bank under the thinly veiled rhetoric of security. Undergirding this security 
is the construction of West Bank Palestinians as the inferior other who beseech 
domination. 
  
  
 
CHAPTER 5: MYTHS, NAMING, AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 My research findings, recent scholarship outlined in this dissertation, and 
information from Israeli sources, including the Israel Ministry of Affairs website, all 
demonstrate that Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 and the wall create symbolic meanings that 
construct the identity of both Palestinians and Israelis in intentional and unintentional 
ways. 
 Power in discourse is concerned with discourse as a lace wherein relations of 
power are exercised and enacted (Fairclough, 2001, p. 36) Power in discourse is the 
capacity to determine to what extent that power will be overtly expressed (p. 60). The 
conflicting images of graffiti and vandalism on the Bethlehem side of the wall, compared 
to the clean, well-maintained surface on the Jerusalem side, illustrate power in discourse. 
Palestinian and international graffiti artists exercise their power to use the wall as a 
medium for political messages and constructing/reconstructing narrative about Israeli 
colonial occupation of historic Palestine, which have now manifested into a 8-meter-high 
concrete wall. Power in discourse as lace includes their construction as terrorist; hence 
the need for security measures such as the wall and checkpoints. 
Evident in the data is power in discourse. Amir (2011), the interview data, and the 
data from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website all concur that the wall persuades 
audiences that separating property and people (i.e., separating Israelis from West Bank 
Palestinians) results in Israeli security. As my findings illustrate, the intentional 
connection of the wall and Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 with security and separation create 
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a semiotic construct that transforms the wall and Bethlehem Checkpoint 300 into myths 
and meta-signs that construct ideologies held by Israelis living on the Jerusalem side of 
the wall and Palestinians living on the Bethlehem side. A rhetoric of security justifies the 
creation of the wall, according to Israeli sources. Palestinians, Israeli activists, and 
internationals recognize and refute the rhetoric of security, and they offer their own 
rhetorical responses of land grab, occupation, and denial of Palestinian rights, including a 
restriction on Palestinian movement (Interview Data, 2012; Graffiti Data, 2012; Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). For Israelis, the wall provides security from any West 
Bank Palestinians whose aim is to harm Israeli citizens. 
In this chapter, I discuss the visual discourse created by the wall and its 
construction of symbolic myths, how the act of naming leads to the construction of these 
symbolic myths, how the wall constructs the identity of Palestinians and Israelis, what 
lessons were learned as a result of this research study, and how we can move forward 
with regard to Palestinian and Israeli peace. 
 
Visual Discourse and the Construction of Symbolic Myths 
 
One important aspect of visual discourse that my investigation supports is the 
significance of both verbal and visual naming, and how the act of naming shapes 
discursive practices. Visual rhetorics such as the wall, graffiti, checkpoints, settlements, 
and other architectural structures seek to persuade audiences and have an impact on 
discourse. Language and the power to name represent an institutional authority to 
149 
 
 
 
delegate the power of words/language/naming to an authorized spokesperson. Social 
institutions grant the power of naming to individuals (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 107). An 
example of authorized authority to name can be found in a speech by Israeli Prime 
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who ―legalized‖ three Jewish outposts in the West Bank 
(Murphy, 2012). Netanyahu‘s performative utterance has power to legalize, because 
Israeli governmental institutions authorize him to name outposts as legal. Neither Jewish 
workers nor Israeli residents have power to name the outposts as legal, because no social 
institution has authorized them to do so. 
As a tool for constructing both verbal and visual discourse, naming is a 
prerequisite to separation and the construction of rhetorics, specifically visual rhetorics. 
Fence evokes a very different meaning than wall. Naming marks visual rhetorics in 
specific, ideologically rooted ways. When something is named and marked, a 
signification occurs, which leads to the construction of mythologies (Barthes, 1972, p. 
114). People and institutions create the world through naming, and social struggles locate 
with the ritualized strategies of naming (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 105). In a broader sense, 
those in power have the power to name and define words and symbols, and thus to shape 
discourse.  
In the case of this research study about Bethlehem Checkpoint and the wall, 
mythologically and ideologically, separation and security are synonymous—to separate is 
to secure, and to secure is to separate. A security wall inevitably serves as a separation 
wall, and a separation wall serves as a security wall. A person or institution seeking to 
secure must also separate. Likewise, a person or institution seeking to separate must also 
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secure. Separation as a mythological construct is deeply connected to culturally held 
ideologies. Walls have protected spaces, places, and people for millennia, and walls have 
visually and discursively communicated to both the constructors of the wall and those 
being constructed by the wall that something or someone needs separating and securing. 
The ideology of the need for separation provides the lens through which viewers interpret 
symbols and construct mythological meanings surrounding the idea of separation. A 
fence or wall is a particular type of visual rhetoric because fences and walls, by their very 
nature, require a separate and opposite construct to create meaning. Fences and walls 
visually and ideologically distinguish and separate whomever or whatever on one side 
from a different whomever or whatever on the other side.  
Separating Israelis and Palestinians equates to security for Israelis. Ideologically, 
this separation constructs a rhetoric of separation or ―two states for two people‖ discourse 
that seeks to persuade Israeli, Palestinian, and international audiences that Jewish Israelis 
and Palestinian Arabs cannot peacefully cohabitate. An insecure space and people creates 
a trope to justify the creation of a secure space and people. In other words, security 
requires a binary construct. To be separate and secure is not only to be distinct, but also 
to be clean of the symbolic other. As stated previously, Cohen (2006) pointed out that 
Israel leadership solved their ―native problem‖ in the 1948 Arab/Israeli War with the 
removal, expulsion, and cleansing of Arab places west of the Green Line to the 
Mediterranean Sea. This campaign of cleansing Arab people, villages, and towns from 
the new State of Israel, as documented extensively by Pappé (2006), Chomsky and Pappé 
(2015), Darwish (2008), and Kadman (2015), resulted in a clean space for Israelis to 
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colonize, even though small numbers of Palestinians still lived among them. Then Israeli 
leadership recreated the problem of native others when it invaded and captured the West 
Bank from Jordan in the 1967 Arab/Israeli war. Israeli leadership continues to face a 
dilemma regarding the Palestinians from the area acquired after the 1967 war. The 
current solution to Israel‘s native problem is the containment and separation of 
Palestinian Arabs from Israelis, using apparatuses such as the wall.  
Separation is a prerequisite for recognizing and constructing a mythological 
opposite. The binary between us and them defines identity by contrasting that identity 
with the construction of an opposite symbolic other. Without a contrasting opposite 
identity, singular or even collective identity remains nebulous and ambiguous. Identity is 
recognized only when contrasted and compared to a separate other. This binary of us 
requiring them, or you requiring me, proves fundamental to identity construction. 
 In other words, identity construction requires a separate construct by which to 
contrast. Sameness does not aid in identity formation or space distinction, because it 
makes visual markers, ideologies, and mythological symbols invisible. Sameness is only 
recognized when the opposite is introduced and contrasted. Said (1978) argued that the 
West often views native Arabs and Islam as backward, violent, and in need of civility 
(pp. 48–49). This construction further justifies the identity of distant lands and foreign 
peoples as exotic others in desperate need of the civilized West, who should rule these 
less advanced people and, for their benefit, introduce superior Western culture to their 
savage and inferior culture (Said, 1994, p. 9). The construction of the other requires an 
ideological and mythological opposite. These non-Westerners are not the same as 
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Westerners. 
 Said (1994) extensively discussed the construction of non-native others by 
colonial and imperial Western powers including Western Europe and the US. Said (1978) 
said, ―The Arabs and Islam represent viciousness, veniality, degenerate vice, lechery, and 
stupidity in popular and scholarly discourse‖ (p. 26). This construction of Arab Other 
allows, if not requires, their domination by a superior knowledge and culture. The 
privileged role of culture, particularly Western culture, has largely been ignored in 
scholarly discussion of empire and the modern imperial experience, particularly given 
that the global reach of the early 19th- and 20th-century European imperialism ―still casts 
a considerable shadow over our own times‖ (Said, 1978, p. 5). 
The Western construction of Arabs, and the Orient in general, supports an 
ideological formation, framework, and discourse that posit Arabs and Orientals as a 
people who require domination by the West (Said, 1994, p. 9). Civilized peoples and 
nations are civilized only because of their construction of other peoples‘ or nations‘ 
incivility. A construction of civility requires a construction of incivility, its opposite. 
Israel and Western powers alike posit others‘ incivility to determine and define their own 
identity as civil. 
Conflict is no different with respect to mythological, separate, and opposite sides. 
In most cases, one side of the conflict symbolically represents one position, ideologically 
informed, and another side represents an opposing ideological position. The discourse of 
terrorism and the ―war on terror‖ rhetoric neatly fits within this framework. Each side of 
the terrorism discourse/rhetoric opposes the other‘s side. These opposing sides 
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symbolically and collectively represent civilizations that oppose one another, typically on 
ideological grounds. An ideological positioning of Israeli Jewish ethnos and culture as 
hierarchically superior to Palestinian Arab ethos and culture has allowed Israeli 
separation of Palestinian Arabs from Israeli citizens. The Israeli government‘s focus on 
the land, the Zionist agenda for building Eretz Yisrael, and the centrality of the land to 
Israeli identity and ethnos, at the expense of Palestinian natives, suggests that Israeli 
leadership and security personnel have adopted this imperialistic ideology that constructs 
Palestinians Arabs as other in need of a superior Israeli culture. 
 Wodak (2012) offered further insights into how identity construction requires an 
opposite. As Wodak explained, ―Language (and other symbolic systems) is used to 
determine and define similarities and differences; to draw clear boundaries between ‗us‘ 
and ‗others‘ (pp. 216–217). Differences are evaluated and an ―ideological moment‖ is 
often implicitly and sometimes explicitly introduced through categorization (p. 217). The 
contextual nature of language shapes identities, which further shape language use. We 
manifest who we are partly through our language and linguistic behavior. Identities thus 
are contextual, constructed and re-constructed in interactive relationships, and identity 
construction always includes processes of inclusion and exclusion because it defines 
oneself and others. Individual and national identities are also produced, reproduced, and 
manifested symbolically (p. 216). 
The orient/occident binary, an invention of Western scholarship according to Said 
(1978), is an example of Wodak‘s (2012) concept. This identity construction further 
perpetuates Western cultural civilization as superior to the primal and primitive nature of 
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non-Western cultures. A Palestinian other with an identity construction influenced by 
Western imperialism, as discussed by Said, opposes the civilized and peaceful Israeli who 
seeks to live side-by-side with Palestinian Arabs and Israel‘s other Arab neighbors. 
Western imperialism ideologically constructs the uncivilized, exotic, irrational, and 
erratic other who violently and destructively attacks the civilized, Western, rational, 
logical citizenry who, in turn, must defend themselves against this opposite, illogical and 
irrational other. Israelis and Westerners often transform these terrorists attacks into 
symbolic, mythological constructs: an attack on Israel and the West is an attack on Israeli 
and Western values, cultures, and ways of life. Freedom, democracy, human rights, and 
rule of law are under attack, symbolically and mythologically. The terrorist attack is 
transformed into the myth that cultural values and ideologies themselves are under attack. 
 An examination of official documents from Palestinian leadership reveals a 
similar construction of mythological other. The harkat al-muqawamah al-isamiyyah 
(HAMAS) charter specifically labels the State of Israel as colonial occupier, whereas 
HAMAS is ordained by the HAMAS God to eliminate Israel (Harakat al-Muqawama al-
Islamiyyah, 1998). Similar to the Promise Land discourse, Palestinian discourse evident 
in the HAMAS charter evokes a religious rhetoric creating a religious lens through which 
HAMAS views the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The discursive battle between the 
respective religious rhetorics on both sides of the conflict often position the conflict as a 
religious war: Judaism versus Islam, Jews versus Muslims, or Jewish versus Arab 
Palestinian Muslim historical narrative. The rhetorical and discursive positioning of the 
conflict as a religious war further mythologizes the conflict, transforming it into a 
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simplistic, binary battle between good and evil. For the predominantly Christian West 
and the State of Israel, Judaism represents the good and Islam represents the evil. For the 
largely Islamic Middle East and North Africa, the binaries of good and evil are 
reversed—Islam is good, but the State of Israel and the predominantly Christian West are 
evil.  
 
Naming and Ethnic Cleansing 
 
 The naming of the wall as a security or anti-terrorism fence and the naming of the 
land as Eretz Yisrael, by the Israelis are rooted in the mythology of separateness and in 
an imperialistic ideology that has discursively approved an ethnic cleansing and 
expulsion campaign aimed at native Palestinian Arabs by Israeli militia and subsequent 
Israeli leadership. Likewise, the HAMAS document represents a verbal discourse 
supporting an ethnic cleansing of Israel and Israelis from the contested land.  
Pappé (2006) defined ethnic cleansing as ―expulsion by force to homogenize the 
ethnically mixed population of a particular region or territory‖ (p. 2). This definition 
includes the provision that ethnic cleansing also involves the erasure and eradication of a 
region‘s history by any and all means available (p. 2). Those engaged in ethnic cleansing 
then supplement their collective history with the region‘s history, often framing that 
history as unique. The historical supplementation of historic Palestine‘s regional history 
is clearly evident in Jewish Israeli discourse that frames Jewish Israel as having the 
historical connection to the contested land, as ordained by an ancient Israeli God (e.g., the 
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Promise Land rhetoric). Thus ethnic cleansing of Palestinians is rhetorically justified 
because Israeli leadership is simply returning the contested land to its rightful owners, the 
Israelis, by expelling those who do not belong there, the Palestinian Arabs. Benny Morris 
argued that the viability of an Israeli state is contingent upon the ―complete‖ ethnic 
cleansing of Palestinian Arabs. Peace will not occur in Israel until the remaining 
Palestinian Arabs—including West Bankers, Jerusalemites, and Arab Israelis—are 
removed or physically ―transferred‖ (Abu-saad, 2004, p. 294; Chomsky, 2006, pp. 184–
185). 
 HAMAS employs similar colonial rhetoric to justify its violent actions aimed at 
the State of Israel. Religious rhetoric frames historic Palestine as belonging to the Arabs 
alone, and Muslim Arabs also justify the HAMAS rhetoric in particular. HAMAS seeks 
to liberate historic Palestine from its colonial occupiers, the Israelis (HAMAS Charter, 
Part III, Article 11, 2008). In other words, HAMAS seeks to liberate historic Palestine 
and ―cleanse‖ it of Israelis. According to the HAMAS charter, Islam provides the guiding 
principles for ―liberation‖ activities aimed at Israel (HAMAS Charter, Part I, Article 1, 
2008). The violent actions of HAMAS and those of religiously conservative Jews in 
Israel and Israeli security personnel, are rhetorically governed, sanctioned, and approved 
by each group‘s respective God. In this sense, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is indeed a 
religious war being played out in and on a contested place called Eretz Israel by Israelis 
and Filistin by Palestinians. The conflict is further played out in religious discourse on 
both sides. Eretz Yisrael and Filistin have been given by God to two different, opposing 
groups; therefore, to some extent, violent actions aimed at one another are sanctioned and 
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endorsed by both the Israeli God and the HAMAS God. 
 The act of ethnic cleansing is rooted in an understanding of making a thing, place, 
or person clean by removing some other thing, place, or person that is not wanted or that 
proves harmful to the other thing, place, or person that is clean. To ―clean‖ someone or 
something, individuals or institutions must create discursively and rhetorically 
something, someone, or some place that is not clean. Similar to identity construction, 
cleansing requires a mythological and symbolic opposite that is unclean. 
Most scholars, however, fail to use the phrase ―ethnic cleansing‖ in the context of 
Palestinian/Israeli discourse. Morris discussed the ―transfer‖ of Palestinian Arabs from 
the State of Israel and the West Bank to surrounding Arab countries (Chomsky, 2006) 
Even though both Israeli and Palestinian sources implicitly or explicitly refer to the 
concept of ethnically cleansing the land of the other, the power to carry out a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing firmly rests in the hands of the Israelis, whose military and political 
power rivals that of any nation in the Middle East including HAMAS or other Palestinian 
factions.  
Naming the founding of the State of Israel as ethnic cleansing undermines and 
confronts the prevailing Israeli narrative that world Jewry came to historic Palestine to 
―make the dessert bloom‖ and to populate ―a land without people for people without a 
land‖ (Sand, 2009, p. 188). These two Zionist mantras, supported by an imperialistic 
ideology and construction of Palestinian Arab as inferior other, helped fuel the colonial 
expansion on native Palestinian land. Ethnic cleansing in this context is not the mass 
extermination of an ethnic group—in this case, Palestinian Arabs—but a systemic 
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expulsion and pushing out of one ethnic group by another, which is how Pappé (2006) 
defined the concept. The expulsion and pushing out of an ethnic group ―cleans‖ the 
contested land for the other group to colonize. Sand (2009) agreed that European Zionists 
subscribed to an imperialist ideology that believed indigenous Arab Palestinians would 
benefit from the culture and intellect of European Zionists. The injection of Zionist 
―yeast‖ would produce a ―cake‖ to be shared by Palestinian Arabs (p. 7). 
Yiftachel (2010) offers a perspective on Zionism from the lens of geography, by 
pointing out that Zionism represented a different kind of colonialism. The need to provide 
a safe haven for world Jewry after the oppression of Jews worldwide, particularly in 
eastern Europe, provided Zionists with a humanitarian cause. They needed to provide a 
safe haven for world Jewry through the colonization of a ―land without a people,‖ which 
just so happened to be the Jewish Promise Land. The result was a multifaceted and 
complex manifestation of colonialism (p. 75). Settling the land meant first securing the 
land for the establishment and expansion of the Israeli colonial project, and securing it 
from local Palestinian Arabs. Settling, however, was only one of many strategies for the 
colonization of the land. Other strategies included the seeking of new territories for 
settlement expansion and the replacement of local Palestinian Arab cultures and ways-of-
life with European Jewish ways of life. This racialization included transferring 
Palestinians to segregated enclaves and a planning framework for the Judization of Israel 
and the West Bank (Yiftachel, 2009, p. 71, 77).  
In other words, these immigrant Jews seeking to colonize their safe haven and 
Promise Land must also clear and cleanse the land from native Palestinian Arabs. The 
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Israeli colonial project, often entangled with the humanitarian cause of finding a safe 
haven for persecuted Jews, helped discursively hide the impact of Israel‘s colonial project 
on native Palestinian Arabs. Much of the discourse surrounding the founding of the State 
of Israel and its current colonial project fails to use the term ―ethnic cleansing.‖ The 
failure of naming the founding of the State of Israel as ethnic cleansing illustrates the 
power of naming.  
The United States and other Western powers laud the State of Israel for its 
intellectual, technical, cultural, and military prowess in an often hostile and volatile Arab 
and Islamic part of the world. An ideological shift must occur if indeed the founding of 
the State of Israel and current colonial practices in the West Bank are to be named ethnic 
cleansing in both scholarly and U.S. leadership discourse. The concept of ―ethnic 
cleansing of native Arab Palestinians‖ needs to be introduced to current discourse 
surrounding Israel and Palestine, to reflect accurately the methods used to colonize 
historic Palestine and to expel or contain native Palestinian Arabs for the benefit of 
immigrant Jews and the expansion of the State of Israel.  
Palestinian discourse often uses the name Nakba (catastrophe) to refer to the 
founding of the State of Israel. Thus the Palestinian historical narrative, seldom heard in 
the West and Western scholarship, has already acknowledged and named the founding of 
the State of Israel and its current colonial expansion as catastrophic events that have 
resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs from their homes 
to provide a ―safe haven‖ for world Jewry. The ongoing Nakba is the continual expulsion 
of native Arab Palestinians from their homes, using architectural structures such as the 
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wall, checkpoints, and settlements, as well as the ideological construction of Palestinians 
as collective terrorists who are intellectually and culturally inferior to Israelis. Supporting 
and strengthening this Palestinian identity construct is the current ―war on terror‖ 
rhetoric, and the marking of Palestinians as ―Muslims‖ further constructs their identity as 
a dangerous other determined to attack—perhaps destroy—the civilized, rational, and 
culturally superior Christian West, which includes the State of Israel. 
Separation of Israelis from Palestinian Arabs is not new. Smith (1993) discussed 
an ideology and mythology of separation of Palestinians and Israelis during the British 
Mandate period from 1922-1948. The idea of a two-state solution goes back to at least 
that time. The United Nation Partition Plan of 1947 separated the contested land into two 
distinct parts: one part for the Jews and a separate part for the Palestinian Arabs. This 
plan gave the Jewish state approximately 5,500 square miles with a population of 
approximately 538,000 Jews and 387,000 Arabs. The Arab State, by contrast, covered 
approximately 4,500 square miles and a population of approximately 10,000 Jews and 
804,000 Arabs (The Partition Plan, 2017). Separation of people groups also roots heavily 
in a Hebrew Bible understanding of the ancient Israelites, ancestors of modern-day 
Jewish Israelis, as being separate and distinct from their non-Israelite neighbors 
(Zerubavel, 1995). Leviticus 15:21 says, ―‗You must keep the Israelites separate from 
things that make them unclean, so they will not die in their uncleanness for defiling my 
dwelling place, which is among them.‘‖ This text makes a clear connection between 
separateness and cleanliness. 
The wall and its symbolic rhetoric of security are strategies that attempt to hide 
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the Israeli leadership‘s systematic ethnic cleansing of Israeli proper and the West Bank 
from native Palestinians. Pappé‘s (2006) said, ―In Israel since 1948, ethnic cleansing is 
not just a policy—it is a way of life, and its constant practice criminalizes the state, not 
just its policies‖ (p. 31). The rhetoric of security informs and shapes other discourses and 
other discursive symbols such as the ID, Israeli Jewish settlements, East Jerusalem, and 
holy sites located in East Jerusalem. A failure to understand this rhetoric is a failure to 
understand the discursive practices and rhetorical strategies that justify the construction 
of the wall, checkpoints, settlements, and other related symbols that work together to 
communicate a specific mythology about Palestinians and the West Bank. These physical 
constructions symbolize security, while constructing the West Bank and Palestinians as 
unsafe, potential terrorists, or even animals, for which complex security measures are 
needed (Interview Data, 2012). Pappé argued that Israeli security personnel also 
constructed Palestinians as the enemy: 
Anyone who has been in Israel long enough, as I have, knows that the worst 
corruption of young Israelis is the indoctrination they receive that totally 
dehumanizes Palestinians. When an Israeli soldier sees a Palestinian baby, he 
does not see an infant—he sees the enemy. (p. 31) 
Cleansing the West Bank from native Palestinian Arabs has primarily manifested 
in separation and expulsion, which are also acts of cleansing. The cleansing of 
Palestinians from the West Bank manifests in visual, physical, and symbolic structures, 
mainly the wall, checkpoints, IDs, settler-only roads, and Israeli Jewish settlements. 
These visual structures literally separate and visually and ideologically erase Palestinian 
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Arabs and their land claims. Settlements and the wall expel Palestinians because they 
prevent Palestinian expansion and growth into what is arguably Palestinian land east of 
the Green Line. The wall expels Palestinians farmers from their fields, divides Palestinian 
families, and secures Israelis by containing Palestinians to small enclaves surrounded by 
the wall and settlements. Israeli leadership justifies these structures rhetorically as 
security apparatuses and by invoking the Promise Land discourse positing all the 
contested land as belonging to the Israelis and the Israelis alone. Israeli security personnel 
have systemically removed, expelled, and ―cleansed‖ Palestinian Arabs from the vast 
majority of historic Palestine and have contained native Palestinians Arabs to three 
distinct, non-contiguous Bantustans in the West Bank (Interview Data, 2012; Pappé, 
2006; Chomsky, 2006; Chomsky & Pappé, 2015).  
Israeli leadership continues to build settlements in the West Bank, despite 
international agreements including the Oslo Accords, the consistent condemnation of 
these settlements by the United Nations, and the rebuking of Israel‘s settlement polices 
by Israeli allies such as the US. The occupation of the West Bank by Israeli security 
personnel is justified by the all-powerful rhetoric of security and consequential 
construction of a dangerous, inferior, uncivilized, erratic other. 
 Israeli leadership fails to comply with U.N. resolutions, thus demonstrating their 
own power to refute or even ignore those resolutions—and thus, in a sense, ignore the 
international community represented in the United Nations. U.N. Resolution 194 III 
clearly states that Palestinian Arab refugees ―should be permitted‖ to return to their 
homes in historic Palestine lost during the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. 
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The phrase in the U.N. Resolution, ―live at peace with their neighbors,‖ provides Israeli 
leadership with a pretext to refuse to allow Palestinian refugees to return to their historic 
homes in Israel proper, the West Bank, and Gaza. The rhetoric of security informs that 
pretext. As long as Israeli leadership constructs Palestinians as terrorists, symbolized and 
communicated by rhetorical props such as the ID, checkpoints, and wall, then they can 
refuse to comply with the U.N. Resolution 194—because these so-called ―terrorists‖ 
refuse to live at peace with their Israeli neighbors per the requirement of U.N. Resolution 
194.  
 
The Terrified Terrorists: Identity and Perspective 
 
Myths associated with terrorism and a rhetoric of security, as powerful as they can 
be, are a matter of perspective. Israel leadership was quick to name the car ramming of 
Israeli security personnel at Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank as ―terrorism,‖ but they 
continue to strangle the West Bank Palestinian economy and way-of-life with separation 
policies, the wall, checkpoints, and settlements (Lonergan, 2004; Malkawi, 2009). Israeli 
news media named recent knife attacks against Israelis as ―terrorism,‖ while Israeli 
military systematically and extensively destroyed the northern Gaza strip in 2014 using 
the rhetoric of ―security threats from HAMAS-ruled Gaza‖ (Lieber, 2017). Why are some 
acts called terrorism, and other acts explained as defense in the name of security, as the 
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs argues? Was the destruction of the northern Gaza 
strip in 2014 actually terrorism on the part of Israelis? Were the recent knife attacks on 
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Israelis in Jerusalem actually security or defense on the part of Palestinians? Why isn‘t 
the military occupation of the West Bank by Israeli security personnel named terrorism? 
Why wasn‘t the expulsion of native Palestinian Arabs from historic Palestinian named as 
terrorism? Who or what has the power to name such actions? 
Jewish militias committed violent terrorist acts during the British Mandate period. 
Heller (1999) discussed the bombing of the King David Hotel in 1948 by the Jewish 
militia group Irgun, the military wing of Revisionist Zionism. Other Jewish terrorist acts 
ensued, including the bombing of the British embassy in Rome (p. 5). Menachem Begin, 
Israel‘s seventh prime minister was the commander of the Irgun. Begin led the violent 
revolt against the British occupation of historic Palestine, which eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 (Heller, 1999, p. 9). Said (1979) proclaimed, 
―Begin has been known as a terrorist, and has made no effort to hide that fact‖ (p. 44). 
Begin‘s book, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun (1952), describes his terrorists acts aimed at 
women and children. Other leaders of Israel, including Israel‘s first prime minister David 
Ben-Gurion, often lauded by the West and Israel as promoters of democratic, Western-
held values, also engaged in terrorist activities aimed at ―liberation‖ (p. 44). Suarez 
(2017) said that the Zionist narrative does not frame these violent acts as terrorism 
because they were aimed at the ruling British establishment (p. 8). 
In Israeli and Palestinian discourse, naming becomes important for creating 
symbolic meanings and verbal/visual rhetorics. Israelis and Palestinians discursively 
compete to name and subsequently construct mythologies that suit their particular 
agendas relative to land rights, sovereignty, and violent actions. Jerusalem, named 
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―Yerushalem‖ by Israeli Jews, symbolizes and creates a mythological meaning 
transforming the historic city into a myth that communicates Jewish Israeli ethnos and 
historic and theological connections to the contested land in and around the ancient city. 
Likewise, naming Jerusalem ―Al-Quds‖ symbolizes and creates symbolic meaning for 
Arab Palestinians that transforms the city into a myth that communicates Palestinian Arab 
ethnos and historic and theological connections. Naming perpetuates power inequities 
between those who have the right to name and those who do not.  
Naming carries immense power when constructing mythologies. This power 
dictates which discursive practices and related ideologies dominate, and hence codify, 
complex terms such as security, terrorists, and terrorism. The names ―terrorist‖ and 
―terrorism‖ permit Israel to deploy its colonial practices and military occupation of the 
West Bank. Terrorism, after all, has come to unify Western powers and Israel against a 
common other enemy who is vile, dangerous, and represents the antithesis of Western-
held values.  
The symbols and rhetoric of the ―war against terrorism‖ align perfectly with 
Israel‘s symbols and rhetoric of sovereign power. Israeli leadership and security 
personnel name these structures ―security,‖ thus transforming them into a myth that 
transcends the simply meaning of the structure itself. The myths created by these symbols 
are clear: (1) the State of Israel is sovereign; (2) Palestinians in general pose a threat to 
that sovereignty; and (3) the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has no 
end because Palestinians continue to resist the colonization of historic Palestine. Israeli 
leadership and news media name Palestinian resistance actions as terrorism, and this so-
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called terrorism justifies and authorizes Israeli colonial practices aimed at West Bank 
Palestinians and the continual occupation of the West Bank by Israeli security personnel. 
As Chomsky (2006) pointed out, the West, including Israel, often failed to adapt 
universality when labeling one act as terrorism and another as defense (p. 36). From the 
perspective of many West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Arabs, Israeli leadership and 
security personnel are the terrorists. Morris (2004), Pappé (2006), Chomsky and Pappé 
(2015), Darwish (2008), and Kadman (2015) extensively documented the systematic 
ethnic cleansing of Palestinian villages during the founding of the State of Israel. 
Chomsky and Pappé (2015) reinforced this point and reminded readers, ―The Nakba took 
place where Israel is today, not the West Bank or the Gaza Strip‖ (p. 44). That is, the 
current boundaries of the State of Israel are a result of the ethnic cleansing and expulsion 
of native Palestinian Arabs. I argue that ethnic cleansing as defined by Pappé is indeed 
terrorism, and that naming the current Israeli separation and security policies aimed at the 
erasure of Arab Palestinian culture and way of life as ethnic cleansing is a first step 
toward naming and defining the State of Israel accurately, and even perhaps reaching 
peace agreements that acknowledge the rights of both Palestinian Arabs and Israelis.  
 
The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict: Lessons Learned 
 
The violent and destructive attacks of September 11, 2001, on U.S. civilian targets 
have taken on mythological status for many residents of the US. The rhetorical meaning 
system now in place gives the name and identity of ―terrorism‖ and ―terrorist‖ a new 
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identity and context. The ―war on terror‖ discourse surrounding the September 11 attacks 
and its frequent and consistent use in multiple contexts discursively authorized, if not 
required, the U.S. military, the good guys in this war, to embark on a global crusade to 
fight an evil terrorist other residing in a distant exotic land. The identity of this dangerous 
other was constructed using simplistic binary rhetoric that positioned the dangerous other 
as opposite to U.S. culture and civilization. The United States was good, and the terrorists 
were evil. The United States was a Christian nation fighting an evil, dangerous, Muslim 
other enemy. The United States was an innocent victim of vile terrorist acts.  
In a joint session of Congress in September 2011, U.S. President George W. Bush 
constructed the September 11 tragedies using simplistic binary terms that evoked separate 
and opposite identity constructs, and that also alluded to the cleansing of the entire world 
of the unclean, terrorists. His congressional audience and world viewers saw the 9/11 
tragedy unfold live on television. In President Bush‘s words, ―Either you‘re with us or 
you‘re with the terrorists‖ (Bush, 2001). The context of this speech provided President 
Bush with a meaning system that enabled him to make this clear binary distinction of 
identity between us and terrorist. These binary identity markers allowed the U.S. to 
separate us from them discursively, rhetorically, ideologically, and symbolically. 
September 11 became a mythological symbol for the US‘s war on these dangerous, exotic 
others who were inferior to U.S. citizens and civilization. 
The symbolic meaning of 9/11 further acknowledged Israel‘s role in this global 
war on terror. Israel‘s identity, as constructed by U.S. leadership, is that of a democratic 
and free country whose culturally held values and ideologies mirror those of the US. 
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Israel, too, found itself in a war against (Palestinian) terror. Like the US, Israel opposed 
terrorism and represented the opposite of terrorism. This event also brought the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy discourse, because 
terrorism, often relegated to distant lands in the Middle East, now impacted the U.S. 
homeland. The events on 9/11 solidified the ideology of a terrorist—an exotic, irrational, 
dangerous other ―out there‖ whose intent was to attack the US, a mythological symbol of 
world power, capitalism, freedom, and democracy. 
Constructing a separate, dangerous, binary opposite is not a new phenomenon. 
Empires have long used an ideological construction of binary opposites and separateness 
to construct both their own identity and the identity of an opposite other. In other words, 
empires have required their respective binaries to construct identity. In antiquity, the 
Greeks required the barbarians, and the Europeans required the Africans (Said, 1994, p. 
10). The United States required the USSR during the Cold War, the Israelis require the 
Palestinians, and now the US, Israel, and Western countries all require terrorists. An 
empire‘s respective binary opposite proves essential to constructing the empire‘s identity, 
and thus justifying colonial and imperialistic practices often aimed at preventing 
―terrorism.‖ For the West, the constructed enemy is Islam (Lean and Esposito, 2012). 
 The ideological support of empire largely remains unquestioned and unexamined, 
resulting in little domestic resistance (Said, 1994, p. 11). In other words, citizens of an 
imperial regime are seldom aware of that empire‘s imperial practices and how those 
practices impact citizenship within that empire. Citizens, regardless of their lack of 
awareness, often unconsciously subscribe to a set of beliefs and experiences that support 
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the idea of empire (Said, 1994, p. 11). Embedded ideological beliefs that certain peoples 
beseech domination by a superior culture supports this ideological construct (Said, 1994, 
p. 9, 11). Citizens of the empire unconsciously subscribe to this ideology of superior 
culture and benefit from it. An empire‘s focus on land and profit benefits its citizens 
economically and militarily, as ordinary citizens, often unknowingly, reap the rewards of 
imperialism and colonial expansion. Said (1994) stated, ―We (the West) belong to the 
superior race and civilization‖ (p. 17). The resulting racialization inevitably leads to a 
separation of people based on race and other cultural criteria. The West, then, positions 
itself above other subject races, resulting in identity construction of other races as in need 
of Western culture and civilization. Thus, the empire justifies its colonial and imperial 
practices because others need Western culture and civilization. 
 Zionists point to this identity construction, and the United States frequently 
engages in evangelization of distant lands by seeking to spread the U.S. values of 
democracy, capitalism, and freedom. U.S. citizens often discursively justify this 
hierarchy and racialization by offering our ―help‖ to these uncivilized others. The 
language found in a ―global spread of democracy‖ rhetoric further illustrates a hidden, 
unexamined, imperialistic ideology evident in the Western discourse about non-
Westerners. Adas (1998) makes an interesting point about the degree to which colonizing 
nations discriminate against subject peoples. The Qing Empire demarcated subject people 
based on their assimilation into Chinese cultural criteria, especially language and dress. 
European empires, however, demarcated based on race (pp. 386–387). As Adas 
explained, ―In all of the European empires, race came to supplant culture as the dominant 
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marker of difference, of superiority and inferiority, and, by the late ninetieth century, as 
an intrinsic impediment to full assimilation into Western civilization‖ (p. 387). 
 The ideological positioning of Israeli Jewish ethnos and culture as hierarchically 
superior to Palestinian Arab ethos and culture allows, if not warrants, Israeli leadership 
and security personnel‘s construction of the dangerous, Palestinian Arab other. Symbols 
such as the ID, Bethlehem Checkpoint 300, and the wall illustrate Israel‘s imperialistic 
attitude toward Palestinian Arabs. Colonizers looked upon the Palestinian Arab natives 
and constructed their identity as an inferior other. Entangled with this identity 
construction are Israel‘s God-ordained claims on the land and Israeli nationhood 
ambitions, in a land populated by millions of Palestinian Arabs with millions more living 
in diaspora outside historic Palestine. Palestinian nationhood ambitions, rooted in a 
similar construction of the Israeli other, are foiled because of Israel‘s discursive, 
rhetorical, and military power. This power, coupled with unwavering rhetorical, political, 
and military support from an imperial, global superpower, the US, allows the Israeli 
narratives of Promise Land and security from terrorists to dominate Palestinian/Israeli 
discourse, particularly in the United States and Europe. 
  From my perspective, citizens of Western empires such as the United States must 
engage in discursive resistance to sustaining and maintaining an empire. Naming the 
United States as an ―empire‖ is the first step. Naming the colonization of historic 
Palestine as ethnic cleansing rooted in imperialism is another step. Peace and conflict are 
manifestations of the ideological workings of language. Confronting the language that 
shapes an imperialistic ideology becomes a necessity for changing the current imperial 
171 
 
 
 
discourse and imperial policies that will follow. Confronting the ideology of empire 
through discourse further requires awareness that as citizens of that empire, we benefit 
immensely from that empire. Understanding that we benefit and how we benefit may 
shift ideologies to that of how, as an empire, we can engage the others in a constructive 
and mutually beneficial way that acknowledges them not as others, but as equally 
valuable citizens with equally valuable cultures, languages, viewpoints, and ways of life. 
 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
 I conclude, from everything examined in this research study, that separation, 
security, cleansing, and associated mythologies will not resolve the conflict between the 
Israelis and Palestinians. The two-state solution discourse, common among Israeli, 
Palestinian, and U.S. leadership, further supports a separation between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Each state is to be cleansed of the other people group. ―Two states for two 
people‖ is how the saying goes. The Israelis and Palestinians both want the same thing: 
sovereignty, self-determination, and nationhood. These wants have manifested in a 
separation discourse and visual manifestations such as the wall, Bethlehem Checkpoint 
300, settlements, and the ID. Separation and cleansing are requirements for sovereignty 
and self-determination for both Israelis and Palestinians. 
The challenge with separation discourse and its relationship to sovereignty and 
self-determination is current Israeli policy aimed at the West Bank and areas east of the 
Green Line. Israeli Jewish settlements built in the West Bank and East Jerusalem adjacent 
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to Palestinian villages call into question the validity of a ―two states for two people‖ 
discourse. Rhetorically, Israeli leadership navigates this apparent contradiction of 
building settlements among Palestinian villages and towns by constructing the 
settlements as ―security apparatuses.‖ Settlements are often located on mountaintops, thus 
maintaining a visual presence that further evokes the mythology of security for Israelis 
and a mythology of stark, Western-influenced colonialism for Palestinians (Yiftachel, 
2009, p. 34). 
 The status quo and current ―two-state solution discourse‖ favors the powerful 
Israelis. The backing of the United States as an imperial superpower, the construction of a 
dangerous Palestinian other, the current ―war on terror‖ discourse, Jewish ethnos and 
culture positioned as superior to Palestinian Arab ethnos and culture, and Israel‘s God-
given right to the contested land—these all converge to make a two-state solution, an 
Israeli State and a neighboring Palestinian State, impossible. The ―two states for two 
people‖ discourse further perpetuates the status quo and makes a two-state solution 
impossible. This discourse hides Israeli colonial practices by constructing Israel as a 
seeker of peace, while depicting Palestinians and Palestinian leadership as seeking the 
destruction of the State of Israel.  
Palestinian resistance to the Israeli colonial project, often named ―terrorism‖ by 
Israeli news media, helps the Israel colonial project by ―proving‖ that Israelis want peace 
and two states, while Palestinians want conflict. Israeli leadership employs this discourse 
while simultaneously constructing settlements in the West Bank east of the Green Line, 
in an area that would otherwise likely eventually become an autonomous Palestinian 
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state. The security rhetoric and Promise Land discourse authorizes settlement 
development, often deep inside the West Bank, thus eliminating any hopes of a 
Palestinian State because the settlements literally chop up the West Bank. The 
settlements, along with the wall that often encircles the settlement, and settler-only roads 
in the West Bank eliminate any hope of a contiguous, self-determining, and autonomous 
Palestinian state. 
 The idea of separation is embedded in imperialistic ideology, and Israelis will 
continue to view themselves as separate and distinct from their Palestinian counterparts. 
My conclusion is that Palestinian resistance to Israeli separation and ―security‖ policies 
will continue. This Palestinian resistance will favor the status quo because the 
construction of this resistance as ―terrorism‖ supports and warrants the current rhetoric of 
security, leading to more settlement development and more Israeli colonial activities 
named ―security.‖ The status quo will continue indefinitely, which is the opposite of 
peace. 
 
What Can We Learn? 
 
 Separation and security, as evident in the Palestinian/Israeli discourse relative to 
resolving the conflict, remind us of the power of rhetorical binaries. Separation requires a 
binary—it requires some other person, place, or thing from which to be separate. The 
concept of security implies that some people, places, or things need securing from some 
other people, places, or things. Theses concepts, simply put, construct a binary us versus 
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them, or here versus there. 
The idea of separation has manifested in current political discourse outside of 
Israel and the West Bank. This dissertation argues that separation and security are 
typically synonymous. Great Britain recently separated itself from the European Union 
(EU), and U.S. leadership has extensively discussed the need for a border wall that will 
separate the United States from Mexico. In both of these cases, separation is indeed 
synonymous with security. A rhetoric of immigration from those outside of Great Britain 
fueled the rhetoric of Great Britain‘s exit (Brexit) from the European Union. In other 
words, Great Britain‘s separation from the EU leads to security for Great Britain. 
 Indubitably or undoubtedly, like the West Bank wall, the US/Mexico wall‘s 
―securing‖ of the southern border with Mexico will become a symbol for U.S. 
leadership‘s policy toward immigration from Mexico. The symbolic meaning of wall 
along the Mexican border will symbolize how U.S. leadership views non-US citizens. 
The mythological meaning is clear: non-US citizen others who potentially threaten U.S. 
collective identity and U.S. interests are not welcome in the US. Mexico itself will also 
take on binary meaning materialized in the wall, primarily that Mexico and people 
beyond the Mexican border are separate and distinct from the United States and U.S. 
citizens, and Mexico is a dangerous place where dangerous others reside. The wall will 
attempt to cleanse the United States from further infiltration by the unclean, dangerous, 
Mexican other. Likewise, Brexit will rhetorically construct Great Britain‘s non-British 
other, who, like the Palestinian other or the Mexican other, poses a threat to British 
security and ways of life. 
175 
 
 
 
 The rhetoric of ―America First‖ evident in current U.S. political discourse posits 
the United States and the interest of citizens of the United States as ―first‖ and all other‘s 
interests as second, if not merely inconsequential. This binary clearly reveals an ideology 
that will further separate and isolate the United States with regard to its regional and 
international neighbors, similar to the mythological meaning of Brexit. This rhetoric 
perpetuates tribalism in which the US—the us—and even Great Britain, looks inward for 
protection and security of their own respective interests from threats from them, the US‘s 
binary opposite construct. The mythological meaning is clear—others pose a threat. 
Ironically, separating and securing will result in isolation and tribalism, which eventually 
will threaten the interests of those who seek to literally circle the wagons and protect 
those of us within that circle from them, the others on the outside. 
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APPENDIX A: UMCIRB APPROVAL LETTER 
 
 
 
  
 
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What category do you represent? 
a. Israeli 
i. Where do you live? 
ii. How long have you lived in Israel? 
b. Palestinian 
i. Do you have a Jerusalem ID? 
ii. Do/have you received permission or permit to pass through the 
gate 300?  
1. How often? 
2. For what reason? 
3. How do you feel about the permit process? 
c. Tourist 
i. What city and country do you live? 
ii. How many times have you visited Jerusalem/Israel? 
iii. How many times have you visited the West Bank? 
iv. What/whom do you visit when in the West Bank? 
 
2. What is your religious. affiliation? 
a. Christian 
b. Jew 
c. Muslim 
 
3. Gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
4. Where do you live? 
 
5. Do you use Gate 300? How often do you/have you pass/passed/use/used Gate 
300? 
 
6. How would you describe Gate 300? How would you describe your experiences 
with Gate 300? 
 
7. How/what do you feel when you pass through Gate 300? Can you pass through 
Gate 300? 
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8. What advantages/challenges does Gate 300 represent to you? 
 
9. How does/has Gate 300 impact/impacted your day-to-day activities? 
 
